

**TRANSLATIONS
OF
CHRISTIAN LITERATURE**


**THE TREATISE OF St. BERNARD
CONCERNING GRACE
AND FREE WILL**

WATKIN W. WILLIAMS, M.A.,

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TRANSLATIONS OF CHRISTIAN LITERATURE

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SERIES II
LATIN TEXTS

THE TREATISE OF ST. BERNARD
ABBAT OF CLAIRVAUX
CONCERNING GRACE AND
FREE WILL



THE TREATISE OF ST. BERNARD
ABBAT OF CLAIRVAUX
CONCERNING GRACE
AND FREE WILL

ADDRESSED TO
WILLIAM, ABBAT OF ST. THIERRY

TRANSLATED, WITH AN INTRODUCTION
SYNOPSIS AND NOTES BY
WATKIN W. WILLIAMS, M.A.

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AUTHOR OF "THE MORAL THEOLOGY OF
THE SACRAMENT OF Penance"

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RS

INTRODUCTION

THE treatise of St. Bernard *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* was written at some time shortly previous to the year 1128, and therefore before the author had attained his thirty-eighth year. St. Bernard, in a letter addressed to Hincmar, Chancellor of the Holy See, which the Benedictine editor dates as *circ. an. mcxxviii*, refers to the fact that Geoffrey, Bishop of Chartres, had asked him to send Hincmar some of his "opuscula"; he had at the time, so he thought, nothing at hand worthy of Hincmar's attention, but he adds: "Libellum tamen *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* nuper edidi; illum uobis libenter mittam, cum uos uelle cognouero" (St. Bern. *Epist.* LII).

That portion of the *Vita Prima* of St. Bernard (Books III, IV, and V) which was the work of Geoffrey of Auxerre, St. Bernard's *notarius* at Clairvaux and afterwards himself abbat there, contains, in Book III, chap. viii. 29, which makes mention of a certain number of St. Bernard's works and notices the extent to which they reveal his spirit, an interesting reference to the *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*: "Quam non ingratus gratiae Dei, ex his liquet quae de gratia et libero arbitrio quam fideliter, tam subtiliter disputauit."

The subject of the treatise was suggested, as is plain from the text itself, as the result of a public, or at any rate semi-public, discussion with some person unknown, in which St. Bernard, in strongly commending the work of grace, had seemed to lay himself open to the charge of unduly

minimizing the function of free will. "Loquente me coram aliquando, et Dei in me gratiam commendante, quod scilicet ab ipsa me in bono et praeuentum agnoscerem, et prouehi sentirem, et sperarem perficiendum : Quid tu ergo, ait unus ex circumstantibus, operaris, aut quid mercedis speras uel praemii, si totum facit Deus?" (I, *ad init.*).

The *Praefatio* of the treatise indicates that it was formally addressed to William, Abbat of St. Thierry, near Reims, the same person to whom St. Bernard addressed the *Apologia*, his memorable indictment alike of the spiritual pride of his own, and of the luxury of the Cluniac Order, and who was afterwards responsible for the first book of the *Vita Prima*. William had entered the Abbey of St. Thierry in about the year 1120, being translated thither from that of *St. Nicolas in Saltu* (St. Nicolas-aux-Bois), in the diocese of Laon, both of these houses of the Cistercian Order. He tells (*Vita Prima St. Bern.*, I, vii. 33) the story of his visits to St. Bernard, and of the spell cast over him by the intense spirituality of the abbat. These visits appear to have begun about the time of St. Bernard's recovery from the serious illness brought on by the severe austerities which he practised during the first few years after he was ordained Abbat of Clairvaux; a recovery due, in the main, to the obedience with which he carried out the injunctions of William of Champeaux, Bishop of Châlons, given under the authority of the Chapter of the Cistercian Order. Very frail, very tender, very beautiful must the saint have appeared, in the days of his convalescence, to William of St. Thierry; beautiful with the rare beauty of contented self-submission; tender with the tenderness of self-oblivion; frail with the frailty of self-neglect. "Eodem tempore," he writes, "et ego Claram-uallam, ipsumque frequentare coepi; quem cum ibi cum quodam abbate altero uisitare, inueni eum in suo illo tugario, quale leprosis in compitis publicis fieri solet. Inueni autem ex praecepto, ut dictum

est, episcopi et abbatum seriatim ab omni sollicitudine domus, tam interiori, quam exteriori, uacantem Deo et sibi, et quasi in deliciis paradisi exultantem. Ingressusque regium illud cubiculum, cum considerarem habitationem, et habitatorem, tantam mihi, Deum testor, domus ipsa incutiebat reuerentiam sui, ac si ingrederer ad altare Dei. Tantaque affectus suauitate circa hominem illum, tantoque desiderio in paupertate illa et simplicitate cohabitandi ei, ut si optio illa die mihi data fuisset, nil tam optassem quam ibi cum eo semper manere ad seruiendum ei." Such was his first impression of St. Bernard. The physician to whose care St. Bernard had been entrusted was, it seems, an incompetent person at the very least; and it is interesting to note, as his reply to William's enquiry as to his health suggests, that the patient had not failed to take his measure. "Optime, inquit. Ego, cui hactenus homines rationabiles obediebant, iusto Dei iudicio, irrationali cuidam bestiae datus sum ad obediendum." There was no bitterness in the words; he spoke them, writes William, "modo illo suo generoso arridens nobis"; it was just that saving sense of humour which is ever characteristic of a saint.

How natural that William of St. Thierry should have been more jealous for the honour of St. Bernard than was the Abbat of Clairvaux himself! And when, on the question of free will, and again in the matter of the Cluniac controversy, reflections seemed possible, detrimental to the reputation of St. Bernard, it was William who urged him to state his case, and to whom he addressed the two masterly treatises, with one of which we are concerned. Indeed it is plain, as the Abbé Vacandard points out in a letter to the writer, that "leur amitié était si grande, et Bernard professait pour Guillaume une telle estime qu'on s'explique qu'il lui ait dédié son ouvrage." Further information concerning the circumstances of St. Bernard's relation to William of St. Thierry will be found in the *Histoire Littéraire de La*

pre-eminently in the Gospels, the Pauline Epistles and the Sapiential Books, cannot fail to strike the reader. An attempt has been made to indicate every reminiscence that occurs; some, no doubt, will have escaped notice. It is interesting to discover that where his quotation, if it be so much as quotation, or his reminiscence, varies from the text of the Vulgate, it is frequently the case that the same variant is found when the same quotation or reminiscence occurs elsewhere in his writings. Occasionally, as might be expected, passages are made use of in a manner which the original does not support, a blemish, of course, for which, not St. Bernard, but the Latin Version is responsible.

Researches made by my friend, the Rev. Barton Mills, have led to the conclusion that Mabillon's text of St. Bernard's writings, as presented in the Benedictine folio edition and in Migne's *Patrologia Latina*, is far from trustworthy. It is not, perhaps, generally known that, when the Abbey of Clairvaux was sacked at the period of the French Revolution, a certain number of its literary treasures were rescued, and ultimately found an asylum in the *Bibliothèque de la Ville* at Troyes, where they still remain under the guardianship of the learned and courteous librarian, Mons. Morel-Payen.

Amongst these treasures are two important MSS. of St. Bernard, numbered 426 and 799, which, in the opinion of experts, represent the *textus receptus* of St. Bernard's works accredited at Clairvaux in the third quarter of the twelfth century. The primary concern of this edition of the *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* is, however, not textual criticism. The capitulation of Mabillon, with its summaries—there is no capitulation in the two MSS.—has been followed, but the paragraphing of the MSS. has always been indicated in the Notes; and certain illustrative variants have been recorded. The MSS. referred to in the Notes are, then, these two. Considerable portions of both of them have been carefully collated by Mr. Barton

Mills, and I am deeply indebted to him in this, as in other matters connected with the work in hand. I have also to thank Mons. Vacandard, the distinguished author of the *Vie de Saint Bernard*, for several valuable suggestions. As regards the title of the treatise it will, doubtless, be observed that the words "liberum arbitrium" are in it translated "free will," whereas in the text they are usually rendered "free choice." The reason for this will become apparent to the reader as the argument proceeds. In St. Bernard's view *liberum arbitrium*, *liberum consilium* and *liberum complacitum*, are all three co-ordinated states, either actual or possible, of the one *uoluntas*, and their mutual relation is better expressed if "free choice," rather than "free will," be used for the first. A certain pedantic flavour, however, suggested, at so early a stage, by the terms "free choice," explains the preference of "free will" for the title. In conclusion I would say that, if anything has been written which either misrepresents the mind of St. Bernard, or is contrary to the teaching of Holy Church, I unhesitatingly withdraw it.

WATKIN WILLIAMS.

*Drayton St. Leonard,
Easter, 1920.*

SYNOPSIS

PAGE

CHAPTER I 3

1. There are two factors in the work of salvation—
 - (a) The one *a quo fit*, i.e. *gratia*;
 - (b) The other *cui, uel in quo fit*, i.e. *liberum arbitrium*.
2. Thus—
 - (a) God is the author of salvation;
 - (b) *Liberum arbitrium tantum capax salutis*; and both these statements are exclusive; it is God alone Who can *grant* it, and *liberum arbitrium* alone which can *receive* it.
3. In the work of salvation—
 - (a) *Grace operat*;
 - (b) Free choice *cooperat, dum consentit*; and—
consentire saluari est.

CHAPTER II 7

1. Distinguishing *uita, sensus* and *appetitus*, which man possesses in common with the brutes, from—
 - (a) *Consensus*, which is—
 - (i) *Nutus uoluntatis spontaneus*;
 - (ii) *Habitus animi liber sui*;
 - (b) *Voluntas*, which is—
 - (i) *Motus rationalis*;
 - (ii) Ruling sense and appetite;
 - (c) *Ratio*, the *pedissequa* of *uoluntas*; for *uoluntas*—
 - (i) Is never moved *absque ratione*; and yet
 - (ii) *Multa faciat per ipsam contra ipsam*.
2. *Liberum arbitrium* is so called because in *consensus* man is—
 - (a) *Liber sui propter uoluntatem*;
 - (b) *Iudex sui propter rationem*.
3. *Libertas arbitrii* is the ground of—
 - (a) Merit (*ubi libertas non est, nec meritum*);
 - (b) Judgement (*ac per hoc nec iudicium*).
4. *Libertas arbitrii* is inalienable; for—
 - (a) The will cannot be deprived of its freedom any more than of itself;
 - (b) A man can never either will nothing at all, or will anything definite, *et non uoluntate*.

5. *Libertas arbitrii ex se* renders the *uoluntas* liable to judgement; for—
 (a) *Voluntas nil liberum habet nisi se* ;
 (b) Neither *tardum ingenium* nor *labilis memoria* constitute a man *reus*, nor do the contrary constitute him *innocens*.

CHAPTER III 14

- There is a threefold *libertas*.
 1. *Libertas Gratiæ* ; a *peccato* ; into this *restauramur a gratia*, *reformamur in innocentiam*, *noua in Christo creatura* ; this *libertas* has [compared with (3)] *plurimum uirtutis*.
 2. *Libertas Gloriæ* ; a *miseria* ; this *nobis reseruatur in patria*, and by this *sublimamur in gloriam*, *perfecta in Spiritu creatura* ; this *libertas* has [compared with (1) and (3)] *cumulus iucunditatis*.
 3. *Libertas Naturæ* ; a *necessitate* ; by this in *liberam uoluntatem ac uoluntariam libertatem conditi sumus*, *nobilis Deo creatura* ; this *libertas* has *multum honoris*.

Christ alone possessed, in His days of flesh, all three *libertates* (the second *potentia*, though not wholly *actu*) ; thus He alone is able to bestow upon man the first and the second, of which he had been deprived by sin.

CHAPTER IV 18

1. The saints made perfect in Paradise, while,
 (a) Being disembodied, they so far lack glory, yet
 (b) Possess *libertas a peccato* and *libertas a miseria*.
 2. All rational creatures alike possess *libertas a necessitate*, which—
 (a) *Nec peccato, nec miseria, amittitur uel minuitur* ;
 (b) *Nec maior in iusto est, quam in peccatore* ;
 (c) *Nec plenior in angelo, quam in homine*.
 3. The consent of the human will, whether *conuersus in bonum*, or *deuolutus in malum*, *non inuitus pertrahitur*.
 4. The objection may be raised : I wish to possess a good will, and I cannot do so.

The answer is—

- (a) The *libertas* said to be lacking is really *libertas a peccato*, not *libertas a necessitate* ; for
 (b) The very objection raised proves *libertas a necessitate* ; and further,
 (c) What is willed is good, and, *cum bonum uolumus, bona est uoluntas*.

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 (b) The very objection raised proves *libertas a necessitate*; and further,
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5. These three *libertates* are distinguished—
- (a) *Libertas a necessitate*, which constitutes *liberum arbitrium uel iudicium*, as freedom *discernere quid liceat, uel quid non liceat* ;
 - (b) *Libertas a peccato*, which constitutes *liberum consilium*, as freedom *probare quid expediat, uel non expediat, i. e. to choose pro iudicii rectitudine* ;
 - (c) *Libertas a miseria*, which constitutes *liberum complacitum*, as freedom *experiri quid libeat, uel non libeat, i. e. to embrace what is chosen pro iudicii rectitudine*, not as *durum* or *molestum*, but as *bene placitum*.

CHAPTER V 24

1. Can *liberum complacitum* be enjoyed in this world ?
Generally, no ; for consider—
 - (a) The existence of *peccatum* and *miseria* ;
 - (b) That ordinary pleasures of sense presuppose the absence of satiety ;
 - (c) That all alleviation presupposes suffering.
Yet *contemplatiui*, rarely and in some small degree, enjoy it, when in a state of rapture ; for *experiuntur quod futurum est. Sed quod futurum est felicitas est, and felicitas excludes miseria.*
2. Can *liberum consilium* be enjoyed in this world ?
Yes, in a considerable measure ; it is enjoyed by *quilibet iusti, ex parte quidem, sed non modica.*

CHAPTER VI 28

1. Distinguish *tantum uelle, uelle bonum* and *uelle malum*. With regard to *uelle*—
 - (a) *Ipsium ut esset, creans gratia fecit* ;
 - (b) *Ut proficiat, saluans gratia facit* ;
 - (c) *Ut deficiat, ipsum se deiecit.*
2. Thus—
 - (a) Free choice *nos facit uolentes* ; it is of it that we will ;
 - (b) Grace *nos facit beneuolos* ; it is of it that we will what is good.
3. Further—
 - (a) *Simples affectiones* belong to us *naturaliter* ; they are *ex nobis* ; *donauit creatio* ;
 - (b) The *additamenta* are of grace ; *gratia ordinat quod donauit creatio.*

The virtues, therefore, are no other than *ordinatæ affectiones*.

4. We were created *quodam modo nostri in liberam uoluntatem*; but—

(a) *Diabolo nos mancipat uoluntas, non ipsius potestas*; whereas—

(b) *Deo subiicit eius gratia, non nostra uoluntas*, yet, in such a way that it is *per bonam uoluntatem* that we become, as it were, God's possession.

Thus *libertas arbitrii* remains in either case intact *quatenus merito uel puniamur mali uel glorificemur boni*, grace being, in the latter case, described as the sole agent, because of the impropriety of attributing to God *quod minus, i. e.* the creation of the will, and to man *quod excellentius, i. e.* the perfection of the will.

5. To such perfection there needs a twofold gift of grace, viz.—

(a) *Verum sapere*, which consists in *uoluntatis ad bonum conuersio, ut nil libeat, nisi quod deceat uel liceat*;

(b) *Plenum posse*, which consists in *uoluntatis in bono confirmatio, ut nil desit iam quod debeat*.

[It should be noticed, parenthetically, that there is a threefold goodness of will—

(a) The will is *bona in universitate*, as part of the universe which God made, and which He saw to be *ualde bona*;

(b) The will is *melior in suo genere*, in virtue of the *libertas arbitrii, in qua ad imaginem utique ipsius qui creauit condita est*;

(c) The will is *optima in sui ordinatione*, in that its true end is *omnimoda conuersio ad Deum et ex tota se uoluntaria deuotaque subiectio*. From this last glory is inseparable, for *nec iustitiæ possit haberi perfectio, nisi in plena gloria*; *nec gloriæ plenitudo, absque perfecta iustitia*.]

6. (a) *Verum sapere* presupposes *liberum consilium*, for in such a state alone *nec uelle ualeat quod malum sit*;

(b) *Plenum posse* presupposes *liberum complacitum*, for in such a state alone *nec carere ualeat quod uelit*.

CHAPTER VII

Had man in Paradise *liberum consilium* and *liberum complacitum*? Not in the highest degrees; otherwise he could not have fallen, for his

sin implied that he could both will what he ought not and receive what he would not.

1. There are, indeed, in *liberum consilium* and in *liberum complacitum* two degrees, viz.—

- | | | |
|--------------------------------|---|--|
| (a) <i>Liberum consilium</i> | { | (i) <i>Superior, non posse peccare;</i> |
| | | (ii) <i>Inferior, posse non peccare;</i> |
| (b) <i>Liberum complacitum</i> | { | (i) <i>Superior, non posse turbari;</i> |
| | | (ii) <i>Inferior, posse non turbari.</i> |

It was the two inferior degrees that man possessed in Paradise, and lost by sin.

2. Man lost them by the abuse of *liberum arbitrium*; not *culpa adantis*, but *culpa abutentis, qui ipsam facultatem conuertit ad usum peccandi, quam acceperat ad gloriam non peccandi*. And further—
3. Although it was granted to the will *posse stare ne caderet, non tamen resurgere si caderet*.

CHAPTER VIII. 41

1. Are we therefore to conclude that *liberum arbitrium* has perished because *non potest non peccare*? No; for—

- (a) This inability of *liberum arbitrium*, which extends to *miseria* as well as to *peccatum*, signifies, not the destruction of *liberum arbitrium*, but *duarum reliquarum libertatum priuationem*; the fact being that—
- (b) It does not, nor did it ever, belong properly to *liberum arbitrium, quantum in se est, posse, uel sapere, sed tantum uelle*; and therefore—
- (c) Man is not to be held to have lost *liberum arbitrium* if he ceases to be *potens*, or *sapiens*, but only if he ceases to be *uolens*.
- (d) Thus the *uoluntas posita in miseria* is a *uoluntas misera*, even as there is also a *beata uoluntas*; and we may conclude that *liberum arbitrium (quantum in se est)* can suffer neither destruction nor diminution from *aduersitas* or *necessitas*.

2. How are we to explain the fact that, while *liberum arbitrium* was able *per se in malum corruere*, it is unable *per se de malo in bonum respirare*? By an *a fortiori* argument, viz.: *slans in aliquod melius nullo suo conatu ualebat proicere; iacens non ualet per se resurgere*.

3. Therefore man needs—

Dei uirtutem, et Dei sapientiam, Christum. Who—

- (a) As wisdom, *uerum ei sapere reinfundat, in restaurationem liberi consilii*; and—
- (b) As power, *plenum posse restituat, in reparationem liberi complaciti.*

CHAPTER IX 46

Man has been made in the *imago* and in the *similitudo* of the Creator.

1. The *imago* is *liberum arbitrium*; for—

- (a) *Liberum arbitrium* alone *sui omnino defectum seu diminutionem non patitur*; and—
- (b) On it pre-eminently may be seen impressed *æternæ et incommutabilis diuinitatis substantiæ quædam imago.*

2. The *similitudo* is *liberum consilium* and *liberum complacitum*; for, in them,

- (a) As being capable, not merely of being diminished, but of being wholly lost,
- (b) Is to be recognized *accidentalis quædam magis similitudo* of the divine wisdom and power *imagini superducta.*

3. There are, in the *similitudo*, three grades—

- (a) *Summum gradum summi angeli tenent*;
- (b) *Adam tenuit medium*;
- (c) *Nos infimum*; for—

To the angels was granted *sine peccato et miseria perdurare*; to Adam, *absque his quidem esse, sed non permanere*; to us, *ne esse quidem absque his, sed ipsis tantum non cedere.*

4. How are we to explain the fact that *liberum consilium* is not possessed by the wicked in Hell? Surely the *mala* which they suffer move them to repentance!

- (a) The *mala uoluntas* is not changed for the better in Hell; there is simply an *abnegatio operis*; nay, rather,
- (b) The *mala uoluntas* is obdurate; for certainly it is altogether unwilling to be punished. But it is just that they who have done *punienda* should be punished. *Nolunt igitur quod iustum est.*

CHAPTER X 52

1. What was the effect of the fall of Adam?

- (a) Nowhere in this world could be found the *similitudo*;
- (b) Only the *imago, fæda et deformis.*

2. How was man to be restored to his pristine state?
Whom did such a work befit better than the Son of God, Who, as—
 - (a) *Splendor gloriæ, et*
 - (b) *Figura substantiæ Patris,*
ex utroque facile munitus apparuit, et
 - (a) *Unde reformaret deformem, et*
 - (b) *Unde debilem confortaret ?*
3. He is—
 - (a) *Ipsa forma, Which gave to liberum arbitrium its pristina forma ;*
 - (b) *Sapientia Dei, which “ attingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suauius.”*
4. Thus it is fitting that—
 - (a) *Liberum arbitrium be reformandum from the same source and by the same agency as it had been formatum, and, moreover,*
 - (b) *A summo angelo usque ad minimum uermiculum, ab ortu creaturæ usque ad finem destinatum a Creatore, nothing lies outside His influence.*
5. The restoration effected is “ a claritate in claritatem, tanquam a Domini Spiritu,” and if by the Spirit of the Lord, therefore not by *liberum arbitrium* itself; for—
 - (a) *Liberum arbitrium* is not so called *quod æqua inter bonum et malum potestate aut facilitate uersetur ;* neither God, nor angels, nor devils are so placed; but
 - (b) Rather because whether in good, or in evil, *æque liberam faciat uoluntatem ;* no one can be said to be either good or bad *nisi uolens ;* and thus
 - (c) What *liberum arbitrium* properly possesses is not *in electione facilitas* as between good and evil, but *in uoluntate libertas.*

CHAPTER XI 58

1. It is, therefore, the prerogative of the rational creature to be *sui iuris, suæque ipsius uoluntatis ;* it has been created such that only of its own will—
 - (a) *Aut mala fieret, et iuste damnaretur ;*
 - (b) *Aut bona maneret, et merito saluaretur.*
2. This statement must, however, be understood in such a sense—
 - (a) Not that its own will could suffice unto it for salvation;
 - (b) But that *nullatenus sine sua uoluntate consequetur.*

3. But there are two types of expression, which may suggest that necessity is imposed upon *liberum arbitrium*.
 - (a) The *tractio Patris* of John vi. 44, and the "compelle intrare" of Luke xiv. 23, on the one hand, and
 - (b) The *lex captivum ducens in legem peccati* of Rom. vii. 23, and similar terms elsewhere, on the other hand.
4. (a) The explanation of the former is that God judges no man worthy of salvation *quem non ante probauerit uoluntarium* ;
- (b) The explanation of the latter is that, *quantum ad arbitrium spectat*, the will is always free in the presence of temptation *intus forisue* ; for *libere de suo consensu iudicabit*.

CHAPTER XII 62

1. There is the dilemma presented by the case of those who, under the influence of fear, deny the faith ; in such a case—
 - (a) Either there is *culpa* ; and the person is, therefore, not under compulsion ;
 - (b) Or there is not *culpa* ; and the person is, therefore, under compulsion and *liberum arbitrium* has perished.
2. Let us take, as an example, the Apostle Peter.
 - (a) We recognize in him two wills.
 - (i) One of these, *qua uoluit non mori* was *penitus inculpabilis* ;
 - (ii) The other, *qua sibi complacebat quod erat Christianus*, was *multum laudabilis*.
 - (b) Wherein, then, was he blameworthy ?
 - (i) *In eo quod mentiri quam mori maluit*, which was the act of
 - (ii) A *uoluntas reprehensione digna*, in that *corporis magis quam animæ uoluit seruare uitam*.
 - (c) Was the Apostle, therefore, subject to the compulsion of fear ? No ;
 - (i) His will was not compelled by *metus ille subitus*, but rather
 - (ii) *Hic peruersus amor sui* was revealed thereby ;
 - (iii) His weakness of will *per incussum timorem nota, non orta*, made known the extent to which he loved Christ.
 - (d) Thus there is revealed in him, as it were, a

dualism of will, one factor of which was ultimately supreme—

- (i) *Voluntas qua Christum diligebat uim passa est, ut contra se loqueretur ;*
- (ii) *Voluntas qua se diligebat proculdubio consensit, ut pro se loqueretur.*¹
- (e) Are we, therefore, to conclude that the Apostle's will was not free? Has all that has been said of the *libertas uoluntatis*, forsooth, to be unsaid, because *inuenta est cogi potuisse uoluntas*?
- (1) Yes; *si cogi ab alio potuit quam a seipsa ;*
- (2) No; *si sese ipsa coegit, compulsa et compellens.*

What *uis* was used, was used by the will itself; *porro quod a se uoluntas pertulit ex uoluntate fuit.* But if it was *ex uoluntate*, it was no longer *ex necessitate*; it was *uoluntarium*.

3. There is, it should be noted, a twofold compulsion.

- (a) *Passiua*, according to which we are compelled *pati aliquid contra propriam uoluntatem*; this sometimes may take place *absque consensu uoluntario patientis*; in such case the *malum quod fit in nos, siue de nobis inuitis, non est imputandum nobis*;
- (b) *Actiua*, according to which we are compelled *agere contra propriam uoluntatem*; this can never take place *absque consensu uoluntario agentis*; in such case the *malum quod fit a nobis iam non sine culpa est uoluntatis.*

With regard to the Apostle, whose fall was in the category of *compulsio actiua*, the sword did not necessitate, it merely proved, the quality of his will. *Ipsa igitur se in culpam, non gladius impellebat.*

CHAPTER XIII

71

- 1. No power of its own suffices unto *liberum arbitrium* for righteousness; so that its efforts after goodness
 - (a) *Et cassi sunt, si a gratia non adiumentur ;*
 - (b) *Et nulli, si non excitentur.*
- 2. The divine gifts, in regard of salvation, are twofold—
 - (a) *Merita*; the divine purpose being that *præsentia per liberam possessionem nostra interim fierent merita*;

¹ A fuller analysis of the psychological problem here involved will be found in the notes to the text.

- (b) *Præmia*; the divine purpose being that *futura per gratuitam sponsonem expectaremus, immo expeteremus ut debita.*

It is to be noted that *ad condenda merita* God deigns *sibi adhibere creaturarum ministeria*.¹

3. Such *ministeria* God uses in three ways; He works salvation—

- (a) *Per creaturam sine ipsa*, i.e. by means of the *insensibilis*, and also by means of the *irrationabilis creatura*, which—

- (i) *Nec boni merentur, aut mali*; for
(ii) *Non habent unde bono maloue consentiant*;

- b) *Per creaturam contra ipsam*, i.e. by means of the *rationalis*, but *maleuola creatura*; *per malos, siue homines, siue angelos*;

- (i) *Quoniam inuitos, ideo contra ipsos*; for
(ii) *Nocere cupientes*, their *peruersa inuentio* is so overruled as to become to others *utilis actio*, and to recoil injuriously upon themselves; and fittingly
(iii) *Quid illa creatura mereri potest, nisi iram?*

- (c) *Per creaturam cum ipsa*, i.e. by means of the good, whether angels or men, who do His will and His works; thus they are—

- (i) Not merely God's *ministri*, but His *socii*; *utitur angelis et hominibus bonæ uoluntatis, tanquam commilitionibus et coadiutoribus suis*; and fittingly—
(ii) *Peracta uictoria*, He will fully reward them; and, meanwhile, *quid illa creatura mereri potest, nisi gratiam?*

CHAPTER XIV. 79

1. Is this, then, the *totum opus*, the *solum meritum*, of *liberum arbitrium*, *quod consentit*? Yes; certainly; but—

- (a) *Ipse consensus* is not *ab ipso libero arbitrio* (as its originating cause); for—
(b) *Nec cogitare (quod minus est quam consentire) aliquid a nobis, quasi ex nobis, sufficientes sumus.*

2. Thus the *rationale* of well-doing is—

- (a) *Bonum cogitare Deus operatur in nobis*—
(i) *Sine nobis*,

¹ See the note to the text of this passage.

- (ii) *Nec per nos utique,*
- (iii) *Nec nobiscum ;*
- (b) *Bonum uelle Deus operatur in nobis—*
 - (i) *Nobiscum,*
 - (ii) *Non ex nobis,*
 - (iii) *Non iam tamen sine nobis ;*
- (c) *Bonum perficere Deus operatur in nobis—*
 - (i) *Per nos,*
 - (ii) *Non ex nobis,*
 - (iii) *Non iam tamen sine nobis.*

Of these three it is (b) *bonum uelle* alone which *nobis reputatur in meritum ;* in fact *sola bona uoluntas sufficit ad meritum*, and, if it be wanting, *cetera non prosunt*.

3. We must beware, therefore, of attributing well-doing—
 - (a) *Either nostræ uoluntati, quæ infirma est,*
 - (b) *Or Dei necessitati, quæ nulla est,* rather than
 - (c) *Soli gratiæ, qua plenus est.*
4. Nevertheless well-doing is so wrought that—
 - (a) What was begun by grace alone, is performed by grace and the will alike ;
 - (b) *Ut mixtim, non singillatim, simul non uicissim, per singulos profectus operentur ;*

And thus

- (c) *Non partim gratia, partim liberum arbitrium,*
- (d) *Sed totum singula opere indiuiduo peragunt ; totum quidem hoc, et totum illa ;*

Yet in such a fashion that

- (e) *Ut totum in illo sic totum ex illa.*

5. The operation of divine grace in respect of *liberum arbitrium* is threefold, viz.—
 - (a) *Creatio ;*
 - (b) *Reformatio ;*
 - (c) *Consummatio.*

Of these three (b) *reformatio* alone, which,

- (i) *Propter consensum uoluntarium,*
- (ii) *Nobiscum quodam modo fit, in merita nostra reputabitur.*

Such *reformatio* is effected by our various *uirtutum exercitia*.

6. These *uirtutum exercitia* are at once—
 - (a) *As diuino in nobis actitata Spiritu, Dei munera* and,
 - (b) *As cum nostræ uoluntatis actitata assensu, nostra merita.*
7. If, as has been stated, and, as St. Paul (Rom. xv. 18 ; 2 Cor. xiii. 3) confirms us in holding, *uel ipsa uoluntas, de qua omne meritum pendet*, is not *a nobis* ; on what ground does

the Apostle speak so confidently (2 Tim. iv. 8) of a *corona sibi reposita*, a *corona iustitiæ*?

- (a) The *corona* is promised *gratis*; and it is promised *ex misericordia*;
- (b) It is a *corona iustitiæ* because, so promised, *iuste iam et ex debito requiritur*; it is *quod ex iustitia persolvendum*; and
- (c) It belongs to the moral goodness of God *ut reddat quod debet*; *debet autem quod pollicitus est*.

Thus—

- (a) *Voluntas in auxilium*,
 - (b) *Auxilium reputatur in meritum*;
- And, *si a Deo voluntas, et meritum*.

THE TREATISE OF ST. BERNARD CONCERNING GRACE AND FREE WILL

PREFACE

BROTHER BERNARD to the Lord William, Abbat of St. Thierry.

The little work concerning grace and free will, which lately, upon the occasion that thou knowest,¹ I began, I have now by that same grace of God,² so far as I have been able, brought to a conclusion. I fear, however, that I may be found either to have spoken of high matters all too unworthily, or to have reopened needlessly the discussion of matters of which many have already treated sufficiently.³ Do thou therefore read it first of all and, if thou seest fit, alone; lest, should it be submitted to the judgement of men, perchance rather the temerity of the writer be exposed than the charity of the reader be established. But shouldst thou consider that it may profitably

¹ "Qua scitis." The second person plural is used throughout the Preface, suggesting, perhaps, a larger circle than the individual to whom the treatise is addressed.

² The Benedictine editor reads "*eadem gratia adiuuante*," but inserts in the margin "*al. Deo*." The MSS. read "*eadem adiuuante*."

³ *E.g.* St. Augustine, St. Prosper of Aquitaine, St. Hilary of Arles, Faustus of Riez—the last two trained in the great school of Lérins—the Fathers of the Second Council of Orange (A.D. 529), and St. Anselm, all of whom would, surely, be well known to St. Bernard.

be made public, then, be there aught which seemeth to thee obscure, which, in a matter itself confessedly obscure, might be more clearly stated, due regard being had to brevity, do thou not hesitate either to amend it thyself or to refer it to me for amendment ; otherwise shouldest thou defraud thyself of the promise of the Divine Wisdom, which saith : “ They that bring me to light shall possess eternal life.” ¹

¹ Eccclus. xxiv. 31, *Vulg.*

CHAPTER I

That to the merit of a good work is needed, together with the grace of God, the consent of the free will.

It happened once that, when I was publicly commending the grace of God towards me in that in any good work I both recognized that I had been prevented¹ and felt that I was being furthered and hoped for full attainment, by its means, one of the bystanders demanded: What then is thine own work in the matter, or what recompense or reward dost thou hope for, if so be that God doeth it all? What then, I reply, dost thou advise? Give, saith he, the glory to God Who freely prevented thee, moved thee, originated thy good work, and live worthily for the time to come; so mayest thou prove thyself not ungrateful for benefits already received and not unworthy of receiving benefits in the future. Thou counellest well, say I, provided only that thy counsel can be followed. But indeed easier is it to know what ought to be done than it is to do it; for one thing is it to lead the blind and another thing to carry the weary. Not every man that sheweth him the way giveth the wayfarer food for his journey. He that instructeth him so that his feet wander not doeth one thing; he that feedeth him so that he faint not by the way doeth another. Thus neither is every teacher also the giver of the good that he teacheth. Accordingly my need is twofold, namely, to be taught and to be helped to do

¹ "Praeventum," in the technical sense of moved by Prevenient Grace. Cf. the Collect, "Actiones nostras, quaesumus, Domine, aspirando praeueni," etc.

what I am taught. Thou, as a mere man, truly givest excellent counsel to my ignorance, but, if the Apostle is to be believed, "The Spirit helpeth our infirmity,"¹ yea, verily, it needeth that He Who by thy mouth giveth me such counsel, Himself give me by His Spirit help whereby I may obey it. For, see, already His gift to will is present with me, but "how to perform I find not,"² nor have I any confidence that I shall ever find the way unless it be that He Who gave me the will give me also the power to perform the same. Where, then, sayest thou, are our merits? Or where is our hope?³

Listen, I pray: "Not by works of righteousness which we have done, but according to His mercy He saved us."⁴ What? Didst thou think, perchance, that thou hadst created thine own merits,⁵ that thou canst be saved by thine own righteousness, who canst not even say that Jesus is the Lord, save in the Holy Spirit?⁶ Hast thou then forgotten Who it is that said: "Without Me ye can do nothing,"⁷ and "It is not of him that runneth, nor of him that willeth, but of God that sheweth mercy"?⁸

What, therefore, thou askest, doth free will do? I answer

¹ Rom. viii. 26, *Vulg.*, with which the R.V. agrees.

² Rom. vii. 18, *Vulg.*, omitting "bonum."

³ The objections raised seem to be: (1) If both the will and the power are divine gifts, where are the moral values which we are wont to recognize in man, and (2) if the will be granted and there be any doubt as to the grant of the power, is not man's state desperate? St. Bernard does not answer them directly; he leaves them to be met by the argument as it proceeds.

⁴ Tit. iii. 5, *Vulg.*

⁵ "Cum Deus coronat merita nostra, nihil aliud coronat quam munera sua." St. Aug. *Epist.* cxciv. 19. Cf. St. Bernard. *In Cant.* Cant. lxxviii. 6. "Sufficit ad meritum scire quod non sufficiant merita. Sed ut ad meritum satis est de meritis non praesumere; sic carere meritis, satis ad iudicium est." See also XIII. *infr.*, *passim*, and Notes.

⁶ Reminiscence of 1 Cor. xii. 3.

⁷ Joh. xv. 5, *Vulg.*

⁸ Rom. ix. 16, *Vulg.*, substituting "neque" for "non," and transposing "uolentis" and "currentis."

in a word: It is saved. Take away free will and there remaineth nothing to be saved; take away grace and there is no means whereby it can be saved. This work of salvation cannot be wrought without two factors: the one, that by which it is wrought, and the other, that for which or in which it is wrought. God is the author of salvation; free will is merely receptive thereof; none can grant it save God alone, nothing can receive it save the free will. Thus then salvation is given by God alone, and it is given only to the free will; even as it cannot be wrought¹ without the consent of the receiver, so cannot it be wrought without the grace of the giver. Accordingly free will is said to co-operate with the grace which worketh salvation, when the free will consenteth, that is to say, is saved; for to consent is to be saved.² It followeth that the spirit of a brute can in no wise receive such salvation, for it lacketh the faculty of free consent whereby it may submissively obey the God that saveth it, whether by acquiescing in His commands, or by believing His promises, or by rendering thanks for His benefits. But consent of the will is one thing; natural appetite is another.³ The latter, indeed, is common to us with the irrational

¹ The Benedictine editor reads "esse," with the marginal note, "*al' effici.*" The MSS. read "esse."

² Plainly *salus* and *saluari* are used here of the state of present salvation, the *status gratiae* or *status naturae reparatae*. Cf. *σωζόμενος* in Acts ii. 47, and *σωτηρία* in 2 Cor. vi. 2.

³ St. Bernard here evidently means the sensual appetite (*passiones*), not the rational appetite. St. Thomas distinguishes the *appetitus sensitivus* from the *appetitus intellectivus*. "Potentiae appetitiuae distinguuntur secundum differentiam apprehensorum, sicut secundum propria objecta. . . . Appetitus intellectivus, etsi feratur in res, quae sunt extra animam singulares, fertur tamen in eas secundum aliquam rationem uniuersalem; sicut cum appetit aliquid quia est bonum. Unde Philosophus dicit in sua Rhetorica (II. 4, *circ. fin.*), quod odium potest esse de aliquo uniuersali, puta cum odio habemus omne latronum genus. Similiter etiam per appetitum intellectivum appetere possumus immaterialia bona, quae sensus non apprehendit, sicut scientiam, uirtutes et alia huiusmodi."—*Summ. Theol.* I. Qu. lxxx. Art. 2.

animals ; nor hath it the power of giving consent to the spirit,¹ being ensnared by the attractions of the flesh. And perhaps it is this of which the Apostle speaketh under another name as "The wisdom of the flesh," where he saith : "The wisdom of the flesh is at enmity with God ; for it is not subject to the law of God, as indeed it cannot be."² Having then (as I have said) this appetite in common with the brutes, it is voluntary consent which distinguisheth us from the same. It is a habit of the mind, self-determining. Voluntary consent is not under compulsion, nor can it be extorted. It is an act of the will ; it is not subject to necessity ; it neither denieth itself nor yieldeth itself to any, save only willingly.³ Otherwise, if it can be compelled to act when it would not, it is subject to force and not voluntary. But where there is not an act of will, there is not consent, for consent cannot be other than an act of will. Where, therefore, there is consent, there is an act of will. Moreover, where there is an act of will, there is freedom. In this sense it is that I understand the term free will.

¹ Cf. Gal. v. 17.

² Rom. viii. 7, *Vulg.*

³ Thus the will is a *δύναμις τῶν ἐναντίων*, and its act, in any given case, may be either *voluntarium positivum* or *voluntarium negativum*. Cf. St. Thom. *Summ. Theol.* II. (1), Qu. lxxi. Art. 5, ad. 2. "Aliquid dicitur voluntarium non solum quia cadit super ipsum actus voluntatis, sed quia in potestate nostra est ut fiat vel non fiat, ut dicitur *Ethic.* III. 5). Unde etiam ipsum non velle potest dici voluntarium, (inquantum in potestate hominis est velle et non velle."

CHAPTER II

In what freedom of will consisteth.

IN order that what is said may be made plain, and that we may the more completely attain unto the end we seek, it needeth, I think, that we go somewhat further back in our enquiry. In the material world life is not the same thing as sense-perception; nor sense-perception as appetite; nor appetite as consent. This will be the more plain if we define each of these. There is in every corporeal being¹ a life, which is an internal and natural movement, energizing only within the confines of such a being.² Whereas sense-perception, which is a movement in the body and proper to its life, energizes outside its confines.³ The natural appetite, however, is an active force in the living being, whose function it is to move the senses to self-gratification.⁴ But

¹ *In quolibet corpore.* Although St. Bernard is not thinking of plant-life, his meaning in this definition may be well illustrated from St. Thomas (*Summ. Theol.* I. Qu. xviii. Art. 1). "Plantae et aliae res uiuentes mouentur motu uitali, secundum hoc quod sunt in sua dispositione naturali"; with these he contrasts "corpora graui et leuia," which are moved "a motore extrinseco. . . . Et ita non mouent seipsa, sicut corpora uiuentia." Thus a living being is that which moves "a mouente intrinseco," i.e. which has, in St. Bernard's words, "internus et naturalis motus."

² *I.e.* the life in question is present, *quâ* life, so long as the internal and natural movement is maintained, "sicut motus cordis in animali"; cf. St. Thomas, *ut supra*.

³ The *sensus* is the *anima sensitiva*; it energizes *per organum corporale*, and its object is external to itself (*extrinsecus*). Cf. St. Thom. *Summ. Theol.* I. Qu. lxxix. Art. 1.

⁴ Cf. St. Thomas's distinction between the *appetitus sensitivus* and the *appetitus intellectivus*. "Id quod apprehenditur, et appetitur, est idem subiecto, sed differt ratione. Apprehenditur enim ut est ens sensibile, uel intelligibile; appetitur uero ut est conueniens, aut bonum."

consent is spontaneous assent of the will ; or, indeed (as I remember that I have already said), it is a habit of the mind, self-determining.¹ Further, will is a movement of reason, and rules over both sense-perception and appetite.² In fact will, in whatever direction it determine itself, always hath reason as its companion, we may say, as its follower : not that it is always moved by reason, but that it never moveth without reason, in such a way that it doth many things by means of reason against reason, that is to say, as it were by the aid of its ministry but against its advice or judgement.³ Whence we read : "The children of this world

Summ. Theol. I. Qu. lxxx. Art. 1. On the whole subject of appetite (*ὄρεξις*) the *De Anima* of Aristotle (III. 10 *sqq.*) should be consulted. The sense-perception, in its relation to appetite he calls *φαντασία*, to which elsewhere he refers as *αἰσθησις τῆς ἁσθενῆς* ; just as appetite does not energize without sense-perception (*ὄρεκτικὸν δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασίας*), so appetite is, as St. Bernard puts it, "uis in animante" (*ἡ φαντασία δὲ ὅταν κινῇ, οὐ κινεῖ ἄνευ ὄρεξεως*), moving the senses to self-gratification.

¹ "Consensus nominat applicationem appetitui motus ad aliquid praeexistens in potestate applicantis." There are four stages in consent, (1) *apprehensio finis*, (2) *appetitus finis*, (3) *consilium de his quae sunt ad finem*, and (4) *appetitus eorum quae sunt ad finem*. St. Thom. *Summ. Theol.* II. (1), Qu. xv. Art. 3.

² It may be urged that sense-perception is involuntary, so far as it is excited by external objects. The answer is that it is only involuntary when it is not willed in the cause (*voluntarius in causa*), *i.e.* when the will has not consented to its production. Moreover, *sensus* and *consensus* are in mutually exclusive categories, from the point of view of freedom ; the former is a natural *affectus*, the latter a moral *effectus*. Cf. St. August. *Enarr. in Ps. cxviii.* 3 (1). "Si uoluntatis non adhibeatur assensus, mouetur quidem nonnullus affectus, sed nullus ei relaxatur effectus." In this connection what is true of *sensus* is true also of *appetitus*.

³ By *ratio* evidently is to be understood *intellectus*, which is a *δύναμις τῶν ἐναντίων*, *i.e.* it either may or may not be in conformity with the eternal law, the divine reason. An act of will may be contrary to what St. Thomas calls the *ordo rationis* in man, but being deliberate, *i.e.* a considered act, it cannot be done apart from reason ; thus in wrong doing the reason serves against itself. *Ratio* is the *principium* of every properly human act, whether good or bad. For the identity of *ratio* and *intellectus*, see St. Thom. *Summ. Theol.* I. Qu. lxxix. Art. 8. For the relation of *ratio humana* to *uoluntas* as its *regula proxima* (its *regula suprema* being the *lex aeterna* or *ratio Dei*), see *ibid.* II. (1), Qu. xxi. Art. 1, and Qu. lxxi. Art. 6.

are in their generation wiser than the children of light,"¹ and again: "They are wise to do evil."² For no creature can be intelligent, even in wrong doing, save only by the aid of reason.

But reason hath been given to the will in order to instruct it, not to destroy it. It would, however, destroy it, were it to impose upon it such necessity that it could not freely of its own choice determine itself, whether by wrongly consenting either to the appetite or to some evil spirit³ (in which case it would be merely animal, incapable of perceiving, in any case, of following after, the things which belong to the Spirit of God), or by accepting the leading of grace unto well-doing, and thus becoming that spiritual will which judgeth all things, but is itself judged of none.⁴ If, I say, the will were unable, owing to the prohibition of reason to take either of these courses, then it would cease to be the will. For where necessity is there is not free will.⁵ But if right or wrong could be done under compulsion, and without the consent of free will, in such case a reasonable creature ought indeed, on no valid ground, to suffer the doom of misery, nor could it fully enjoy blessedness, seeing that that faculty in it, which alone is capable either of

¹ Luke xvi. 8, *Vulg.*, reading "prudentiores sunt" at the beginning of the sentence.

² Jer. iv. 22, *Vulg.*

³ *I.e.* to temptation either *ab intra* or *ab extra*.

⁴ The πνευματικός of 1 Cor. ii. 15. A state is implied practically equivalent to *liberum consilium*, of which St. Bernard treats later.

⁵ St. Thomas distinguishes *necessitas coactionis* from *necessitas praecepti*. It is the former of which St. Bernard speaks, and "haec quia repugnat voluntati, tollit rationem meriti. Alia autem est necessitas ex obligatione praecepti, siue ex necessitate finis, quando scilicet aliquis non potest consequi finem uirtutis, nisi hoc faciat; et talis necessitas non excludit rationem meriti, inquantum aliquis hoc quod sic est necessarium uoluntarie agit." *Summ. Theol.* II. (2), Qu. lviii. Art. 3. St. Thomas speaks of the *necessitas consequens obedientiam* in the *status religionis* as "necessitas . . . liberae uoluntatis, inquantum homo uult obedire, licet forte non uellet id quod mandatur secundum se consideratum implere." *Ut supra* II. (2), Qu. clxxxvi. Art. 5.

misery or of blessedness, namely, the will, would be lacking. The aforesaid life, sense-perception, appetite, plainly do not of themselves produce either misery or blessedness; otherwise would the plants which possess life, and the beasts which possess the remaining two attributes also, be either liable to misery or fit for blessedness, which is altogether impossible. We possess, therefore, on the one hand, life in common with the plants, and on the other hand, as well as life, sense-perception and appetite in common with the beasts, while that which distinguisheth us from both is what is called will. And it is consent of the will, free, not necessitated, which, seeing that in it consisteth our righteousness or unrighteousness, maketh us deservedly blessed or the reverse. Such consent, then, on account both of the inalienable freedom of the will, and of the inevitable judgement which reason everywhere and at all times exerciseth when we act,¹ is not (as I think), unfittingly called free choice,² being self-determining on account of the will, and self-judging on account of the reason. And rightly doth judgement accompany freedom, seeing that he that is free to determine himself, when he sinneth, judgeth himself. There is a judicial sentence passed, because, if he sinneth, he, who need not sin unless he would, justly suffereth what he would not.³

Moreover, were the will not acknowledged to be free, how could either good or evil justly be imputed to it? Necessity, indeed, removeth responsibility for both of these.

¹ *Ratio* or *intellectus* being the *principium* of a properly human act.

² As the argument proceeds, St. Bernard would seem to use the term *uoluntas* for the will, and the term *liberum arbitrium* for the consent of the will, implying that such consent is both *uoluntarius* and *deliberatus ratione*. Thus we may say that the *liberum arbitrium* is so-called because human consent is "*liber sui propter uoluntatem*" and "*iudex sui propter rationem*."

³ Here, evidently, the notion of the mere *ratio humana* passes into that of *ordo rationis*, which is in conformity with the *lex aeterna* or *ratio Dei*.

Further, where necessity is, there is not freedom ; where freedom is not, there is neither merit,¹ nor its correlative, judgement, excluding altogether original sin, which it is agreed is of a different order from personal sin. Thus it remaineth that whatsoever hath not this liberty of free consent, undoubtedly can neither merit nor be subject to judgement.² Therefore, save only the will, all that belongeth to man, seeing that it is incapable of self-determination, is a matter neither for the award of merit nor for judgement. Life, sense-perception, appetite, memory, thought,³ and anything else of such kind that there may be, are subject to necessity, except in so far as

¹ "Unde et liberum nominatur arbitrium, quod liceat uersari in his pro arbitrio uoluntatis. Inde homo ad promerendum potis. . . . Ubi autem non est libertas, nec meritum." St. Bern. *In Cant. Cant.* lxxx. 6. According to St. Thomas there are two *principia meriti*, grace and free will, of which grace is the *principalius*. "Humanus actus habet rationem merendi ex duobus : primo quidem et principaliter ex diuina ordinatione, secundum quod actus dicitur esse meritorius illius boni ad quod homo diuinitus ordinatur. Secundo uero ex parte liberi arbitrii, inquantum scilicet homo habet prae caeteris creaturis ut per se agat uoluntarie agens." *Summ. Theol.* II. (1), Qu. cxiv. Art. 4. By the former *principium* man merits *ex condigno*, i.e. because he acts "ex uimotionis diuinae" ; by the latter he merits *ex congruo*, i.e. "quia congruum est ut dum homo bene utitur sua uirtute, Deus secundum superexcellentem uirtutem excellentius operetur." *Ut supra* II. (1), Qu. cxiv. Art. 6. Nevertheless, man does not merit *ex condigno* "secundum absolutam iustitiae rationem, sed secundum diuinae ordinationis quamdam praesuppositionem." *Ut supra* II. (1), Qu. cxiv. Art. 1. The quality of *condignitas* in any act is founded in grace. *Ut supra* II. (1), Qu. cxiv. Art. 3. St. Thomas here thinks of the strict justice which, in human affairs, maintains or restores equality, which strict justice is impossible between God and man. Cf. Arist. *Ethic Nic.* V. (4), 9. *Διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὀνομάζεται δίκαιον, ὅτι δίχα ἐστὶν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις εἴποι δίχαον, καὶ ὁ δίκαστῆς δίχαστῆς.*

² A man can only be held responsible for what he does as a free agent ; only a free act is imputable. Moral theology, as distinct from civil law, recognizes certain factors which diminish or even may, in certain circumstances, dispense from responsibility, e.g. ignorance and inadvertence, provided that the former is not culpable, and the latter does not amount to criminal carelessness (*culpa lata*).

³ "Ingenium." Probably St. Bernard means by it the mental bent of the individual.

they are subject to the will.¹ But it is impossible for the will, which cannot of its very nature do otherwise than obey itself (for there is none who doth not will what he willeth, or who willeth what he doth not will), to be deprived of its freedom. The will can, indeed, be changed, but only to another will,² in such a way that it never loseth its freedom. Therefore it can no more be deprived of its freedom than it can be deprived of itself. Were a man ever able either to will nothing at all,³ or to will anything unwillingly, then and then only would the will be able to be deprived of its freedom. Hence it is that to the insane, to infants, and also to persons asleep, nothing which they may do, whether it be good or bad, is imputed; because, plainly, just as they are not in possession of reason, so do they not possess the use of their own wills, and therefore their freedom is not subject to judgement. Seeing, then, that the will hath nothing free save itself, it is only rightly judged as it is in

¹ St. Bernard's point seems to be that, apart from the will, the possession of all these, including even *ingenium*, leaves man on a level with the brutes, so that, did he not possess free will also, his every act would result from a *motus primo-primus*, i.e. from some impulse associated with an involuntary recognition; but, as it is, "*voluntas est quippe in omnibus (motibus), immo omnes nihil aliud quam voluntates sunt*," excluding, of course, cases of physical impulse (*motus primo-primi*), into which the consent of the will does not enter at all. Cf. St. August. *De Civ. Dei.*, xiv. 6. It may be well to state that a *motus primo-primus* is the lowest, and only wholly non-imputable, *motus* in the Scholastic scale.

² Without losing its identity, the will reveals a change in itself by changing its object. The abuse of such a power is *inconstantia*. Cf. Gal. i. 6; Eph. iv. 14.

³ In cases of choice in which the will is indifferent it is not deprived of its freedom, for it freely wills to be indifferent. Say, in a case of *libertas specificationis*, if a man is indifferent as to whether he sits by the fire or takes a walk, he is none the less free in what he does, his act being *voluntarius in causa*; he wills, perhaps, to gratify his host. It may be well to note the Scholastic distinction between *libertas specificationis*, freedom of choice between acts of the same kind which differ specifically, *libertas contradictionis*, freedom to do or not to do a particular act, *libertas contrarietatis*, freedom to do an act or to do its contrary, e.g. to love or to hate, and *libertas exercitii*, freedom to do something or to do nothing at all.

itself. Indeed, neither slowness of intellect, nor lapse of memory, nor restlessness of appetite, nor obtuseness of sense-perception, nor feebleness of vitality, of themselves bring a man into condemnation, even as their contraries do not make him innocent; and this for no other reason than that these conditions are proved to be caused necessarily, and independently of the will.¹

¹ *Per se* they are not imputable, *i.e.* supposing that none of them is *voluntarium in causa*. A man whose lapse of memory was due to inebriety would be responsible, in so far as he foresaw, or ought to have foreseen, this result.

CHAPTER III

That there is a threefold freedom: that of nature, that of grace, and that of glory.

It is the will alone therefore which, seeing that by reason of its innate freedom it is compelled by no necessity either to disagree with itself or to consent in any matter in spite of itself, rightly maketh a man, as being under no compulsion to be either righteous or unrighteous, fittingly capable of blessedness or of misery; provided, that is to say, that it hath given its consent whether to righteousness or to unrighteousness. Accordingly I think that this free consent of the will, upon which (as aforesaid) every act of judgement is founded, is not unsuitably wont to be called, as we have already defined it, free choice, the word "free" having reference to the will, and the word "choice" to the reason. Yet is it not necessarily free with that liberty of which the Apostle speaketh: "Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty."¹ This is that freedom from sin of which he saith elsewhere: "When ye were the servants of sin ye were free from righteousness. . . . But now being made free from sin, and become servants to God, ye have your fruit unto holiness, and the end everlasting life."² But who is there in the sinful flesh that can claim for himself freedom from sin? Of this liberty free choice can, I think, by no means rightly be said

¹ 2 Cor. iii. 17, *Vulg.*, omitting "autem." Here St. Bernard passes to consider the limitations of the will in the *status naturae lapsae*.

² Rom. vi. 20, 22, *Vulg.*, with the substitution of "autem" for the first "uero" in ver. 22.

to be possessed.¹ There is also a freedom from misery of which the Apostle speaketh likewise: "The creature itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God."² But doth any man claim to possess such freedom in this our mortal state? Therefore we rightly refuse to call the will free in respect of this freedom. But there is a freedom which, I think, is more proper to the will, and of which we can speak as freedom from necessity, on the ground that what is necessary seemeth to be the contrary of what is free, in the sense that what is done of necessity is not freely done; and the converse.

Seeing therefore that, as may have occurred to us, there is set before us a threefold freedom, that from sin, that from misery, and that from necessity; the last of these is bestowed upon us in the state of nature, the first is restored to us by grace, and the second is reserved for us in the fatherland.³ Let us then call that which is first in order of development the freedom of nature, that which is second, the freedom of grace, and that which is third, the freedom of life or of glory. By the first were we created with freedom of will to choose as we will, creatures ennobled for the service of God; by the second are we restored to innocence, newly created in Christ; by the third are we raised to the state of glory, creatures perfected in the

¹ "Dicendum quod homo peccando liberum arbitrium dicitur perdisse, non quantum ad libertatem naturalem, quae est a coactione, sed quantum ad libertatem, quae est a culpa et a miseria." St. Thom. *Summ. Theol.* I. Qu. lxxxiii. Art. 2. St. Bernard, of course, would not imply that in this world there may not be such a measure of *libertas a peccato* as is implied by the *libertas gratiae*. Cf. John viii. 31-36. "Seruum te caritas faciat, quia liberum te ueritas fecit." St. August. *In Ps.* xcix. 7.

² Rom. viii. 21, *Vulg.*, where "gloriae" (Gk. δόξης) is a genitive of apposition. "Quid erit liberius libero arbitrio, quando non poterit seruire peccato, quae futura erat et homini, sicut facta est angelis sanctis, merces meriti?" St. August. *De Corr. et Grat.* xi. 32.

³ "In patria." Cf. Heb. xi. 14: "Qui enim haec dicunt, significant se patriam inquirere."

Spirit. Thus the first freedom hath great honour, the second hath more abundant virtue, the last hath superabundant delight.

It is indeed in virtue of the first that we rule the brutes ; in virtue of the second that we subdue the flesh ; in virtue of the third that we overcome death ; or, let us say, just as in the gift of the first freedom God put under our feet sheep and oxen and the beasts of the field, so also by means of the second freedom He in like manner casteth down and crusheth beneath our feet those spiritual beasts of this world,¹ of which it is said : " Deliver not to the beasts the souls that confess to Thee." ² Finally, in the third state of freedom, when He shall have fully subdued us to ourselves by means of victory over corruption and over death, when, that is to say, the last enemy, death, shall have been destroyed, then shall we pass unto the glorious freedom of the sons of God, the freedom wherewith Christ shall make us free when He shall deliver us over as His kingdom to God, even the Father.³ It was of this freedom, as also of that which we have called freedom from sin, that, as I think, He spake, when He said unto the Jews : " If the Son therefore shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed." ⁴ He would signify that free choice needeth a liberator ; but plainly not a liberator from necessity of which, by the very fact that it is the function of the will,⁵ it could know nothing ; but a liberator from sin, into which it freely and of itself had fallen, and at the same time from the penalty of sin, which it had heedlessly incurred and was unwillingly bearing, from neither of which could it at all be set free,

¹ " Huius aeris," as contrasted with *aether*, the pure air of heaven.

² Ps. lxxiii. 19, *Vulg.*

³ Combined reminiscence of Rom. viii. 21, 1 Cor. xv. 24 *sqq.*, and Gal. iv. 31, *Vulg.*

⁴ John viii. 36, *Vulg.*, omitting " ergo."

⁵ The Benedictine editor here reads " uoluntas "; the MSS. read " uoluntatis." The point is that *uoluntas* excludes *necessitas*,

save only by means of Him Who alone of men was made free among the dead;¹ free, that is to say, from sin, yet living in the midst of sinners.

For He alone among the sons of Adam claimeth for Himself freedom from sin, "Who did no sin, neither was guile found in His mouth."² Moreover from misery also, which is the penalty of sin, was He, potentially though not actually, none the less free. No man indeed took away His life; He laid it down of Himself.³ Finally, as the prophet beareth witness: "He was offered because He willed so to be";⁴ even as also, when He willed, He was "born of a woman, made under the law, that He might redeem them that were under the law."⁵ Thus was He Himself also subject to the law of misery; but this was because He so willed, in order that, free among the miserable and sinners, He might break the yoke of misery and sin from off the necks of His brethren.⁶ Accordingly He possessed in full these three kinds of freedom, the first (that from necessity) in virtue both of His divine and of His human natures,⁷ and the rest in virtue of His divine power. Whether, or in what manner, and to what extent, the first man possessed in Paradise these two last-mentioned kinds of freedom we shall see later.

¹ "Inter mortuos liber." Ps. lxxxvii. 6, *Vulg.*

² 1 Pet. ii. 22, *Vulg.* Cf. Isa. liii. 9.

³ Reminiscence of John x. 18, *Vulg.*

⁴ Isa. liii. 7, *Vulg.*

⁵ Gal. iv. 4, 5, *Vulg.*, in the nominative case, and reading "natus" with "ex muliere." Cf. St. Aug. *Serm. ad Catech.* viii. "Ille quando uoluit natus est, quando uoluit mortuus est; quomodo uoluit natus est de Virgine, quomodo uoluit mortuus est in cruce."

⁶ There is a fresh paragraph in the MSS. here.

⁷ In virtue, *i.e.* of the fact that He was "very man" as well as "very God."

CHAPTER IV

What kind of freedom belongeth to the holy souls in their disembodied state : what kind belongeth to God, and what kind is common to all reasonable creatures.

¹ WE must, however, understand that both these kinds of freedom are possessed in fulness and perfection by the disembodied souls which have been made perfect, even as they are possessed by God and by His Christ and by the angels in heaven. To the holy souls indeed, who have not yet received their bodies, there lacketh something of glory ; nevertheless they have no misery. ² Freedom from necessity, however, belongeth to all reasonable creatures, whether evil or good, equally and indifferently with God. Nor is this freedom lost, or diminished, either by sin or by misery ; nor is it greater in the righteous than in the unrighteous, or more complete in the angels than in men. For even as by means of grace the consent of the human will is given to well-doing, so that, by the fact that it is willingly given and not unwillingly compelled, it maketh a man freely good and free in well-doing ; thus also the consent of the will, when of its own accord turned aside to evil, maketh a man none the less both free and self-determining in evil-doing, being indeed led by his own will and not compelled by any outside force to become evil. And as the angels in heaven, or even God Himself, remain good freely, that is to say, of

¹ In the MSS. there is no fresh paragraph here. As stated in the Introduction, the capitulation and also the summaries of the chapters are the work of the Benedictine editor.

² A fresh paragraph in the MSS. begins here.

their own will, and not of any extrinsic necessity; so the devil both fell into evil-doing and persisteth therein equally freely, that is to say, of his own free motion, and not by the compulsion of another. Therefore freedom of will remaineth, even where there is captivity of mind, certainly as fully in the evil as in the good, though in a more ordered state in the good; it remaineth also as completely, after its proper fashion,¹ in human creatures as it doth in the Creator, though in Him it is more powerful.

But as to the fact that men are wont to complain, and say: I will to possess a good will and I am unable so to do; this by no means implieth a restriction of its freedom, so that in such a case the will as it were suffereth violence or is subject to necessity; but plainly witnesseth that the will lacketh that freedom which is called freedom from sin. For he that willeth to possess a good will proveth that he possesseth a will, for it is only by means of the will that he willeth to possess a good will; but if he possesseth a will, then hath he freedom, not from sin but from necessity. Truly he perceiveth of himself that he hath not freedom, so as to be able, when he willeth, to possess a good will; freedom, plainly, from sin by which it grieveth him that his will is oppressed, though not suppressed.² Yet without doubt he already hath in some way a good will, when he willeth to possess such a will.³ What he willeth is, in fact, good; nor could he will what is good unless by a good

¹ "Pro suo modo in creatura" is contrasted with "in illo (*sc.* Creatore) potentior."

² "Premi, non perimi." The *jeu de mots* is singularly happy, but difficult to render in English. "Suppress" is strong enough, if we remember the original sense of *supprimo*, "to sink a ship to the bottom of the sea."

³ Estimated morally we *are*, at each stage, what we are *on the way to become*. The act of correspondence to First Grace has in it the potentiality of Final Perseverance and of the glory which it merits. So much, and no less, is there in any genuine act of good will. "Voluntas pro facto reputari dicitur." Corn. à Lap. in Rom. iv. 3. There is, in any concrete act, no moral goodness save goodness of will.

will; even as he could not will what is evil unless by an evil will. When we will what is good, that is a good will; when we will what is evil, that is an evil will. In both cases there is will, and everywhere there is freedom: necessity yieldeth to will. But when we cannot do what we will,¹ we perceive indeed that our freedom is by reason of sin in a certain way miserable,² though not lost.³

It is, therefore, simply from this freedom, by which the will is free to judge itself, whether as good, if it have consented to well-doing, or as evil, if to evil-doing (forsooth it perceiveth plainly that it is only by an act of will that it hath consented to either of the two), that we believe free determination to be so called.⁴ For freedom from sin might, perhaps, more fittingly be called free counsel,⁵ and freedom from misery free pleasure,⁶ rather than free determination.⁷ As a fact determination is judgement. But just as it belongeth to judgement to distinguish between what may and what may not be allowable, so it belongeth to counsel

¹ "Non ualemus quod uolumus." Another illustration of St. Bernard's use of forcible peronomasia.

² The Benedictine editor reads here "captivum, vel miseram"; the MSS. omit "captivum, vel." St. Bernard uses *miser* and *miseria* throughout in a technical sense. He postulates a threefold *libertas*; *ibertas a necessitate*, the *libertas naturae*, *libertas a peccato*, the *libertas gratiae*, and *libertas a miseria*, the *libertas gloriae*.

³ In the MSS. there is no fresh paragraph here.

⁴ St. Bernard is, perhaps, not always consistent, but, as a rule, he uses *uoluntas* of the faculty of the will, and *arbitrium* of the use of this faculty, or, to put it otherwise, *uoluntas* is the will *in potentia*, whereas *arbitrium* is the will *in actu*. It seems, however, best to translate *arbitrium* as the context demands; here there is evidently a connection between the self-judgement of the will and the legal sense of the word in question.

⁵ *Liberum consilium*. St. Bernard would evidently imply by this term enlightened understanding. Cf. Prov. viii. 14, *Vulg.*: "Meum est consilium, et aequitas; mea est prudentia, mea est fortitudo."

⁶ *Complacitum*. The word is not classical as a noun substantive; *placitum* is, however, found both in its literal sense and in that of an opinion. The Vulgate "In lege Domini uoluntas eius" (Ps. i. 2) well illustrates St. Bernard's meaning.

⁷ In the MSS. a fresh paragraph begins here.

to show what may and what may not be expedient, and to pleasure to discover what may and what may not be agreeable. Would that we as freely took counsel for our profit as we judge concerning the allowableness of our deeds,¹ so that, even as by judgement we freely decide as to the allowable and the non-allowable, so by counsel we were free to choose for ourselves the allowable *as expedient*, and to reject the non-allowable *as inexpedient*! For in such a case we should be not only free in judgement, but without doubt also free in counsel, and therefore free from sin. But what if either the freedom to approve what is expedient, or the freedom to judge what is allowable, give us also the other kinds of freedom? Should we not then rightly be said to possess free pleasure also, seeing that we should perceive ourselves to be free in the same manner from everything that could displease, that is from all misery? But, as it is; seeing that there are many things which by the judgement we decide ought to be either done or not done, which yet by the counsel we neither approve nor reject in accordance with right judgement; and, again, seeing that not all things which we approve as right and expedient do we also freely welcome as well-pleasing to us, but that rather we impatiently endure them as hard and painful; such being the case, is it sufficiently plain that we possess neither free counsel nor free pleasure.

It is another question whether, even before sin entered in, the first man had free pleasure; this shall be discussed in its proper place. But quite certainly we shall possess it, when by the mercy of God we shall obtain what we pray for when we say: "Thy will be done in earth, as it is in

¹ We may judge wrongly, but we always judge freely, as to the licit and the illicit; whereas the scales in which we weigh our profit are too often weighted; in other words, we have equal freedom, but not equal facility (*aequilibritas*), in choosing good or evil.

heaven." For this shall be fulfilled when that which (as hath been said) seemeth to be common everywhere to all reasonable creatures, namely, a will free from necessity, shall be (as it is in the holy angels) both secure from sin and safe from misery in the elect of mankind also, who shall at length prove by the happy experience of a threefold freedom "what is that good, and acceptable, and perfect, will of God."¹ Meanwhile, because this hath not yet come to pass, it is freedom of choice² alone which in its fulness and integrity man now possesseth. For freedom of counsel existeth but in a measure only, and that in a few spiritual persons, who "have crucified their flesh with its vices and desires,"³ so that sin may not reign in their mortal body.⁴ Thus then that sin doth not reign cometh of freedom of counsel; that sin, however, is not wholly lacking cometh of the captivity of the will.⁵ "But when that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away";⁶ that is to say, when the judgement shall be wholly free, there shall no longer be any captivity of the will. And this it is for which every day we pray, when we say unto God: "Thy kingdom come." Not yet is this kingdom fully established amongst us. Nevertheless every day little by little it draweth near, and with sensible increase are its borders daily extended, at least in those whose inward man

¹ Rom. xii. 2, *Vulg.*, reading "bona" before "uoluntas," and "ac" for the first "et."

² I.e. *libertas a necessitate*.

³ "Carnem suam crucifixerunt cum vitiis, et concupiscentiis." An exact reproduction of the Vulgate, Gal. v. 24. Thus by "spiritual persons" are intended those who are led by, live by, and walk by the Spirit.

⁴ A reminiscence of Rom. vi. 12, *Vulg.* The context here illustrates the extent to which St. Bernard is steeped in the language of the Vulgate. See Introduction, pp. ix. *sq.*

⁵ Captivity, not to necessity, but to sin; the terms used, "captiuitas liberi arbitrii," are not a negation of the freedom of the *uoluntas*; the limitations imposed by sin do not impair its *ingenita libertas*. Cf. Chap. III *ad. init.*

⁶ I Cor. xiii. 10, *Vulg.*, adding "tunc."

is by the help of God "renewed from day to day."¹ Therefore in the measure in which the kingdom of grace is extended, in that measure is the power of sin diminished. But in the measure in which, on account of the body of death² which "presseth down the soul," and on account of the straitened state of our earthly habitation, which indeed "weigheth down the mind that museth upon many things,"³ the kingdom of grace is still restricted, in that measure in this our mortal life even they who seem to be somewhat nigh unto perfection are under necessity of confessing: "In many things we offend all,"⁴ and "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us."⁵ Wherefore it is that they pray without ceasing, saying: "Thy kingdom come." But this will not be consummated even in them, until not only doth not sin reign in their mortal body,⁶ but there neither is nor can be any sin at all in the body then immortal.

¹ A reminiscence of 2 Cor. iv. 16, *Vulg.*: "Is, qui intus est, renouatur de die in diem." St. Bernard's choice of words is careful; "every-day" is *quotidie*; "daily" is *indies*; and here, as we see, he follows the Vulgate.

² A reminiscence of Rom. vii. 24, *Vulg.* Cf. Rom. viii. 10, *Vulg.* "Corpus quidem mortuum est propter peccatum."

³ "Corpus enim, quod corrumpitur, aggrauat animam, et terrena inhabitatio deprimit sensum multa cogitantem" (Wisd. ix. 15). Cf. 2 Cor. v. 1 and 2. This is a very frequent reminiscence with St. Bernard; see, e.g. *De Præcepto et Dispens.* xx. 59; *In Ascens. Dom. Serm.* iii. 1.

⁴ Jas. iii. 2, *Vulg.*, omitting "enim."

⁵ 1 John i. 8, *Vulg.*, substituting "quia" for "quoniam," and "nosipsos" for "ipsi nos."

⁶ A reminiscence of Rom. vi. 12, *Vulg.*

CHAPTER V

*Whether freedom from misery, or freedom of counsel,
is granted in this world.*

WHAT now are we to say as regardeth the existence of freedom of pleasure in this wicked world, in which scarcely "sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof";¹ in which "the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now,"² being indeed "made subject to vanity, not willingly";³ where the life of man upon the earth consisteth in temptation;⁴ where even spiritual men, who "already have received the firstfruits of the Spirit, even they groan within themselves waiting for the redemption of their bodies"?⁵ Can it at all be that, under such conditions, there is any place for freedom of the kind of which we speak? For neither will innocence, nor righteousness, be found to be safe either from sin or yet from misery in a world in which the righteous man crieth out: "O wretched man that I am! Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?"⁶ and again: "My tears have been my meat day and night."⁷ Where

¹ Matt. vi. 34, *Vulg.*

² The "ingemiscit, et parturit" of the Vulgate (Rom. viii. 22), quoted by St. Bernard, fails to express the community suggested by the *συσπενδάξει καὶ συνωδίνει* of the Greek.

³ Rom. viii. 20, *Vulg.*, reading "Vanitati nimirum subiecta" for "Vanitati enim creatura subiecta."

⁴ "Militia est vita hominis super terram" (Job vii. 1, *Vulg.*).

⁵ Rom. viii. 23, *Vulg.*, reading "qui primitias Spiritus iam acceperunt, ingemiscunt et ipsi intra semetipsos" for "primitias Spiritus habentes, et ipsi intra nos gemimus," omitting "adoptionem filiorum Dei," and substituting "corporis sui" for "corporis nostri."

⁶ Rom. vii. 24, *Vulg.*

⁷ Ps. xli. 4, *Vulg.* substituting "Factae sunt," for "Fuerunt."

nights and days are passed in mourning, there surely is no time to spare for taking pleasure. Finally, they that would live godly in Christ themselves suffer persecution the more;¹ for judgement beginneth at the house of God.² Which also He commandeth, saying: "Begin at them of my household."³

But although virtue be in no place of safety in this world, perchance vice is, and in some measure enjoyeth pleasure and escapeth misery. Far from it. For they that rejoice where they have done evil, and exult in deeds of infamy, do but laugh with the wild laughter of the mad.⁴ But no misery is more genuine than is false joy. In short, what in this world seemeth to be happiness is so far misery, that the wise man saith: "It is better to go to the house of mourning, than to go to the house of feasting."⁵ There is certainly some pleasure in the good things of the body, namely, in eating, drinking, warming oneself, and other the like comforts or coverings of the flesh. But can it be said that even in these matters we are wholly free from misery? Bread is good, but to the hungry; drink delighteth, but the thirsty; in fact, to him that is satisfied food and drink are by no means pleasant, but distasteful. Take away hunger, and thou wilt not relish bread; take away thirst, and thou wilt decline the most limpid fountain as though it were a stagnant marsh. In like manner is it only he that is faint with heat that seeketh shade; and only he that is chilled or

¹ "Et omnes, qui pie uolunt uiuere in Christo Jesu, persecutionem patientur" (2 Tim. iii. 12, *Vulg.*).

² "Quoniam tempus est ut incipiat iudicium a domo Dei" (1 Pet. iv. 17, *Vulg.*).

³ The Vulgate of Ezek. ix. 6 reads, "et a sanctuario meo incipite"; St. Bernard substitutes "a meis" for "a sanctuario meo." There is no fresh paragraph in the MSS. here.

⁴ "Tale est quod faciunt, quale cum rident phrenetici." One is reminded of Rochester's wife in *Jane Eyre*. The picture is quite in St. Bernard's best manner. The quotation from Eccl. vii. 3, which closely follows, suggests a reminiscence of the "melior est ira risu" and the "risus stulti" of Eccl. vii. 4-7.

⁵ Eccl. vii. 3, *Vulg.*

in the gloom troubleth himself about the sun.¹ None of these things will be pleasing to a man unless urgent need have gone before. If the need be taken away, then the very pleasantness which seemeth to be in them is turned into loathing and disgust.² It must be confessed, therefore, that, in this respect, everything which belongeth unto our present life, partaketh of misery; unless it be that, in the continual trials of our heavier labours, our lighter labours are, as it were, a kind of consolation, and, while perchance, as time passeth and conditions change, tedium and relief follow one upon another, the experience of the lesser labours seemeth unto us to be some reprieve from misery, so that sometimes the passage from the more painful to the less irksome toil is counted for felicity.

And yet it must be confessed that they who, at times rapt in spirit through excess of contemplation, are in some small measure able to taste the sweetness of heavenly felicity, are indeed, as often as they experience such a state, free from misery. Plainly these, as cannot be denied, even in the flesh, although but seldom and only in their raptures, enjoy freedom of pleasure, in that with Mary they "have chosen the best part, which shall not be taken away from them."³ For they that now possess what cannot be taken

¹ The conclusion has been drawn, surely without warrant, from a passage in *St. Bernard. Sec. Vita*, compiled at some date between 1167 and 1170, by Alanus of Auxerre, where we read (XVI. 45): "Iuxta lacum etiam Lausanensem totius diei itinere peregens, penitus non attendit, aut se uidere non uidit. Cum enim uespere facto, de eodem lacu socii colloquerentur, interrogabat eos ubi lacus ille esset, et mirati sunt uniuersi," that St. Bernard had no feeling for nature. It is to be noted that this work, as compared with the *Vita Prima*, "porte," to quote the Abbé Vacandard (*Vie de St. Bernard*, I., p. xlii), "la marque d'une préoccupation tendant au panégyrique"; and the incident in question, whether historical or not, is probably given as an illustration of St. Bernard's faculty of abstraction from material surroundings.

² A fresh paragraph in the MSS. begins here.

³ Luke x. 42, *Vulg.*, reading "elegerunt" and "ab eis," for "elegit" and "ab ea."

away from them in truth have experience of that which is to come. But that which is to come is felicity. Moreover felicity and misery cannot exist together at the same moment. As often therefore as they partake of the former, so often do they not feel the latter. Accordingly it is only contemplatives who in this life are in any degree able to enjoy freedom of pleasure, and that but in part, in very small part, and upon the rarest occasion.¹ Beyond this there are even some righteous persons who enjoy freedom of counsel, in part certainly, but in considerable part.² For the rest, freedom of will (as hath been plainly shown above) belongeth equally to all who have the use of reason; as such, it is none the less in the evil than in the good, it is as entire in the present world as in the world to come.³

¹ For contemplation, as understood by the mystics, see Fénelon, *Explication des Maximes des Saints*, Art. XXI. "C'est l'oraison parfaite de laquelle parlait St. Antoine, et qui n'est pas aperçue par le solitaire même qui la fait. La contemplation est également autorisée par les anciens Pères, par les docteurs de l'école, et par les saints mystiques. Elle est nommée un regard simple et amoureux, pour la distinguer de la méditation, qui est pleine d'actes méthodiques et discursifs."

² There is a fresh paragraph in the MSS. here.

³ The economy of man as a social being plainly presupposes free will. Man, as a rational creature, "agit iudicio, quia per uim cognoscitiuum iudicat aliquid esse fugiendum, uel prosequendum. Sed quia iudicium istud non est ex naturali instinctu in particulari operabili, sed ex collatione quadam rationis; ideo agit libero iudicio, potens in diuersa ferri." It is upon the basis of such a postulate that he is the subject of "consilia, exhortationes, praecepta, prohibitiones, praemia et poenae." St. Thom. *Summ. Theol.* I. Qu. lxxxiii. Art. I.

CHAPTER VI

That grace is altogether necessary in order that we may will what is good.

IT hath, I think, been sufficiently shown that this freedom of will is yet in certain fashion held captive, so long as the other two kinds of freedom scarcely at all, or only in a small measure, accompany it ; and that from no other cause than the lack of these two kinds of freedom ariseth that defect of ours of which the Apostle speaketh, saying : “ So that ye cannot do the things that ye would.”¹ To will indeed belongeth to us in virtue of free choice, but not also the power to do what we will. I do not speak of willing what is good, nor of willing what is evil, but merely of willing. For to will what is good is a moral success, to will what is evil is a moral failure. But the simple act of willing, that it is which either succeedeth or faileth. Further, it is creative grace which gave existence to the will ; it is saving grace which giveth it moral success ; it is the will itself which bringeth about its own moral failure. Accordingly, free choice maketh us possessed of will ; grace maketh us possessed of good will. It is in virtue of free choice that we will, it is in virtue of grace that we will what is good. For even as it is one thing simply to fear, and another thing to fear God ; one thing simply² to love and another thing to love God (indeed, the terms fear and love, considered merely in the abstract, signify affections, but with the

¹ Gal. v. 17, *Vulg.*

² The MSS. omit this second “ simpliciter.”

addition of the object¹ they signify virtues); so also is it one thing to will and another thing to will what is good.²

The affections, truly, considered simply in themselves, belong to us by nature; in a certain sense they originate from ourselves; that they are directed towards their proper objects is due to grace. Nor, indeed, is the case otherwise than that grace ordereth aright what creation hath bestowed, so that the virtues are none else than the affections rightly ordered. It is written concerning certain men that "there they were in great fear, where no fear was."³ There was fear, but it was unregulated fear. The Lord wished to regulate it aright in His disciples, when He said: "I will show you whom ye ought to fear";⁴ so also David saith: "Come, ye children, hearken unto me: I will teach you the fear of the Lord."⁵ Thus, too, did the Lord rebuke men for unregulated love, saying: "I came as the light into this world, and men loved darkness rather than light."⁶ Therefore⁷ is it that the bride prayeth in the Song of Songs: "Order love in me aright."⁸ In like manner also were they rebuked for an unregulated will, to whom it was said: "Ye know not what ye ask."⁹ But they were taught

¹ Viz. God.

² In the MSS. there is no fresh paragraph here.

³ "Illic trepidauerunt timore, ubi non erat timor" (Ps. xiii. 5, *Vulg.*). St. Bernard reads "trepidassent." The A.V. and R.V. (Ps. xiv. 5) give nothing corresponding with "ubi non erat timor." The P.B. (Ps. xiv. 9) follows the Vulgate.

⁴ Luke xii. 5, *Vulg.* St. Bernard omits "autem," and reads "timere debeatis" for the "timeatis" of the Vulgate. Evidently he understands the object of fear, here referred to, to be, not the Evil One, but God.

⁵ Ps. xxxiii. 12, *Vulg.*

⁶ St. Bernard turns the "lux uenit" of John iii. 19, *Vulg.* into the first person, adding the emphatic "Ego," and inserting "hunc" before "mundum."

⁷ I. e. because it is grace alone which orders love aright.

⁸ "Ordinavit in me caritatem" is the Vulgate rendering of *Cant. Cant.* ii. 4. St. Bernard reads "Ordinate." "And his banner over me was love" (A.V. and R.V.).

⁹ Mark x. 38, *Vulg.*

to lead back the perverted will into the way of righteousness, when they heard: "Are ye able to drink of the cup that I am about to drink of?"¹ Then indeed by word, but afterward by example also, He taught them to order the will aright, when, praying, in the hour of His passion, that the cup might pass from Him, He added immediately: "Nevertheless not what I will, but what Thou wilt."² Therefore we have received from God in the state of nature the power to will, in the same way as we have received the power to fear and the power to love, so that thus we might be simply created beings;³ but to will what is good, even as to fear and to love God, we receive by the visitation of grace, so that thus we may become (not simply creatures but) God's creatures.

In a certain manner then, created as our own possession for freedom of will, by means of goodness of will we are made God's possession.⁴ Moreover it is He that made the will free, Who also maketh it good; and to this end doth He make it good "that we may be a kind of firstfruits of His creatures":⁵ since, better were it

¹ Mark x. 38, *Vulg.* St. Bernard substitutes "bibiturus sum" for the "bibō" of the Vulgate.

² The Vulgate of Matt. xxvi. 39, reads "sicut" for St. Bernard's "quod," and omits "uis" in the latter clause.

³ "Aliqua creatura," *i.e.* creatures possessed merely of a δύναμις τῶν ἐναντίων: the virtuous ἐνέργεια by reason of which we become, in the sense here intended, "Dei creatura" is due to grace.

⁴ St. Bernard would not, of course, deny that man in the merely natural state belongs to God; what he seeks to emphasize is that the one thing which is at man's absolute disposal, as a free being, is freedom of choice, *i.e.* the will as a δύναμις τῶν ἐναντίων; in the course of the argument he implies that the affections, so far as they may be directed by the will, are equally man's own possession. Only in the light of such considerations as these is it possible to maintain a due sense of human responsibility.

⁵ Quoted from the Vulgate of Jas. i. 18, with the substitution, in the Benedictine edition, of "aliquid" for "aliquod." The MSS., however, read "aliquid initium" for the "initium aliquod" of the Vulgate, and the question of a correction by Mabillon arises here, as elsewhere.

for us not to have existed at all than for us to remain always our own possession. For they, who willed to be their own possession, became indeed "as gods, knowing good and evil";¹ but they did not then belong only to themselves, they belonged to the devil also. Accordingly free will maketh us our own; evil will maketh us the devil's; good will maketh us God's. This is the meaning of the words: "The Lord knoweth them that are His."² For to them that are not His He saith: "Verily I say unto you, I know you not."³ When, therefore, by reason of evil will we belong to the devil, in a certain sense we do not meanwhile belong to God:⁴ even as when by reason of good will we become God's possession, we then cease to be the devil's; seeing that "No man can serve two masters."⁵ For the rest, whether we belong to God or to the devil, we do not cease to belong to ourselves also. Indeed free will remaineth to us in either case, whereby there remaineth also the ground of merit; so that deservedly we are either punished as evil persons, who have of their own will freely become such, or glorified as good, which equally we cannot be save only as free agents. In truth it is our own will, and not the power of God, which delivereth us over to the devil: it is God's grace, and not our own will,

¹ Gen. iii. 5, *Vulg.*

² 2 Tim. ii. 19. St. Bernard reads "nouit" for the "cognouit" of the Vulgate.

³ Matt. xxv. 12, *Vulg.*

⁴ This is the state of mortal sin, in which the determining factor is the deliberate choice of evil by the will. Plainly, *all* sin, whether mortal or venial, is a *deordinatio* of the will, but "quando anima deordinatur per peccatum usque ad auersionem ab ultimo fine, scilicet Deo, cui unitur per charitatem, tunc est peccatum mortale; quando uero fit deordinatio citra auersionem a Deo, tunc est peccatum ueniale." St. Thom. *Summ. Theol.* II. (1), Qu. lxxii. Art. 5. Cf. *Ibid.* III. Qu. lxxxvii. Art. 1: "Per peccatum mortale mens omnino a Deo auertitur, utpote contra charitatem agens; per peccatum autem ueniale retardatur affectus hominis, ne prompte in Deum feratur."

⁵ Matt. vi. 24, *Vulg.*

which maketh us subject to God.¹ Our will, of course, was (as must be confessed) created good by the good God; it will not, however, be perfect until it hath been perfectly subjected to its Creator.² But far be it from us to ascribe to the will itself its own perfection, while we ascribe to God its creation only; seeing that, without doubt it is better for it to be perfect than for it to have been simply made; and that, indeed, it seemeth to be blasphemy to ascribe to God the lesser, and to ourselves the more excellent work.³ Finally the Apostle, perceiving what was of nature, and what was to be expected of grace, said: "To will is present with me, but how to will perfectly I find not."⁴ He knew for a fact that he was able to will, as possessing free choice; but that, in order that he might will perfectly, he was in need of grace. For if to will what is evil is, as it were, a failure of the will, then to will what is good must be a success of the will; for the will, however, to be able to will everything that is good is its perfection.⁵

¹ "Nemo ei dicit 'sic hominem factum, ut de iustitia quidem posset in peccatum ire, et de peccato ad iustitiam redire non posset': sed ut in peccatum iret, sufficit ei liberum arbitrium, quo se ipse uitiauit; ut autem redeat ad iustitiam, opus habet medio, quoniam sanus non est; opus habet uiuificatore, quia mortuus est." St. Aug. *De Nat. et Grat.* xxiii. 25.

² The human will, regarded as *tantum uelle*, is the work of *creans gratia*, and as such is necessarily perfect; the moral perfection for which it is destined, and which is the work of *saluans gratia*, does not imply any imperfection in the work of *creans gratia*, nay, rather it is only on the foundation of the completed work of *creans gratia* that *saluans gratia* can build; to put it otherwise, the former perfection is organic, the latter functional.

³ Plainly it is deism to ascribe to God the organic, and to ourselves the functional, perfection.

⁴ "Nam uelle adiacet mihi: perficere autem bonum non inuenio" (Rom. vii. 18, *Vulg.*). St. Bernard reading "Velle adiacet mihi, perficere non inuenio," and playing upon the words *perfecta* and *perficere*, and using the latter term as a verb neuter, contrasts "tantum uelle" with "uelle bonum"; whereas St. Paul is really contrasting "uelle bonum" with "perficere bonum."

⁵ The perfection of the will consists in the acquirement of good moral habits (*habitus acquisiti*). Cf. St. Bern. *Epist.* ccliv. 4: "Quod si studere perfectioni, esse perfectum est; profecto nolle proficere, deficere est." There is no fresh paragraph in the MSS. here.

In order, therefore, to the perfection of that will of ours, which we possess in virtue of free choice, we stand in need of a twofold gift of grace, namely, both wisdom, which is the conversion of the will to what is good, and also full power, which is its establishing in the good.¹ Now perfect conversion is conversion to what is good, to the end that nothing may be pleasing save only what is fitting, or what is lawful; perfect establishing in the good is to the end that nothing which is thus pleasing may any longer be lacking. Then at length shall the will be perfect, when it shall have become both completely good and well satisfied.² The will possesseth, certainly, a twofold goodness from the beginning of its existence; the one, a general goodness derived from the mere fact of its creation, in that it could not have been created other than good by the good God, for "God saw all that He had made, and it was very good";³ the other, a special goodness derived from the freedom of choice, in virtue of which it was made even after the image of Him Who created it. Suppose now that to these two goods be added a third, its conversion to its

¹ These would appear to be two of the gifts of the Holy Ghost, *sapientia* and *fortitudo*. As regards the former, "per sapientiam dirigitur et hominis intellectus, et hominis affectus; et ideo ponuntur duo correspondentia sapientiae, tanquam directiuo; ex parte quidem intellectus donum intellectus; ex parte autem affectus donum timoris. Ratio enim timendi Deum praecipue sumitur ex consideratione excellentiae diuinae, quam considerat sapientia." St. Thom. *Summ. Theol.* II. (1); Qu. lxviii. Art. 4. St. Thomas's distinction between *virtutes* and *dona* may be illustrated by his language in *Articulus* 1 of this same *Quaestio*. With his characteristic respect for the authority of Aristotle he refers to the *Nicomachean Ethics* (VII. 1) as follows: "Philosophus supra uirtutem communem ponit quamdam uirtutem heroicam uel diuinam, secundum quam dicuntur aliqui diuini uiri." There is a fresh paragraph in the MSS. here.

² The paronomasia, "cum plene fuerit bona, et bene plena," is forcible, but difficult to render in English; the "plene bona" refers to *conuersio*, and the "bene plena" to *confirmatio*, which together effect the perfection of the will in the moral as distinct from the natural sphere.

³ Gen. i. 31, *Vulg.*, reading "uidit" for "uiditque."

Creator; then not unfittingly will the will be counted perfectly good; good, without doubt, as a mere created thing, better by reason of its special gift of freedom, best by reason of its being regulated aright.¹ But the regulation of the will consisteth in its conversion in every single respect to God, in its entire and free devotion and submission to Him. To such perfect righteousness, however, is rightly due, nay, indeed, is actually joined the fulness of glory; for these two things are so united the one to the other that the perfection of righteousness cannot be possessed, save only in the fulness of glory; nor can there be fulness of glory apart from perfect righteousness. Finally, as a matter of due merit, there can be no such righteousness apart from glory, seeing that there can be no true glory which is not derived from such righteousness; wherefore it is rightly said: "Blessed are they which do hunger and thirst after righteousness, for they shall be filled."²

But these are those two gifts of which we have above spoken, namely, true wisdom and full power; thus wisdom concerneth righteousness, and power concerneth glory. The terms "true" and "full" are added, the one in order to distinguish from the wisdom of the flesh, which is death,³ as well as from the wisdom of the world, which is foolishness with God, and by which men are wise in their own sight,⁴ "wise," I mean, "to do evil";⁵ the other, in order to distinguish from them of whom it is said: "Mighty men

¹ "Bona nimirum in uniuersitate, melior in suo genere, optima in sui ordinatione." There is a fresh paragraph in the MSS. here.

² Matt. v. 6, *Vulg.* For the limitation of the *bona uoluntas* in the sphere of grace see St. August. *De Grat. et Lib. Arb.* xvii. 33, 34, where he distinguishes between the will as *bona* and as *magna* and *robusta*, and identifies the latter with the "diuino amore ardentissima uoluntas" of Rom. viii. 35. There is no fresh paragraph in the MSS. here.

³ A reminiscence of Rom. viii. 6, *Vulg.*

⁴ Reminiscences of 1 Cor. iii. 19, and Rom. xii. 16, *Vulg.*

⁵ Jer. iv. 22, *Vulg.*

shall be mightily tormented.”¹ For neither true wisdom nor full power are to be found at all, except there are joined to the free will those two possessions, to which we have earlier referred, namely, freedom of counsel and freedom of pleasure. I should say that, certainly, he alone possesseth true wisdom and full power, who is at last able not only to will in virtue of free choice, but also to will perfectly in virtue of the remaining two kinds of freedom,² seeing that he can no longer will what is evil, nor fail in the attainment of what he wills; of which results the one, namely, true wisdom, cometh of freedom of counsel, and the other, namely, full power, cometh of freedom of pleasure.³ But who would dare to boast, because man hath it within his reach to become such and so great as this? Where, or when, is such an end attained? Surely, not in this world, is it? Were any disposed so to boast, he would be greater than Paul, who confesseth, saying: “How to will perfectly I find not.”⁴ Was Adam in Paradise such and so great as this? Surely, had it been so, never would he have been an exile⁵ therefrom.

¹ “Potentes autem potenter tormenta patientur,” Wisd. vi. 7, *Vulg.* St. Bernard omits “autem.”

² “Non tantum uelle . . . sed . . . et perficere.” St. Bernard would seem here to extend the connotation of the term *perficere*, as used on p. 32, so as to include, not only *uelle bonum*, but also *perficere bonum* in the sense in which St. Paul uses the latter terms in Rom. vii. 18. Of the two kinds of freedom referred to, *liberum consilium* implies *uelle bonum*, and *liberum complacitum* implies *perficere bonum* the former constituting *libertas a peccato*, the *libertas gratiae*, the latter constituting *libertas a miseria*, the *libertas gloriae*.

³ (1) *Verum sapere* is found only where there is *liberum consilium*, for there only “nec uelle ualeat quod malum sit.” (2) *Plenum posse* is found only where there is *liberum complacitum*, for there only “nec carere (ualeat) quod uelit.”

⁴ Rom. vii. 18, *Vulg.*, omitting “bonum.” Here, as we have already noticed, the course of the argument brings St. Bernard to St. Paul’s sense of *perficere bonum* (see p. 32); “to will perfectly” (*perficere*) meaning to will and to perform what is good; perfection would be lacking were *plenum posse* lacking.

⁵ The MSS. here read “exsul esset” for the “exsulasset” of the Benedictine text.

CHAPTER VII

Whether the first man in Paradise was endowed with this threefold freedom, and how far his endowment was lost by sin.

IT is now the place to consider a question which we have so far deferred, namely, whether the first man possessed in Paradise those three kinds of freedom of which we have spoken, that is to say, freedom of choice, of counsel and of pleasure, or, in other words, freedom from necessity, from sin, and from misery, in all their fullness ; or but two of them, or only one. And indeed, concerning the first of these, there is now no question, if we remember how plainly higher reason hath taught us that it is equally the possession of the righteous and of sinners. Concerning the remaining two it may not improperly be asked whether Adam ever possessed either both, or so much as one of them ? For, if he possessed neither of them at all, what is it that he lost ? Freedom of choice, at any rate, he always preserved intact both before and after his sin. If he lost nothing, in what did he suffer by being cast out of Paradise ? But if he lost either one of them, how did he lose it ? What is certain is that, from the time that he sinned, thenceforward, so long as he remained in the flesh, he was free neither from sin nor from misery. But again, he could in no measure have lost either of these freedoms, when he had once received it ;¹ otherwise he cannot be proved to have possessed in their perfection

¹ St. Bernard is, of course, stating this hypothetically, in order to elucidate his forthcoming distinction between the higher and lower degrees of *liberum consilium* and of *liberum complacitum*.

either wisdom or power, as we have above defined them, for he would have been able both to will what he ought not to have willed and to receive what he was not willing to receive.¹ Or should it rather be said that, in a certain measure, he possessed wisdom and power, but that, because he did not possess them in their fullness, he was able to lose them?² For, indeed, each of these hath two degrees, a higher and a lower. The higher degree of freedom of counsel is not to be able to sin; the lower degree is to be able not to sin.³ So also the higher degree of freedom of pleasure is not to be able to be disturbed; the lower degree is to be able not to be disturbed.⁴ Accordingly [the first] man received at his creation the lower degrees of both kinds of freedom together with full freedom of choice, and, when he fell into

¹ Cf. St. August. *De Trinit.* xiii. 5(8): "Beatus igitur non est, nisi qui et habet omnia quae uult, et nihil uult male." In this context St. Augustine quotes a striking statement of Cicero: "Velle enim quod non deceat, id ipsum miserrimum est: non tam miserum est non adipisci quod uelis, quam adipisci uelle quod non oporteat." For the defects consequent upon the first sin of Adam, see St. Thom. II. (2), Qu. liii. Art. 1. "Carentia prudentiae et cuiuslibet uirtutis includitur in carentia originalis iustitiae, quae totam animam perficiebat. Et secundum hoc omnes isti defectus uirtutum possunt reduci ad originale peccatum."

² There is a fresh paragraph in the MSS. here.

³ This distinction is recognized by St. Augustine. "Prima libertas uoluntatis erat, posse non peccare, nouissima erit multo maior, non posse peccare; prima immortalitatis erat, posse non mori, nouissima erit multo maior, non posse mori; prima erat perseuerantiae potestas, bonum posse non deserere, nouissima erit felicitas perseuerantiae, bonum non posse deserere." *De Corr. et Grat.* xii. 33. This last is the *nunquam peccandi uoluntaria felixque necessitas* (St. August. *De Perf. Just. Hom.* iv. 9). A somewhat similar distinction is found in St. Anselm (*Dialog. de Lib. Arb.*, xiv.). "Illa [libertas] quidem quae separabiliter [rectitudinem] tenet, fuit angelorum omnium, antequam boni confirmarentur et mali caderent; et est omnium hominum ante mortem, qui habent rectitudinem eandem. Quae uero tenet inseparabiliter est electorum angelorum et hominum; sed angelorum electorum post ruinam reproborum, et hominum post mortem suam." It will be plain, of course, that the *rectitudo*, of which St. Anselm speaks as possessed *separabiliter*, is of such a kind as to be within the reach of fallen man.

⁴ *Turbari*, i. e. *miser esse*.

sin, lost the two former. But he fell from the state of being able not to sin into that of not being able not to sin, having wholly lost freedom of counsel.¹ So too did man fall from the state of being able not to be disturbed into that of not being able not to be disturbed, having wholly lost freedom of pleasure. There remained to him only freedom of choice, and that subject to punishment, in that by its means he lost the other kinds of freedom; but it he could not lose. Having, indeed, by his own will become the servant of sin, deservedly he lost freedom of counsel. Further, having by reason of sin become liable to pay the penalty of death, how was he any longer able to keep possession of freedom of pleasure?²

Of the three kinds of freedom, therefore, which he had received, Adam, by the abuse of that which is called freedom of choice, deprived himself of the rest. But he abused it by the fact that, when he had received it for his glory, he made of it his disgrace, according to the testimony of the Scripture which saith: "Man when he was in honour, had no understanding; he was compared unto the foolish beasts, and become like unto them."³ To man alone, amongst living creatures, was it given, on account of his prerogative of free choice, to be able to sin. But it was given to him

¹ The higher degrees of *liberum consilium* and *liberum complacitum*, although they place man under law—*libertas agendi necessitatem non tollit, sed ponit* (Spinoz. *Tractatus Politici*, II. 11)—yet increase his moral freedom; *liberior igitur est voluntas quae a rectitudine non peccandi declinare nequit, quam quae illam potest deserere* (St. Anselm. *Dial. de Lib. Arb.*, I.); otherwise we should be correct in arguing *ideo Deum non voluntatem, sed necessitatem habere iustitiae, quia non potest uelle peccare* (St. August. *De Nat. et Grat.*, xlv. 54). Cf. St. Leon. *Serm. in Quadr.* i. 2: "Tunc est uera pax homini et uera libertas, quando et caro animo iudice regitur, et animus Deo praeside gubernatur." Thus also St. Augustine (*De Mor. Eccl. et de Mor. Man.* I. xii. 21), speaking of the relation of the *animus* to God, says that, *illo solo dominante*, it is *liberrimus*.

² There is here no fresh paragraph in the MSS.

³ Ps. xlviii. 13, *Vulg.*

not in order that he should accordingly¹ sin, but in order that, if he did not sin when he was able to have sinned, he might appear more glorious. For what could have redounded more to his glory, than if it could have been said of him, as the Scripture runneth: "Who is he, and we will praise him?" Why is he thus praiseworthy? "For wondrous things he did while he lived." What things? "Who was able to transgress," it saith, "yet did he not transgress; to do evil yet did he not do evil."² This honour, then, he preserved so long as he did not sin; when he sinned he lost it. But he sinned, because he was free to sin; nor was he free otherwise than by virtue of freedom of choice, whence it was indeed that he had in him the possibility of sinning. Yet was it not the fault of Him who gave him free choice, but of himself who abused it, in that plainly he converted to the use of sinning the faculty which he had received for the glory of not sinning.³ For although he sinned by means of the power which he received, he did not sin because he possessed the power to do so, but because he willed to do so. For, when the devil and his angels sinned, the rest also of the angels did not sin; not because they were not able to sin, but because they did not will to sin.⁴

Man's fall, when he sinned, is to be ascribed, therefore, not to the gift of the power to sin, but to the fault of the will. Nevertheless, though he fell by an act of will, he hath it not equally in his power by an act of will to rise

¹ The MSS. here read "perinde" for the "proinde" of the Benedictine edition; the distinction in meaning is not essential.

² Ecclus. xxxi. 9, 10, *Vulg.*

³ To hold God responsible for sin is to deny His existence as a moral governor. This is implied by St. Bernard's words in Chapter II, where he argues that, apart from moral freedom, neither good nor evil can be imputed. Cf. St. August. *De Lib. Arb.*, II. i. 3. "Et poena iniusta esset et praeium, si homo uoluntatem non haberet liberam."

⁴ There is no fresh paragraph in the MSS. here.

again free from sin ; because although there was given to the will the power so to stand that it should not fall,¹ there was not given it the power to rise again, if it fell. For not so easy is it to get out of a pit as it is to fall into it. By an act of will alone man fell into the pit of sin ; but no act of will is sufficient to enable him to rise again, seeing that now, even if he so will, he is not able not to sin.²

¹ For the protection divinely afforded to human *προαίρεσις* by (a) *χάρις*, (b) *νόμος* and (c) *τόπος*, see St. Athan. *De Incarn.* iii. 4, and compare Tatian, *Contr. Graec.* vii.

² Cf. St. August. *De Perf. Just. Hom.* iv. 9 : "Quia uero peccauit uoluntas, secuta est peccantem peccatum habendi dura necessitas, donec tota sanetur infirmitas." See also Canon xix. of the Second Council of Orange (A.D. 529) : "Cum sine Dei gratia salutem non possit custodire quam accepit, quomodo sine Dei gratia poterit reparare quod perdidit ?" It is important to notice that sin, as imputable, is essentially an act of will. "Mala uoluntas iam sola peccatum est, etiam si desit effectus, id est, si non habeat potestatem." St. August. *De Spirit. et Litt.* xxxi. 54. There is no fresh paragraph in the MSS. here.

CHAPTER VIII

That free choice remaineth after sin hath entered in.

WHAT then? Hath free choice perished, because man is not able not to sin? By no means: but man hath lost free counsel, by means of which he before possessed the power not to sin; he lost it, moreover, in such a manner that, because he is not able indeed any longer not to be disturbed, it befalleth him in his wretched state to have lost also freedom of pleasure, by means of which he before possessed also the power of being able not to be disturbed.¹ There remaineth, therefore, even after sin, freedom of choice, which, although in a state of misery,² is yet intact. And the fact that man is not able of himself to shake himself free of the bondage of sin, or of misery, doth not signify the destruction of freedom of choice, but privation of the two remaining kinds of freedom. For there neither belongeth, nor ever hath belonged, to freedom of choice, as such, to possess either power or wisdom, but merely will: it maketh us neither able, nor wise, but simply willing.³ Therefore we are not to be thought to have lost freedom of choice, if we cease to be either powerful or wise,⁴ but only if we cease to be willing. For where there is not will, there is not freedom. I do not say, if we ceased

¹ There is a fresh paragraph in the MSS. here.

² *I.e.* unaccompanied by *liberum complacitum*, freedom of pleasure, freedom “*experiri quid libeat, uel non libeat.*” Cf. IV. *supra*.

³ “*Posse, uel sapere, sed tantum uelle.*” Cf. VI. *supra*. “*Liberum arbitrium nos facit uolentes*”; this is its function, as such; it is the function of grace to bestow upon us the gifts of *uerum sapere* and *plenum posse*.

⁴ *I.e.* if the will ceases to be either *in bono confirmata*, or *ad bonum conuersa*.

to will what is good, but if we ceased to will at all : it must be allowed without contradiction that, when the will—no goodness of will—no longer existeth, then also freedom of choice is lost. But if the case be that the will is merely unable to will what is good, it meaneth that it lacketh, not freedom of choice, but freedom of counsel. Again, if the will be unable, not indeed to will what is good, but to perform the good which it willeth,¹ then let it be assured that it lacketh freedom of pleasure, not that it hath lost freedom of choice. If, then, freedom of choice everywhere accompanieth the will, in such a way that, unless the will wholly cease to be itself, it lacketh it not, but alike in evil and in good remaineth the will ; thus none the less doth free choice also abide in its fulness whether in evil or in good. And as the will, even when in the state of misery,² doth not cease to be the will, but is called, and is, the miserable will, as it is also called, and is, the blessed will ;³ so also can neither any adversity, nor necessity, either destroy or (so far as in it lieth)⁴ in any degree lessen freedom of choice.⁵

But, although free choice remaineth everywhere equally without any diminution, nevertheless it will not find itself able of itself to revive from an evil to a good state, after

¹ Its state being not yet that of *plenum posse*, in which the will is so established in the good "ut nil desit iam quod libeat." Cf. VI. *supra*.

² *I.e.* so long as it is in a state in which "non ualeamus, quod uolumus," and thus "sentimus quidem ipsam quodam modo libertatem esse miseram, non tamen amissam" ; a state out of which the will cannot pass until it attains to the *libertas gloriæ*. Cf. IV. *supra*. St. Bernard would hold, doubtless, that, in proportion to our possession of the *libertas gratiæ*, there are degrees in our *miseria* even in this world. See V. *supra*, *ad init.*

³ "Beata uoluntas." The point is that, whether it possess *libertas gloriæ* or only *libertas gratiæ*, it always possesses *libertas a necessitate*, and it is this last which constitutes it the will.

⁴ "Quantum in se est." The limitation, whatever it may be, of *liberum arbitrium*, cannot be imposed *ab extra* : free choice always remains self-determining.

⁵ There is no fresh paragraph in the MSS. here.

the same fashion in which of itself it was able to fall from a good into an evil state.¹ And what wonder is it if one that lieth prone be not able of himself to rise again, seeing that when standing upright he was unable by any effort of his own to advance to a better position? In fine, while freedom of choice still in some measure had with it the other two kinds of freedom, it was unable from the lower vantage ground of them to rise to higher levels, that is to say, to rise from the states of being able not to sin and being able not to be disturbed to those of not being able to sin and not being able to be disturbed: but if, even however aided by those other two kinds of freedom, it yet was not strong enough to advance from the good to the better, how much less, now that it is deprived of them, will it be able of itself to escape from evil to the good in which it stood of old?²

Man, therefore, hath need of "the power of God, and the wisdom of God,"³ even Christ, in order that, by reason of the fact that He is wisdom, He may reinfuse into him true wisdom,⁴ and thus restore to him the state of freedom of counsel, and in order that, by reason of the fact that He is

¹ St. Bernard is leading up to the doctrine of the necessity of grace. He begins by insisting upon the evil plight into which the will finds itself by reason of sin. Cf. St. August. *De Perf. Just. Hom.* iv. 9. "Quia uero peccauit uoluntas, secuta est peccantem peccatum habendi dura necessitas." In the *De Lib. Arb.* iii. 51-54, St. Augustine treats of the infirmity of the will due to sin: "Sunt etiam necessitate facta improbanda, ubi uult homo recte facere, et non potest," he boldly exclaims. See also his striking commentary on Rom. i. 21 sqq. in *De Nat. et Grat.* xxii. 24.

² The argument is an *a fortiori* one. If, with all the privileges of the *status innocentiae*, man fell, how, with all the drawbacks of the *status naturæ lapsae*, can he unaided rise again? The MSS. read here "de malo iam in id quod fuit bonum," etc., for "de malo in id," etc., of the Benedictine edition.

³ I Cor. i. 24, *Vulg.*

⁴ In order to convey the idea of the *infusion* of grace, and to exclude the Lutheran notion of imputation, it has seemed better to translate "uerum ei Sapere reinfundat" quite literally. The *uerum Sapere* and the *plenum Posse (infra)* are the two gifts of grace which constitute *uelle perfectum*. Cf. VI. *supra*.

power, He may re-establish in him full power, and thus restore to him the state of freedom of pleasure ; in such a measure that, being in virtue of the one perfectly good, he may no longer know sin, and, being in virtue of the other completely blessed, he may suffer no adversity. But in truth it is in the future life that such perfection as this is to be expected, when both kinds of freedom now lost will be restored¹ to free choice ; not merely in the measure in which in this world they are restored to any righteous person, however perfect he may be ; nor merely in the measure in which it was granted even to our first parents to possess them in Paradise ; but as already now the angels possess them in heaven.² Meanwhile, however, let it suffice in this body of death, and in this evil world,³ that by freedom of counsel we obey not sin in lust,⁴ while by freedom of pleasure we fear not to suffer adversity for righteousness' sake.⁵ But, in this sinful flesh and in this evil day, if not wholly to lack, certainly not to consent to sin, this is in no small measure to be wise ; and, if not yet wholly to enjoy felicity, at least for truth's sake manfully to endure contempt, this is in no small measure to be powerful.⁶

¹ The Benedictine editor reads " plene restaurabitur," with the alternative " plenarie " in the margin ; the MSS. omit the adverb altogether.

² The degrees of excellence in this respect are well expressed by the dictum of St. Prosper of Aquitaine : *Gratia est gloria inchoata ; gloria est gratia consummata*. Complete beatitude consists in *Deum per essentiam uidere* ; this man did not possess in Paradise, i.e. *ante peccatum*, nor did the angels possess it *ante confirmationem* ; but the good angels after the fall of the evil angels, were *confirmati*. Cf. St. Thom. *Summ. Theol.* I. Qu. lxii. Art. 8. " Cum non possit angelus beatus quidquam uelle uel agere, nisi Deum attendens, qui est ipsa bonitas, non potest aliquo pacto peccare." For the state, in this respect, both of man and of the angels in *prima sui conditione*, see St. Thom. *Summ. Theol.* II. (2), Qu. v. Art. 1.

³ Reminiscence of Rom. vii. 24 and Gal. i. 4, *Vulg.*

⁴ Reminiscence of Rom. vi. 12, *Vulg.*

⁵ Of course the lower degrees of *liberum consilium* and *liberum complacitum* are intended here. Cf. V. *supra*.

⁶ The *uerum Sapere* and the *plenum Posse* of VI. *supra*. There is no fresh paragraph in the MSS. here.

Truly it behoveth us here, meanwhile, by freedom of counsel to learn no longer to abuse freedom of choice, in order that in the future we may be able fully to enjoy freedom of pleasure. Thus, indeed, we are restoring in ourselves the image of God ; thus by means of grace we are being prepared to win that ancient honour which we lost through sin. And blessed is he who shall deserve to hear it said concerning himself : " Who is he, and we will praise him ? For he did wondrous things while he lived ; he was able to transgress, yet did he not transgress ; to do evil, yet did he not do evil." ¹

¹ Ecclus. xxxi. 9 and 10, *Vulg.* ; a passage already quoted in VII. *supra*, where the Vulgate is exactly followed. Here the Benedictine editor reads "malum" for "mala" of the Vulgate, while the MSS. read "mala" but omit "qui" before "potuit."

CHAPTER IX

That the image and the likeness of God, in which we were created, consist in a threefold freedom.

Now I think that in these three kinds of freedom consist the very image and the likeness of the Creator, in which we were created; that the image indeed consisteth in freedom of choice, while in the remaining two kinds of freedom is revealed a certain two-sided likeness.¹ Hence it is, perhaps, that freedom of choice alone suffereth not at all any defect or diminution of itself, because it is in it above all else that, as it were, may be seen impressed the substantial image of the eternal and unchangeable Godhead.² For although it had a beginning, yet it knoweth not destruction; neither hath it any increase from righteousness or from glory, nor doth it suffer any diminution from sin or from misery.³ What

¹ *Bipartita similitudo*. St. Thomas holds that a trinity in man is implied by his creation in the image of God: "in homine esse imaginem Dei et quantum ad naturam divinam, et quantum ad Trinitatem personarum" (*Summ. Theol.* I. Qu. xciii. Art. 5); even as, before him, St. Augustine had taught that "in homine inuenimus trinitatem, id est, mentem, et notitiam qua se nouit, et dilectionem qua se diligit" (*De Trin.* XV. vi. 10). St. Bernard, however, is nearer to St. Thomas in his differentiation between *imago* and *similitudo*; although, unlike the latter, he reserves the term *imago* for what is essential to man as man. Cf. St. Thom. *Summ. Theol.* I. Qu. xciii. Art. 4. "Imago creationis in omnibus inuenitur hominibus, sed recreationis, in iustis tantum, similitudinis uero solum beatis." It will be plain that the *imago in iustis* answers to the *verum sapere*, and the *similitudo in beatis* to the *plenum posse* of St. Bernard. See also St. Joh. Damasc. *De Fid. Orth.* II. 12.

² *Diuinitas*; but the English word "divinity" is, owing to its colloquial use, too weak.

³ *I.e.* the *liberum arbitrium*, as such, once created, is necessary, not contingent; although it had a γένεσις, it has no φθορά.

is there that, while it is not eternal, is more like unto eternity than is this? Further in the other two kinds of freedom, seeing that they can be not only partly diminished, but also wholly lost, we recognize as it were a likeness of divine wisdom, and a likeness of divine power, added to the divine image.¹ Finally we have lost them both by sin, and we have recovered them both by grace; and every day, indeed, we either advance in them, or we fall back from them, some of us more, others of us less. They can also be so lost that they cannot any longer be recovered; and they can be so possessed that they can never at any time be either lost or diminished.

In this two-sided divine likeness of wisdom and of power, not indeed in its highest degree, but in that which is next to the highest, was man created in Paradise. For what is nearer to the state of not being able to sin, or to be disturbed (in which without doubt the holy angels are now confirmed, and in which God always exists), than that of being able not to sin and not to be disturbed, in which, we know, man was created? And he—nay, rather, we in him and with him,² having by means of sin fallen from this state, have by means of grace received again, not indeed the very same degree thereof, but in place of it a certain lower degree. For we are not able to exist here

¹ For the manner of distinction between the *similitudo* and the *imago*, see St. Thom. *Summ. Theol.* I. Qu. xciii. Art. 9. “*Similitudo non distinguitur ab imagine secundum communem rationem similitudinis (sic enim includitur in ratione ipsius imaginis); sed secundum quod aliqua similitudo deficit a ratione imaginis, uel etiam est imaginis perfectiua.*”

² Cf. Corn. à Lap. *in Rom.* v. 12. “*In quo omnes peccaverunt: In quo, supple, non peccato, sed uno homini; Graecum enim ὁ est masculinum, ἀναπρία nero est femininum. Ita St. August. Lib. de Peccat. Meritis, X, qui et rationem addit: Quia inquit, omnes homines fuerunt ille unus homo, scilicet Adam.*” Thus, as Cornelius points out, “inobedientia et peccatum Adæ realiter inhaeret nobis, non autem tantum imputatur nobis.” See also Mozley, *Hist. and Theol. Essays*, II. p. 142.

in this world entirely without sin, or without misery; although we are able, by the aid of grace, to avoid being overcome by sin, or by misery. Nevertheless Scripture saith: "Whatsoever is born of God, sinneth not."¹ But this is said of them that are predestined unto life, not meaning that they do not sin at all, but that sin is not imputed unto them, being either punished by befitting penance, or in love put utterly away.² "Love," indeed, "covereth a multitude of sins,"³ and "Blessed are they whose unrighteousnesses are forgiven, and whose sins are covered."⁴ The angels therefore are in the highest, not the lowest grade, of the divine likeness, we are in the lowest; Adam was in the intermediate grade; the evil spirits, again, are in no such grade at all.⁵ To the angels in heaven then it was granted to endure to the end without sin and without misery; but to Adam it was granted to exist without these,

¹ "Omne, quod natum est ex Deo, non peccat" for the "omnis, qui natus est ex Deo, peccatum non facit" of the Vulgate of 1 John iii. 9.

² "Vel punitur condigna poenitentia, uel in charitate absconditur." What does St. Bernard mean by this? Normally every soul, even if by the grace of final perseverance it attains unto glory, must suffer the temporal penalties of sin. And yet even these, however *condigna poenitentia* may be, can never be such as to leave no scope for the divine *charitas*. God's dealing with the souls in purgatory is a work of love. Or is St. Bernard thinking of that rare thing, perfect contrition, which springs from the love of God for His own sake alone? The quotation immediately following suggests that this latter is in his mind.

³ St. Bernard reads "cooperit" for the "operit" of the Vulgate of 1 Pet. iv. 8.

⁴ Ps. xxxi. 1, *Vulg.*

⁵ The beatitude of the angels, *ante confirmationem*, was a *beatitudo naturalis*; for those who, *diuinæ gratiæ auxilio*, did not fall, this became a *beatitudo supernaturalis*; those who fell, lost finally their opportunity of acquiring this higher beatitudo; "hoc est angelis casus, quod hominibus mors"; they became "in peccato obstinati," a fact explained, St. Thomas holds, by the difference between the will of an angel and that of a man; "uoluntas hominis adhaeret alicui mobiliter, quasi potens etiam ab eo discedere et contrario adhaerere; uoluntas autem angeli adhaeret fixe et immobiliter." Thus man, after his fall in Adam, remains *poenitentiae capax*. Cf. St. Thom. *Summ. Theol.* I. Qu. lxiii. and lxiv. *passim*.

though not also to continue to exist without them;¹ to us,² however, it was not granted even to exist without them, but only not to be overcome by them. For the rest, the devil and his angels, even as they never have the will to resist sin, so are they never able to escape the penalty of sin.

Seeing, therefore, that these two kinds of freedom, freedom of counsel and freedom of pleasure, by means of which wisdom and power are supplied to reasonable creatures, do, by the dispensation of God, vary according as He willeth, in respect of certain causes, places and times—so that on earth they are possessed but in very small measure; in heaven fully; in the intermediate state moderately; in hell not at all—whereas freedom of choice, wherewith reasonable beings were created, is in no degree whatsoever changed by their condition, but (so far as it is free choice) is always equally possessed in heaven, on earth, and in hell; (seeing that this is so) it is only fitting that the two former should be held to be the divine likeness, and the latter the divine image. And indeed that in hell both kinds of freedom, which belong to the divine likeness, have perished, the authority of Scripture testifieth. For that true wisdom which cometh, we know, of freedom of counsel, doth not exist at all that passage sheweth, where we read: “Whatsoever thy hand can do, do it with all thy might: for there is neither work, nor judgement, nor wisdom in the lower world, whither thou hastenest.”³ Moreover, concerning power, which is granted by means of freedom of pleasure, the Gospel saith as

¹ *I.e.* Adam was not *confirmatus in beatitudine*, as were the good angels.

² *I.e.* in the *status naturae lapsae*.

³ Eccl. ix. 10. St. Bernard reads “*potest manus tua facere*” for the “*facere potest manus tua*,” and “*est*” for the “*erunt*” of the Vulgate, and omits “*scientia*.” Further, he is scarcely justified in understanding “*apud inferos*” of hell, rather than of the grave generally.

followeth: "Bind him hand and foot, cast him into outer darkness."¹ For what is binding of the hands and feet, if not complete deprivation of power?

But some one saith: How cometh it that there is not any wisdom there, where the ills that are suffered compel repentance for the ills that have been wrought? Surely it cannot be either that in torment a man cannot repent, or that to repent of evil is not true wisdom? Now this objection would rightly be raised, were it the case that what is punished is merely the deed of sin, and not also the evil will.² Certainly there is no doubt but that no one in torment delighteth³ to repeat an act of sin. But if, even in torment, the will remaineth evil, what value hath the abnegation of an evil act, that any man should therefore be accounted wise simply because now in the midst of the flames he taketh no delight in riotous living? In a word: "Into a soul that willeth evil wisdom shall not enter."⁴ Whence, however, shall we prove that even in that state, in which the lost are punished, the will remaineth evil? To omit all else, certainly they are unwilling to be punished. But it is right that they should be punished, who have done things deserving of punishment. Therefore they do not will what is right. He, however, who doth not will what is right, hath not a righteous will. By the fact then that his will doth not consent to what is righteous it is unrighteous, and thus also evil. Two things there are, either of which proveth a will to be wicked; namely, that it pleaseth it to sin, and that it pleaseth it to have sinned with impunity

¹ St. Bernard omits after "pedibus" the "eius," and read "proicite" for the "mittite," of the Vulgate of Matt. xxii. 13.

² The *opus peccati* is what is *materially* sinful; the *voluntas mala* is what is *formally* sinful. In the former case sin is not always imputed; in the latter case, in the nature of things, it necessarily must be imputed. "Mala voluntas iam sola peccatum est, etiam si desit effectus, id est, si non habeat potestatem." St. August. *De Spir. et Litt.* xxxi. 54.

³ In the sense of *enjoying the pleasure of*, as is presently explained.

⁴ Wisd. i. 4, *Vulg.*

(in the past). Thus to take pleasure in sin so long as it is possible to sin ; and, when it is no longer possible, to will that sin remain unpunished ; what of true wisdom is there in this? What good will does this show? But granted that it repenteth the lost to have sinned, can we say that the will is yet good if, were the choice given to it, it preferreth to continue in sin rather than to endure the punishment of sin?¹ The former is a wrong choice, the latter is a righteous. But when would a good will choose rather what is wrong than what is right? Besides, they do not truly repent, who do not so much grieve that they have lived unto themselves as that now no longer are they able to live unto themselves. Finally, a man's outward state revealeth his inward state. For so long as the body is in flames of torment, so long is it plain that the will persisteth in wickedness.² Accordingly, among the lost there is nothing whatever of that likeness of God, which consisteth in freedom of counsel and freedom of pleasure ; nor can there be ; yet, by reason of freedom of choice the image of God abideth there immovably.

¹ This were but the *dolor demonum* of which St. Thomas speaks : "Oportet dicere quod in eis sit dolor, et praecipue quia de ratione poenae est quod uoluntati repugnet" ; but "demon ergo, cum peruersae sit uoluntatis et obstinatae, de malo culpae non dolet." *Summ. Theol.* I. Qu. lxiv. Art. 3.

² A change of will in this respect would at once mean freedom from torment ; but there is no freedom from torment, and therefore there is no change of will. Not that St. Bernard would suggest the failure of remedial treatment, but rather the justice of penal treatment ; were the evil state of will in the lost remediable, the treatment would thereby become remedial and thus, on attaining its end, cease. St. Bernard assumes that it does not cease, so far corresponding with the unchangingly evil will, and being precisely that punishment which is "the other half of crime"

CHAPTER X

*That through Christ the likeness which properly belongeth to the divine image is restored in us.*¹

BUT in this world the likeness could nowhere reasonably be found, nay, rather the divine image would here still lie filthy and defaced, were it not that the woman of whom the Gospel tells should light her candle; that is to say, unless He who is Wisdom were to appear in the flesh, and turn inside out the house of sins and seek again the piece which He had lost,² namely, His own image, which, despoiled of its native beauty, encrusted with the filth of sin lay hidden as it were in the very dust; and when found, should cleanse it to its first fair state again, making it like unto the saints in glory; nay, rather, should make it in all respects like unto Himself, when the word of Scripture should be fulfilled, which saith: "We know that, when He shall appear, we shall be like Him; for we shall see Him as He is."³ And, in truth, whom did such a work befit better than the Son of God? Who seeing that He is the effulgence of the Father's glory, and the essential form of His very

¹ The *imago* is not the less itself because the *similitudo* is lost, but it was the divine purpose that the *similitudo* should accompany it as its proper possession and its befitting glory.

² Reminiscence of Luke xv. 8, *Vulg.* St. Bernard's language here must not be understood to contradict the statement that *libertas a necessitate* "nec peccato, nec miseria amittitur, nec minuitur" of IV. *supra*. The *imago* is still the *imago*, although, by reason of *mala uoluntas*, it is defaced so as, in many instances, to be not merely *deformis*, but even *foeda*.

³ I John iii. 2, *Vulg.*, reading "quia" for the first "quoniam,"

being, upholding the universe by His word,¹ manifested Himself, endowed with full power for the twofold work of restoring what was deformed and strengthening what was weak ; putting to flight the darkness of sin by the effulgence of His Godhead,² and restoring wisdom ; and by the virtue of His word giving power against the tyranny of evil spirits.³

He came, therefore, the very essential form⁴ (of God), to Whom the free choice (of man) had to be conformed :⁵ for, in order that it might receive again its original form, it needed to be reformed from the same source from which it had been formed.⁶ But the form is Wisdom ; the conformation consisteth in the image doing that work in the human body which the form doth in the whole world.⁷ Now that Wisdom "reacheth from one end to another mightily, and sweetly doth it order all things."⁸ It "reacheth from one end to another," that is to say, from

¹ Cf. Heb. i. 3, *Vulg.*, which reads : "Qui cum sit splendor gloriæ, et figura substantiæ eius, portansque omnia uerbo uirtutis eius," from which St. Bernard's only variants are "Patris" and "portans uerbo uniuersa." See Westcott *ad loc.*

² "De splendore figuræ." St. Bernard plainly indicates the θεότης by *figura*.

³ "Ex uirtute uerbi," suggests the various missions of the Son : He alone Who is ever "portans, et implens, et protegens" (St. August. *Conf.* I. iv. 4), can restore the *uerum sapere* and the *plenum posse* ; for the former of which cf. St. Athan. *De Incarn. Verb.* xii. 3: Τὸν πάντης (i. e. τῆς κτίσεως) ἡγεμόνα τὸν τοῦ Πατρὸς Λόγον . . . διὰ τοῦτο τὰ ὅλα κινῶντα, ἵνα δ' αὐτοῦ πάντες γινώσκωσι τὸν Θεόν ; and for the latter cf. Athen. *Leg. pro Christ.* x: Γεγένηται τὸ πᾶν διὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ Λόγου καὶ διακεκόσμηται καὶ συγκρατεῖται.

⁴ *Forma*. Cf. Phil. ii. 6, *Vulg.*, "Qui cum in forma Dei esset" : ὃς ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ ὑπάρχων. The word is nearer to the εἰκὼν of 2 Cor. iv. 4 and Col. i. 15 than is *figura*, which is rather σχῆμα. Cf. XIV., *infra*. "Oportuit . . . per formam reformari deformem."

⁵ Cf. Rom. viii. 29, *Vulg.*, "Conformes fieri imaginis Filii sui" : συμμόρφους τῆς εἰκόνος τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ.

⁶ For the fitness of the Word to restore the κατ' εἰκόνα χάρις, which He had bestowed in the beginning, see St. Athan. *De Incarn. Verb.* vii. 4. Τίνος ἦν χρεια πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην χάριν καὶ ἀνάκλησιν, ἥ τοῦ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος πεποιηκότος τὰ ὅλα τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου ;

⁷ I. e. The *forma Dei* is the Eternal Wisdom ; what He does in the universe *liberum arbitrium*, which is the *imago Dei*, is intended to do in us by means of being conformed to Him.

⁸ *Wisd.* viii. 1, *Vulg.*, omitting the "ergo."

the highest heaven to the depths of earth ; from the greatest angel to the very least of worms. But it "reacheth mightily," not indeed by digressive motion or by local diffusion, nor merely by official administration of created life, its subject ; rather by a certain essential¹ and omnipresent strength, whereby indeed He² moveth, ordereth, and governeth the whole universe most potently.³ And all this He doeth by no necessity that compelleth Him.⁴ Nor in these matters doth He work with any difficulty ; but, with a tranquil will, He "ordereth all things sweetly."⁵ In very truth He "reacheth from one end to another," that is, from the origin of created life even unto the end appointed for it by the Creator ; whether it be the end to which fallen nature impels it, or that which judgement hastens, or that

¹ "Substantiali." The phrase "Figura substantiae eius" (Heb. i. 3), in which the *substantia* of the Vulgate renders the ὑποστάσις of the Greek, suggests that it is the Divine Essence (Θεότης) that St. Bernard has in mind. See Newman, *The Arians of the Fourth Century*, pp. 365 sqq., and App. Note IV., 5th Ed., for the history of the terms ὑποστάσις and οὐσία.

² Nothing in the original marks the passage to a *personal* subject, but the sense of such a subject would naturally prevail as the statement proceeds.

³ For the immanence of the Word in the universe, κατὰ δύναμιν, see St. Athan. *De Incarn. Verb.* viii. 1. Οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ κενὸν ὑπολέλειπται τῆς κτίσεως μέρος· πάντα δὲ διὰ πάντων πεπλήρωκεν αὐτὸς συνὼν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ Πατρί. See also *Ibid.* xvii. 1 and 2. But His union with the universe is a union neither κατ' οὐσίαν, i.e. of identity (which would be pantheism), nor of personality, such as is His hypostatic union with the Sacred Humanity. Cf. St. Athan. *ut supra* xli. *passim* for the analogy between the immanence of the Word and His Incarnation.

⁴ The Divine Wisdom is no mere instrument of another will, but rather the free *Causa Principalis*, alike in His creative, in His providential, and in His redemptive work.

⁵ "Semper agens, semper quietus" (St. August. *Conf.* I. iv. 4) ; His very wrath, which no sinner can escape, for "quo fugit nisi a Te placido ad Te iratum?" (St. Aug. *ut supra* IV. ix. 14)—"non . . . sicut hominis, animi perturbatio est" (St. Aug. *De Trinit.* XIII. xvi. 21). Cf. St. Aug. *ut supra* I. ii.-iv. for a fine statement of the dynamic immanence of God. See also St. Anselm *in Heb. i. 3*. "Portat omnia, hoc est, sursum tenet, ne decidant, et in nihilum reuertantur unde creata ab Ipso fuerunt ; et sustentat ea non labore et difficultate, sed imperio suae potentiae."

which grace concedes.¹ He "reacheth from one end to another mightily," seeing that none of these ends is reached, that He doth not foreordain it, as He willeth, by the power of His providence.²

Therefore let free choice seek to rule its own body, even as Wisdom ruleth the world ; itself also reaching "from one end to another mightily," to wit, giving its commands to each sense and to each member with such authority that it allow not sin to reign in its mortal body, nor yield its members as weapons to iniquity, but rather present them for the service of righteousness.³ Thus no longer will the man be the servant of sin, when he doeth not sin ;⁴ from which indeed set free,⁵ he will now begin to recover freedom of counsel and to vindicate his dignity, while he clotheth himself with a likeness befitting the divine image in himself, yea, restoreth his ancient comely state. But let him take heed that he do this not less "sweetly" than "mightily" ; that is to say, "not of sorrow or of necessity,"⁶ which is but the beginning, and not the fulness of wisdom ;⁷ nay, rather,

¹ The passage is a little obscure. The Benedictine editor has the marginal note : "Finis creaturae triplex." In either of the three cases St. Bernard speaks of a *finis destinatus a Creatore*. We need not read into this a doctrine of predestination in the Calvinist sense ; such a doctrine is negatived by the whole treatise. There is an end answering to each of the three descriptions ; in the first fallen nature, in the second the Divine judgement (*causa*, in the sense of a judicial procedure), in the last grace is the ruling factor. It may be correct to distinguish *causa* from *natura* as implying deliberate sinning against light. Thus we get three classes, that of those who know not their Lord's will, that of those who know it and, in spite of grace, do it not, and that of those who know it and, by the aid of grace, do it.

² This, of course, is just St. Augustine's "quo fugit nisi a Te placido ad Te iratum ?" (*Conf.* IV. ix. 14).

³ Reminiscence of Rom. vi. 12, 13, *Vulg.*

⁴ Reminiscence of John viii. 34, *Vulg.* : "Omnis, qui facit peccatum, servus est peccati." See also Rom. vi. 6.

⁵ Cf. Rom. vi. 22, *Vulg.* : "Nunc uero liberati a peccato . . . habetis fructum uestrum in sanctificationem, finem uero uitam aeternam."

⁶ 2 Cor. ix. 7, *Vulg.*

⁷ "Non enim habet amaritudinem conuersatio illius, nec taedium conuictus illius, sed laetitiam et gaudium" (*Wisd.* viii. 16, *Vulg.*).

with a ready and a cheerful will, which maketh a sacrifice accepted, seeing that "God loveth a cheerful giver."¹ And thus in all things he will follow the example of Wisdom, both withstanding vice "mightily," and being "sweetly" at rest in conscience.

But in truth we need also the help of Him by whose example we are incited to such conduct as this; in order, plainly, that by means of Him we may be conformed unto Him, and be "transformed into the same image from glory to glory, even as by the Spirit of the Lord."² Therefore if it be by the Spirit of the Lord that this is brought about, it is no longer by free choice.³ Let no one then think that free choice is so called because with equal power or facility it concerneth itself with good and evil;⁴ seeing that it was indeed able to fall by means of itself, but not to rise again, save by means of the Spirit of the Lord.⁵ Otherwise neither God, nor the holy angels—for they are in such sense good, as not to be able to be evil; nor, again, the fallen angels—for they are in such sense evil, as not to be able to be good—could be said to possess freedom of choice. Nor, moreover, shall we lose free freedom of choice after the

Nevertheless, they who, by means of Wisdom, enjoy the friendship of God, are "propter disciplinæ dona commendati" (Wisd. vii. 14, *Vulg.*).

¹ The Vulgate of 2 Cor. ix. 7 reads: "hilarcm enim datorem diligit Deus." St. Bernard substitutes "quoniam" for "enim."

² 2 Cor. iii. 18, *Vulg.*: "A claritate in claritatem" renders the Greek ἀπὸ δόξης εἰς δόξαν, *claritas* being used in the sense of *renown*, *high reputation*. See XII, *infra*.

³ *I.e.* we do not change ourselves, it is God who changes us; yet we are free to co-operate with Him, or not. Cf. Jer. xxxi. 18, *Vulg.* "Conuerte me, et conuertar: quia Tu Dominus Deus meus."

⁴ This is the doctrine of equilibrium maintained by the Pelagians.

⁵ Cf. VII. and VIII. *supra*, *passim* and Notes. "Etsi datum fuit uoluntati posse stare ne caderet, non tamen resurgere si caderet." See also Westcott, *Gospel of Life*, p. 14, Ed. 1892: "There are two distinct elements in freedom, self-determination and right determination. Our consciousness tells us that we have freedom in the sense of self-determination, but that disturbing influences interfere with the fitness of our choice."

general resurrection, when, undoubtedly, we shall have been inseparably associated, some of us with the good, other of us with the evil, angels. For the rest, neither God nor the devil lacketh freedom of choice; for it is no weak necessity, but a will strong in the good, and a free strength of purpose, which maketh it impossible for the former to be evil;¹ and that the latter is unable to long after the good² no violent force of another effecteth but his own will, stubborn in evil, and his own free obstinacy. Therefore, then, freedom of choice is so called rather because, whether in doing good or in doing evil, it maketh the will equally free; for neither ought, nor can, any man be said to be either good or bad, except in so far as he is willingly such. On this reasoning he will fittingly be said to be equally situated towards good and towards evil, because plainly he has—not, indeed, equal facility in preferring³ but—equal freedom in willing the one or the other.⁴

¹ For the sense in which “bonitatem ipsam suam Deus absolute et necessario nult,” and so far possesses *liberum arbitrium* only “respectu aliorum a se, quae non necessario nult,” cf. St. Thom. *Summ. Theol.* I. Qu. xix. Art. 3 and 10; a limitation which simply means that “impossibile est eum malum culpae uelle.” The good and evil angels equally with God possess *liberum arbitrium* (St. Thom. *ut supra*, Qu. lxiv. Art. 2) “secundum modum et conditionem suae naturae.”

² “In bonum respirare.” The phrase is a difficult one; *respirare* in the sense of *pant* in eagerness does not appear to be classical, but such a rendering is suggested as suitable to the context.

³ “In electione facilitas.” The distinction is a little obscurely expressed. The Benedictine editor notes here: “Haec est libertas potentiae, seu facultas electiua, ad bonum et malum uersatilis; sed cuius exercitium et applicatio ad bonum pendet ex gratia. Cuius quippe conatus ad bonum, et cassi sunt, si a gratia non adiuentur; et nulli, si non excitentur” (*infra* XIII). What St. Bernard must mean is the distinction between *self-determination* and *right determination*.

⁴ For an instance of the strong assertion of free will on the part of the Christian apologists, see St. Just. Mart. *Apol.* I. 43: “Ὅτι ἐλευθέρᾳ προαιρέσει καὶ κατορθοί καὶ σφάλλεται, οὕτως ἀποδείκνυμεν. Τὸν αὐτὸν ἀνθρώπου τῶν ἐναντίων τὴν μετέλευσιν ποιούμενον ὁρῶμεν. Εἰ δὲ εἴμαρτο ἡ φαῦλον ἢ σπουδαῖον εἶναι, οὐκ ἂν ποτε τῶν ἐναντίων δεκτικὸς ἦν καὶ πλειστάκις μετετίθετο. Cf. *Ibid.* II. 7, and *Dial. c. Tryph.* 141; Tatian. *Contr. Graecos*, vii and xi.

CHAPTER XI

*That neither grace, nor temptation, taketh away from
freedom of choice.*

TRULY, as hath been said, by this prerogative of divine¹ dignity the Creator hath singularly honoured the reasonable creature; in such fashion that as He Himself was independent, and was good of His own will, and by no necessity imposed by another;² thus it also should in a manner be so far independent, as neither to become evil and justly to be condemned, nor to remain good and deservedly to be rewarded, save only of its own will. Not, however, that its own will could suffice unto it for salvation; but that without its own will it could take no step in the direction of salvation.³ No one, forsooth, is saved against his will. Nor, indeed, is what is said in the Gospel: "No one cometh unto Me, unless My Father draw him";⁴ and again, in another place: "Compel them to come in,"⁵ at all contrary to this; for, while certainly the loving Father, "Who willeth all to be saved,"⁶ seemeth to draw, or compel, as many as

¹ "Diuinae," the reading of the MSS., is omitted by the Benedictine editor.

² The terms "sui iuris," translated "independent," allow, of course, of the *necessitas* which is self-imposed by the divine nature itself, to which St. Thomas refers when he says that "bonitatem ipsam suam Deus absolute et necessario uult" (*Summ. Theol.* I. Qu. xix. Art. 3).

³ Cf. St. August. *De Spir. et Litt.* xxx. 52: "Liberum arbitrium non euacuatur per gratiam, sed statuitur, quia gratia sanat uoluntatem, qua iustitia libere diligatur."

⁴ "Nemo uenit ad me, nisi Pater meus traxerit eum," for the Vulgate of John vi. 44: "Nemo potest uenire ad me, nisi Pater, qui misit me, traxerit eum."

⁵ Luke xiv. 23, *Vulg.*

⁶ 1 Tim. ii. 4, omitting the "homines" of the Vulgate.

may be; nevertheless, He judgeth no one worthy of salvation, unless He have already found Him willing to be saved. And when He frighteneth men, or smiteth them, His purpose is to make them willing to be saved, not to save them against their will; in so far that, while He changeth the will from evil to good, He doth not take away its freedom, but transferreth its allegiance.¹ As for being drawn, however, it is not always against their will that men are drawn; for neither the blind, nor the weary, are saddened for being led or borne. Moreover Paul was led by the hand to Damascus,² certainly not against His will. Finally she was indeed most willing, who, in the Song of Songs, made earnest request saying: "Draw me; because of the savour of thine ointments we will run after thee."³

Then, on the other hand,⁴ there is the fact that it is written: "Each man is tempted by his own lust, having been drawn away and enticed by it";⁵ and also that "the body which is corrupted presseth down the soul, and the earthy tabernacle weigheth down the mind that museth

¹ Cf. St. August. *In Joh. Evan. Tract.* xxvi. 2: "Ora ut traharis . . . credere non potest nisi uolens."

² "Ad manus autem illum trahentes introduxerunt Damascum." Acts ix. 8, *Vulg.*

³ "Trahe me: post te curremus in odorem unguentorum tuorum." *Cant. Cant.* I. 3, *Vulg.* St. Bernard transposes *curremus* and the two following words, and reads *odore*. The Benedictine editor punctuates so as to take "post te" with "trahe."

⁴ "E regione." St. Bernard has dealt with the objection that the will is compelled by grace; he now passes to the question of its compulsion by temptation.

⁵ "Unusquisque tentatur a propria concupiscentia, abstractus et illectus." The Vulgate of Jas. i. 14 adds "uero" and gives "concupiscentia sua" for "propria concupiscentia." It is noteworthy that the objection, with which St. Bernard deals, would scarcely be raised on the ground of this text by a reader of the Greek; for it is essential to St. James's statement of the *rationale* of successful temptation to understand ἐξελεγχόμενος καὶ δελεαζόμενος as in the middle voice, "allowing himself (meanwhile, if tempted successfully) to be drawn out and enticed."

upon many things";¹ and that the Apostle saith: "I find another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin, which is in my members";² all these statements may be thought to imply that the will is under compulsion and deprived of its freedom. But the truth is that however a man may be pressed by temptation, whether from within or from without,³ his will, so far as concerneth choice, will be always free; in as much as, in spite of everything, it will be free to decide in the matter of its own consent.⁴ But so far as concerneth (freedom of) counsel or (freedom of) pleasure, as long as endureth the struggle with concupiscence and with misery,⁵ so long indeed doth the will

¹ The Vulgate of Wisd. ix. 15, with the omission of "enim" and the transposition of "terrena inhabitatio" and "deprimit," so that the latter precedes. This is a favourite reminiscence with St. Bernard; see e.g. XII, *infra ad fin.*, *De Conuers.*, XVII, and *De Præcept et Disp.*, XX; in all these three instances the same form is found.

² Rom. vii. 23. St. Bernard reads "Inuenio" for "Video" and omits "autem"; he also reads "captiuam me ducentem in legem" for the "captiuantem me in lege" of the Vulgate.

³ "Intus forisue tentationibus." Owing to the presence, even in the regenerate, of concupiscence there is in all men the possibility (which was not found in our Lord; cf. the phrase *χωρὶς ἀμαρτίας* in Heb. iv. 15) of temptation *ab intra*; "speaking generally, temptation may be regarded as *external*, when the suggestions presented to the imagination by the devil surpass in a large measure the force of natural desire—that is to say, when they play by far the greater part in temptation." Williams, *The Moral Theology of the Sacrament of Penance*, pp. 151 *sq.*, Ed. 1917.

⁴ For the will as the *causa deficiens* of an act of sin see St. Thomas, *Summ. Theol.* I. Qu. xlix. Art. 1. "In rebus uoluntarius defectus actionis a uoluntate actu deficiente procedit, in quantum non subiicit se actu suae regulæ," and II. (1), Qu. lxxx. Art. 1, where distinguishing between the will being moved "ab objecto, sicut dicitur quod appetibile apprehensum mouet appetitum," and "ab eo quod interius inclinât uoluntatem ad uolendum," he states that "ex hac parte sola uoluntas hominis sit directe causa peccati eius." Cf. St. August. *De Duab. Anim. contr. Manich.*, xi. 15. "Peccatum sine uoluntate esse non posse omnis mens apud se diuinitus conscriptum legit."

⁵ "Carnis interim concupiscentia, uitæque miseria reluctantæ." Probably *caro* is to be understood comprehensively of the *σάρξ* or lower self.

perceive itself to be restricted in its freedom ; though not on that account to be evil, save only if it consent to evil. Finally Paul, who complaineth that he is being drawn a captive to the law of sin¹—without doubt by reason that he hath not full freedom of counsel—nevertheless boasteth that the consent of his will is unimpaired, and now in large measure also free in well-doing, saying : “It is no longer I that do it.”² Whence, Paul, this confidence? Because, saith he, “I consent to the law of God, that it is good” ;³ and again : “For I delight in the law of God according to the inner man.”⁴ The eye being single he presumeth the whole body to be full of light.⁵ The consent of his will being unimpaired, he doth not hesitate to profess that, although drawn by sin and taken captive by misery, he is yet free in well-doing. And in this confidence it is that he concludeth generally : “There is therefore no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus.”⁶

¹ “In legem peccati trahi.” Cf. Rom. vii. 23, *Vulg.* “Captivum me in lege peccati.”

² Rom. vii. 17, *Vulg.*

³ Rom. vii. 16, *Vulg.*, with the addition of “Dei.” See Liddon’s masterly analysis of the psychology of Rom. vii. 14–25. The passage in question is a consideration of man’s condition in the *status gratiae*. Four stages are noted : the first, in which the lower self, in despite of the higher or true self, is enslaved to sin ; the second, in which is experienced the absence of good in the lower self ; the third, in which the sense of inward schism, a species of moral dualism, is accentuated ; the fourth, in which the sense of grace, as an invigorating and protecting force, is predominant.

⁴ Rom. vii. 22, *Vulg.*

⁵ Reminiscence of Matt. vi. 22 and Luke xi. 34, *Vulg.* “Si intentio tua fuerit recta, totum corpus tuum, id est, omnes aliae tuae facultates lucidae et rectae erunt.” Maldonatus in Luke xi. 36.

⁶ Rom. viii. 1, *Vulg.*, omitting “nunc” and substituting “his” for “his.” It is true that, alike for the regenerate and the unregenerate, “nullus peccati reatus contrahitur” in the absence of *consensus* ; but for the regenerate there is a far higher degree of security against the risk of *reatus*, other things being equal. Cf. St. August. *De Pecc. Orig.* xl. 44, where he states that “non solum peccata omnia . . . verum etiam ipsa desideria vitiosa . . . quae non in ista, sed in alia vita nulla erunt, eodem lanacro baptismatis universo purgantur.”

CHAPTER XII

Whether one that, for fear of death or of other penalty, denieth the faith is to be excused from blame, or to be held destitute of free choice.

BUT let us consider the case of those who, for fear of punishment or of death, have been nominally¹ compelled to deny the faith; let us consider whether, perchance, according to this declaration of their compulsion,² it is the fact either that no blame is due to them for denial of the faith merely by word of mouth, or that the will (as well as the tongue) could have been compelled by force to incur blame; so that, plainly, a man might will what it was admitted that he also did not will, and thus his freedom of choice be done

¹ "Verbo tenus"; i.e. they were subject to *external* force; the question is whether the will was subject to necessity *internally*, so that they were deprived of freedom of choice, or whether, freedom of choice remaining, yet, on the ground of the external force applied, their act was excusable. St. Thomas distinguishes the acts of the will as two-fold; "unus quidem qui est eius immediate, uelut ab ipsa elicited, scilicet uelle; alius autem est actus uoluntatis a uoluntate imperatus, et mediante alia potestate exercitus, ut ambulare et loqui; qui a uoluntate imperantur, exercentur autem mediante potentia motiua." In regard of the former acts, *actus eliciti*, the will cannot suffer violence; in regard of the latter, *actus imperati*, it can. This is, in fact, the distinction which St. Bernard seeks to elucidate here. Cf. St. Thom. *Summ. Theol.* II. (1), Qu. vi. Art. 4. In any given case, however, the question is how far the compulsion is absolute; upon that depends the extent to which blame is due. Both St. Thomas and St. Bernard would agree in holding that the *actus elicited* alone is *ipse proprius actus uoluntatis*, a true act of free choice.

² "Iuxta hanc assertionem." St. Bernard appears to use the term *assertio* in its technical sense of a formal declaration either of freedom or of servitude.

away.¹ And because this were impossible (for a man could not at one and the same time both will and not will the same thing), the question is asked how it is right that evil should be imputed to them that in no way will evil.² For such sin is not as is original sin, by which one who, as yet unregenerate by baptism, not only in the absence of consent, but also for the most part in ignorance as to his state, is on other grounds held in bondage.³ Let us take, for example, the Apostle Peter. He seemed, indeed, against his own will, to deny the truth, inasmuch as he was under the external necessity of either denying it or suffering death. Fearing death he denied it. He was unwilling to deny it, but he was more unwilling to die. Accordingly he denied it against his will; nevertheless he did deny it, lest he should die. But although the man⁴ was compelled to say with his tongue, and not with his will, what he was unwilling to say, he was not compelled to will what he did not will. His tongue was moved against his will;⁵ but was his will at all changed? What was it that he willed? He willed, truly, to be what he was, a disciple of Christ. What was he saying? "I know not the man."⁶ Why did he say this?

¹ Such a person is supposed to say: "I was under compulsion, when I denied the faith." This is his *assertio*. St. Bernard asks what he means by this. Does he mean that the *actus imperatus* was prevented by *force majeure*, or (*quod impossibile est*) that the *actus elicited* was necessitated? "Velle non potest inuitus, quia uelle non potest nolens uelle." St. Anselm. *De Lib. Arbitr.* v.

² *I.e.* whenever denial of the faith is justly blamed, such denial must be an *actus elicited*.

³ *I.e.* "damnatae originis propagatio [eum] damnat" (St. August. *De Pecc. Orig.* xxxii. 37), and not personal sin.

⁴ "Homo"; possibly with a suggestion of human frailty, for which external force was too powerful.

⁵ *I.e.* The *membrum* was unable to fulfil the *actus imperatus*. Cf. St. Thom. *ut supra*, II. (I), Qu. vi. Art. 4. "Quantum igitur ad actus a uoluntate imperatos, uoluntas uolentiam pati potest, in quantum per uolentiam exteriora membra impediri possunt ne imperium uoluntatis exequantur."

⁶ Matt. xxvi. 72, *Vulg.*, omitting "quia."

He willed to escape death.¹ But why was he deserving of reproach in so doing? ¶ We recognize in the Apostle two acts of will; the one, by which he willed not to die, a thing wholly free from blame; the other, by which he delighted to be a Christian, which was highly praiseworthy.² ¶ In what then was the Apostle blameworthy? Was it in that he preferred to lie rather than to die?³ Plainly this act of will was deserving of blame, for he willed to preserve the life of the body rather than that of the soul. "The mouth, to wit, that lieth slayeth the soul."⁴ He sinned therefore, and not without the consent of his own will, which was feeble indeed and wretched, but certainly free. He sinned, however, not by rejecting or hating Christ, but by loving himself too much. Nor did that sudden fear of death compel his will by force to this perverse self-love; but it proved it to exist.⁵ He was, without doubt, already such a man as this, but he

¹ A further distinction may be noted here. The Apostle's denial, so far as an act of will, was an *actus uoluntarius in causa*, i.e., indirectly voluntary; his act of willing to escape death was an *actus uoluntarius in se*, i.e. directly voluntary.

² Both these were *actus elicit*i; both were therefore, true acts of free choice. But, owing to a certain measure of external compulsion, their corresponding *actus imperati* could not both be fulfilled.

³ St. Bernard evidently regards this preference as a further *actus elicit*us; not as a case of the vitiation of consent by grave fear, a possibility recognized, it should be noted, both by Canon and by Civil Law. St. Bernard would probably hold with St. Thomas, that "quod per metum agitur, in se consideratum non est uoluntarium, sed fit uoluntarium in casu, scilicet ad uitandum malum quod timetur" (St. Thom. *Summ. Theol.* II. (1), Qu. vi. Art. 6); for the *actus uoluntarius in casu*, he finds the Apostle responsible. For St. Alphonso's answer to the question, *An metus excuset a transgressione praecepti*, see St. Alphons. *Theol. Mor.* I. 175. "Si ex metu facis quod simpliciter malum est, peccas quidem; minuitur tamen per metum malitia, quia minuitur libertas." As regards "metus grauis, u. gr. mortis, etc.," he adds, "saepe non tantum excusat a praecepto positio, tam diuino, quam humano, sed quandoque etiam ab affirmatio naturali."

⁴ Wisd. i. 11, *Vulg.*, substituting "nempe" for "autem."

⁵ The fear of death, excited by the external conditions, resulted in the *actus elicit*us, i.e. "uoluntas, qua uoluit non mori"; then followed the *actus imperatus*: "Non noui hominem." Thus was revealed the act that the Apostle was already of a certain temperament.

knew it not; although he had heard Him, from whom the truth could not be hidden, say: "Before the cock crow, thou shalt deny Me thrice."¹ Thus that weakness of will, which was revealed, but not caused, by fear inspired, made known the extent to which he loved himself, and the extent to which he loved Christ—made it known however, not to Christ, but to Peter. For, even before all this happened, Christ "knew what was in man."² In so far therefore as he loved Christ, his will (so to do), it is not to be denied, plainly suffered violence, so that he spake in contradiction of himself:³ but in so far as he loved himself, without doubt he freely consented, so that he spake on behalf of himself.⁴ Had he not loved Christ, he would not have denied Him unwillingly; but had he not loved himself more, he would not have denied Him at all. Therefore it must be confessed that the man was compelled, although not to change, yet to dissemble his own will:⁵ compelled, I mean, not to yield in love to God, but to yield somewhat from love of self.⁶

What then? Is all that hath been said above concerning the freedom of the will, perchance, untrue, because,

¹ Matt. xxvi. 34, *Vulg.*, substituting "priusquam" for "antequam."

² John ii. 25, *Vulg.*

³ *I.e.* the *actus imperatus* was forcibly thwarted, and failed to correspond with the *actus elicited*.

⁴ *I.e.* the *actus imperatus* had its effect in correspondence with the *actus elicited*.

⁵ The failure of the *actus imperatus*, to confess Christ, suggested the lack of the corresponding *actus elicited*.

⁶ "Non quidem recedere ab amore Dei; cedere tamen aliquantulum amore sui." But is it possible to indulge self-love in any measure without depriving God of the love due to Him? St. Bernard can only mean that the will to love God was not, as an *actus elicited*, subjected to force by the fact that its *actus imperatus*, the will to confess Christ, was thwarted; while the thwarting of its *actus imperatus*—which was inevitable on the fulfilment of a conflicting *actus imperatus*, namely the will to deny Christ—was to be accounted for by external compulsion. Nevertheless, that, finally, "mentiri, quam mori maluit" was an *actus elicited*, and so far free. It is possible that "aliquantulum" is ironic.

without doubt, it hath been found that the will can be compelled? Yes, certainly; but only if the will could be compelled by another than itself. If, however, it was the will itself that compelled itself, being at once subjected and subjecting; then, just when it seemed to lose its freedom, it actually received it. Of a truth, the force which the will used against itself, it used of itself. Further, what it used of itself, it used as an act of will. What force it used as an act of will, it used, not as necessitated from outside itself, but as a voluntary act.¹ But if as a voluntary act, also as a free act. Finally, one, whose own will compelled him to deny the faith, was compelled because he willed to be compelled: nay, rather, he was not compelled,² but he consented, and that not to an external force other than himself, but to his own will, the will, namely, by all means to escape death. Otherwise how could some woman's voice³ have availed to shape a holy tongue to wicked words, had not the will, the mistress of the tongue, assented? Finally, when afterwards he refrained himself from that excessive love of self, and began, as he ought to do, to love Christ with all his heart and all his soul and all his strength; then could his will⁴ by no threats or penalties be forced in any measure to yield his tongue a weapon unto unrighteousness,⁵ but rather, boldly complying with

¹ St. Bernard is thinking of the final *actus elicited*, by which the Apostle "mentiri, quam mori uoluit." As regards such an act as this "impossibile est uoluntati quoad proprium eius actum, qui est uelle ipsum, uiolentiam inferri; sicut contingit quoad actus imperatos, quos uidelicet exercet mediante alia potentia quæ propter exteriora aliqua ab actu suo impediri potest." St. Thom. *Summ. Theol.* II. (1), Qu. vi. Art. 4. Essentially that which is voluntary is a *principio intrinseco* and *secundum inclinationem uoluntatis*.

² *I.e.* in the sense of suffering violence a *principio extrinseco*.

³ "Vox mulierculæ." Possibly, as is suggested, the diminutive is contemptuous.

⁴ The Benedictine text reads "uoluntati," with the variant "uoluntas" in the margin.

⁵ Reminiscence of Rom. vi. 13, *Vulg.*

the truth, he said: "We ought to obey God, rather than men."¹

There is, verily, a twofold compulsion, according to which we are compelled either to suffer something, or to act, contrary to our own will. Passive compulsion (for so the former is rightly named) indeed can sometimes take place without the consent of the will of him² that suffereth it, but active compulsion never can. Accordingly, the evil which is done in us, or concerning us, is not to be imputed to us, provided that our will have not consented. For the rest the evil which is done by our active agency is not done without the will incurring blame.³ Plainly we are proved to will evil, which would not be the case, if we did not will it.⁴ There is then, too, an active compulsion (as well as a passive), but it doth not excuse the will from blame, when it is also accepted freely. A Christian (in the case in point) was compelled to deny Christ, and

¹ Acts v. 29, *Vulg.* In this case the final *actus elicited* was "*mori, quam mentiri maluit*"; nor was its corresponding *actus imperatus* thwarted by any external compulsion.

² Corresponding with this *gemina compulsio* "*uoluntarium potest aliquid dici dupliciter: uno modo secundum actionem, puta cum aliquis nult aliquid agere; alio modo secundum passionem, scilicet cum aliquis nult pati ab alio*" (St. Thom. *Summ. Theol.* II. (1), Qu. vi. Art. 5). Nevertheless, no external compulsion, "*cum actio infertur ab aliquo exteriori*," can, *a se*, change the *uoluntas non patiendi* so that it becomes a *uoluntas patiendi*; it can inflict the suffering, but it cannot *qua* compulsion, change the will not to suffer. Strictly, what St. Bernard states is true only of the *actus imperatus*, not of the *actus elicited*.

³ St. Bernard has, of course, eliminated the consideration of the vitiation of consent by grave fear; his point is simply that, *secundum actionem*, no external compulsion can prevent the *actus imperatus* from corresponding with the *actus elicited*, whereas, *secundum passionem*, it may.

⁴ St. Bernard recurs here to the thought above suggested by the words "*nec in hunc perversum amorem sui uoluntatem metus ille subitus compulit; sed esse conuicit.*" It amounts to this, that *secundum actionem* no *actus imperatus* can be fulfilled which contradicts its *actus elicited*; e.g. if a man, under external conditions which may appear *verbo tenus* to compel him, commits a crime, the crime, the *actus imperatus*, does not contradict the *actus elicited*, the *proprius actus uoluntatis*, but simply reveals what it is—grave fear apart,

that indeed regretfully, nevertheless not otherwise than as an act of will. He was all too willing to escape the headman's sword; and such a will ruling within him, and not the sword before his eyes, it was which opened his mouth. Thus the sword did not compel his will, but proved it to be what it was. Therefore the will itself brought itself under blame, not the sword. In a word, where the will was right, men could be slain, but they could not be bent. This it is which had been foretold them: "They shall do unto you whatsoever they will,"¹ to your bodily members however, not to your hearts.² Ye shall not do what they will; but they shall do what they will, and ye shall suffer. They shall torture your bodily members, but they shall not change your will; they shall deal savagely with your flesh, but shall have nothing that they can do unto your soul.³ Although the body of the sufferer may be in the power of the tormenter, yet his will is free. By their cruel dealing they shall discover whether the will be weak; they shall not compel it to be weak, if it be not weak already. Truly its weakness is from itself; but its health is not from itself, but from the Spirit of the Lord. It is healed when it is renewed.⁴

¹ Reminiscence of Mark ix. 12. "Elias venit (et fecerunt illi quaecunque uoluerunt) sicut scriptum est de eo." See also Matt. xvii. 12. The reference to this *scriptum* is peculiar to St. Mark, and probably has in view some otherwise unrecorded saying connected with Mal. iv.

5, ⁵⁹.

² "Corda," i.e. "uoluntates."

³ The Bénédictine editor has the following footnote to the passage in the text: "Hoc est quod eis praedictum fuerat . . . quid faciant." "Sic habent codices Dionysianus, Cisterciensis, et alii duo. Horstius aliter. *Hoc est quod dictum est de Joanne: Fecerunt . . . uoluerunt. Numquid quod uoluit ille? Ita et in reliquos Martyres fecerunt; non quod Martyres uoluerunt, sed quod ipsi. Fecerunt, inquam, in eos quae uoluerunt, sed in membra, non corda. Membra cruciauerunt, sed uoluntatem non mutauerunt. Saeuierunt in carnem; animae autem non habuerunt quid facere. Et ita in cod. Colbertino.*"

⁴ Cf. 2 Cor. iv. 16. "Per gratiam sanatio animae a uitio peccati, per animae sanitatem libertas arbitrii, per liberum arbitrium iustitiae dilectio, per iustitiae dilectionem legis operatio. Ac per hoc, sicut lex

Furthermore, it is renewed when, as the Apostle teacheth, "beholding the glory of the Lord, it is transformed from glory to glory," that is, from strength to strength, "as by the Spirit of the Lord."¹ Between which divine Spirit, indeed, and the fleshly appetite, that in man which is called free choice, that is to say, the human will, taketh, as it were, a middle place : and, like unto one hanging in doubtful plight on the steep slope of a very high mountain, thus in the matter of appetite is the will made weak through the flesh, so that, unless the Spirit by means of grace perseveringly helpeth its 'weakness,'² not merely is it unable, by ascending from strength to strength, to attain unto the summit of righteousness, which is, according to the prophet, "even as the mountains of God";³ but, rolling downwards by its own weight from vice to vice, it falleth headlong, overburdened, in truth, not only by the law of sin originally implanted in its members, but in addition by the habits of its "earthly tabernacle" which use hath grafted upon the affections.⁴ Of both of which burdens of the human

non euacuatur, sed statuitur per fidem, quia fides impetrat gratiam, qua lex impleatur : ita liberum arbitrium non euacuatur per gratiam, sed statuitur, quia gratia sanat uoluntatem, qua iustitia libere diligatur" (St. August. *De Spirit. et Litt.* xxx. 52). St. Augustine, of course, here means by *liberi arbitrii statuta* St. Bernard's *libertas consilii*; the *sanatio uoluntatis* makes *liberum arbitrium* to be *liberum consilium*, free with the freedom implied by the presence of the Spirit of the Lord (2 Cor. iii. 17).

¹ 2 Cor. iii. 18, *Vulg.*, with the substitution of "speculando" (transposed) for "speculantes," and "transformatur" for "transformamur." The explanatory terms, "de uirtute in uirtutem," are a reminiscence of Ps. lxxxiii. 8, *Vulg.* The whole passage suggests the development of *libertas complaciti* out of *libertas consilii*. See X, *supra*.

² Reminiscence of Rom. viii. 26.

³ "Iustitia tua sicut montes Dei." Ps. xxxv. 7, *Vulg.*

⁴ "Consuetudine terrenae inhabitationis usualiter affectionibus inlita." For "terrena inhabitatio," cf. Wisd. ix. 15, *Vulg.* "Usualiter" may mean simply *usually, as a rule*; but such a rendering would suggest banality, and that given above is more respectful to the philosophy of St. Bernard. The whole passage is a fine instance alike of the poetic vein and of the moral theology of the writer. Cf. St. August. *De*

will Scripture, forsooth, telleth briefly in a verse, when it saith: "The body which is corrupted presseth down the soul, and the earthy tabernacle weigheth down the mind that museth upon many things."¹ And these two ills of our mortal state, even as they do not injure, but rather train, them that do not consent to temptation;² so also do they not excuse, but rather condemn, them that do so consent; so that neither salvation, nor condemnation, can by any means follow, unless there precede the consent of the will; lest, by any chance, freedom of choice should seem to be in a measure subject to the dictates of force.³

Nat. et Gratia, iv. 4, where the sin *originaliter tractum* is distinguished from that *malis moribus additum*. The term *affectiones* is, probably, to be taken strictly for the movements of reasonable appetite, as distinct from *passiones*, the movements of sensual appetite; their character at any moment of a man's life is, of course, largely determined by the use to which they have been put in the past. "Interest qualis sit voluntas hominis; quia si peruersa est, peruersos habebit hos motus; si autem recta est, non solum inculpabiles, verum etiam laudabiles erunt. Voluntas quippe est in omnibus, immo omnes nihil aliud quam uoluntates sunt." St. August. *De Civit Dei*, xiv. 6.

¹ Wisd. ix. 15, *Iulgr.*, omitting "enim" and transposing "terrena inhabitatio" and "deprimit." Cf. XI. *supra* and Note, where St. Bernard quotes in exactly the same form as here a passage which has evidently much impressed him.

² For the necessity of temptation as a discipline see St. Bern. *In Cant. Cant. Serm.* lxiv. 1: "Necesse est ut ueniant tentationes. Quis enim coronabitur, nisi qui legitime certauerit? Aut quomodo certabunt, si desit qui impugnet?" Cf. St. Bern. *De Diuers. Serm.* iii. 1: "Unde et cognito suo de tentatione profectu, non tantum non refugit, sed etiam tentari appetit: *Proba me*, inquit, *et tenta me*. Crebris itaque huiusmodi uicissitudinibus inter gratiae uisitationem et tentationis probationem in schola uirtutum proficiens, faciente utique uisitatione ne deficiat, tentatione ne superbiat: tali tandem exercitio mandato oculo interiori, statim adest lux. . . ." God is, of course, only the *permissive*, and neither the *effective* (the Evil One), nor the *disposing* cause (human conditions) of temptation. See 1 Cor. x. 13 and Jas. i. 12 *sqq.*

³ "Praescribi," *i. e.* to be under commands, which it cannot choose but obey.

CHAPTER XIII

That human merits are no other than divine gifts.

WHEREFORE that which in created beings is called free choice is, surely, either justly condemned, seeing that by no external force is it predetermined to commit sin; or it is mercifully saved, for no righteousness of its own sufficeth unto it for righteousness.¹ And let the reader bear well in mind that, in what is here said, no account at all is taken of the fact of original sin.² For the rest, let not the cause of the condemnation of free choice be sought outside itself, for nothing in fact condemneth it, save only its own fault; nor are the merits of salvation of itself, but mercy alone saveth it.³ Moreover, its efforts to do good both are

¹ "Cui ad iustitiam nulla uirtus sufficit sua" is the Benedictine reading. The MSS. omit "uirtus." The Benedictine editor gives the following footnote: "Quidam codices, *nulla uis*, Dionysianus: *ad iustitiam nullo modo sufficit sua*." Reading with the MSS. we must understand by "iustitiam" *righteousness in God's sight, true righteousness*.

² "Sane in his omnibus cogitet lector originalis peccati prorsus excipi rationem," *i. e.* what is here urged is true, quite apart from the *peccatum originis*; when that is taken into account the conclusion is strengthened and it is true *a fortiori*. Cf. St. Thom. *Summ. Theol.* II. (I), Qu. cix. Art. 2, for man's need of divine help, not only in his fallen, but also in his unfallen state. "Indignit homo in statu naturae integræ gratuito quodam auxilio, ut bonum non naturale, sed supernaturale uellet et operaretur: et in statu naturae lapsae, quanquam particulare aliquod bonum uelle et operari posset, necessaria tamen ei diuina gratia fuit, ut eius natura sanaretur, et bonum meritorium operaretur, et uellet."

³ "Nullus miser de quacunque miseria liberatur, nisi qui Dei misericordia praeuenitur, sicut dicit Psalmista: *Cito anticipent nos misericordiae tuae, Domine*; et illud: *Deus meus, misericordia eius praeueniet me*." *Concil. Arausicanum Sec. Can. XIV.*

in vain, if they be not aided, and do not exist at all, if they be not moved, by grace.¹ Besides, as the Scripture telleth, the senses and the thoughts of man are prone to evil.² Accordingly, as hath been said, his merits are not to be held as accruing to him of himself (as their source), but rather as descending from on high from the Father of lights; if, of course, the very merits whereby eternal salvation is gained are to be reckoned amongst the best and perfect gifts.³

For God, "Who is our King of old," when "He wrought salvation in the midst of the earth,"⁴ divided His gifts unto men⁵ into merits and rewards; to the end both that the present gifts might, as freely possessed by us, become our merits in the meantime, and that we might look forward to receiving the future gifts as gratuitously promised by Him—nay, rather, expect them as due.⁶ It is in reference to both

¹ "Haec voluntas quae libera est in malis, quia delectatur malis, ideo libera in bonis non est, quia liberata non est. Nec potest homo boni aliquid uelle, nisi adiunetur ab eo qui malum non potest uelle, hoc est, gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum." St. August. *Contr. Duas Epist. Pelagian.* I. 3 (7). Cf. St. Thomas, *Summ. Theol.* II. (1), Qu. cxii. Art. 2: "Ipse bonus motus liberi arbitrii, quo quis prae- paratur ad donum gratiae suscipiendum, est actus liberi arbitrii moti a Deo."

² Reminiscence of Gen. viii. 21, *Vulg.* "Sensus enim et cogitatio humani cordis in malum prona sunt ab adolescentia sua." Cf. Gen. vi. 5; Matt. xv. 19.

³ Reminiscence of Jas. i. 17, *Vulg.* Note the ironic tone of "si, tamen, inter data optima," etc.

⁴ Ps. lxxiii. 12, *Vulg.*, with the substitution of "namque" for "autem."

⁵ Reminiscence of Eph. iv. 8, *Vulg.*

⁶ The present gifts become our merits "per liberam possessionem," i.e. in virtue of the fact that we freely choose to accept them, rather than to decline them. The future gifts of the state of glory, which crown our merits, are pledged to us, in virtue of God's fidelity to His promises, "per gratuitam sponsonem," and the more so because no external necessity compelled Him to promise them; what makes them "debita" is the internal necessity that God should not deny Himself by failing us; it belongs to His moral attribute of goodness to fulfil the work of our salvation. Cf. St. Chrysostom's striking paradox: Οὐ γὰρ οὕτω μέλει τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ αὐτῷ, ὥς τῆς σωτηρίας τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

these that Paul saith: "Ye have your fruit unto sanctification, but the end eternal life."¹ And again he saith: "And we ourselves who have the firstfruits of the Spirit . . . groan over our present state, waiting for the adoption of the sons of God";² meaning, by the firstfruits of the Spirit, sanctification, that is to say, the virtues in which we are at the present stage being sanctified by the Spirit in order that deservedly we may obtain the adoption.³ Again, in the Gospel the same promises are made to him that renounceth the world, where it is said: "He shall receive a hundredfold, and shall possess life eternal."⁴ And thus salvation is not wrought by man's free will, but by the Lord; nay, rather, He is Himself salvation, and the way unto salvation, Who saith: "I am the salvation of the people";⁵ Who showeth the road thereunto: "I am the way."⁶ He made Himself to be the way, Who was the salvation and the life, "in order that no flesh should glory."⁷

Exposit. in Ps. cxiii. 3. For *libera possessio* see St. Thom. *Summ. Theol.* II. (1), Qu. cxiii. Art. 3: "(Dens) ita infundit donum gratiae iustificantis, quod etiam simul cum hoc mouet liberum arbitrium ad donum gratiae acceptandum in his qui sunt huius motionis capaces."

¹ Rom. vi. 22, *Vulg.*

² St. Bernard reads "ingemiscimus" for the "intra nos gemimus" of Rom. viii. 23, *Vulg.*, and transposes "filiolum Dei" and "expectantes."

³ The virtues are essentially good habits. "Virtus est bona qualitas, seu habitus mentis, qua recte ninitur, et qua nullus male utitur" (St. Thom. *Summ. Theol.* II. (1), Qu. lv. Art. 4); they are therefore progressive, "uera uirtus finem nescit; tempore non clauditur" (St. Bern. *Epist.* ccliv. 2). They are the work of the Holy Ghost, and thus are identified with sanctification; St. Thomas (*ut supra*) speaks of a virtue as "quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur," safeguarding freedom of choice by the further statement "quod uirtus infusa causatur in nobis a Deo sine nobis agentibus, non tamen sine nobis consentientibus." Any distinction *in fact* between justification and sanctification is unsound. There is no holiness which is not righteousness.

⁴ Matt. xix. 29, *Vulg.*

⁵ For the Vulgate of Ps. xxxiv. 3: "Salus tua Ego sum."

⁶ John xiv. 6, *Vulg.*

⁷ 1 Cor. i. 29, *Vulg.*

If then the good things of the way are merits, even as the good things of the fatherland (to which we journey) are salvation and life, and if that be true which David saith : "There is none that doeth good, none save One only,"¹ save, that is to say, that One alone of whom it is also said, "None is good, save God alone" :² without doubt, in such case, both our works and His rewards are alike the gift of God, and He Who has made Himself a debtor in respect of the latter, has also made us meritorious in virtue of the former.³ Nevertheless He deigns to make use of the services of His creatures in establishing their merits, not on the ground of His standing in need of such services, but on the ground of their being of profit to His creatures.⁴

God, therefore, worketh their salvation, "whose names are in the book of life,"⁵ sometimes by means of the

¹ This is plainly St. Bernard's interpretation of the "non est usque ad unum" of the Vulgate of Ps. xiii. 1.

² The Vulgate of Mark x. 18, with the substitution of "solus" for "unus."

³ "Qui se fecit debitorem in illis, fecit et nos promeritores ex his." St. Bernard is always felicitous in his well-balanced statements of the doctrine of merit. See, e.g. *In Cant. Cant.*, lxi. 5 : "Meum proinde meritum, miseratio Domini. Non plane sum meriti inops, quamdiu ille miserationum non fuerit"; *ibid.*, lxviii. 6 : "Sufficit ad meritum scire quod non sufficiant merita. Sed ut ad meritum satis est de meritis non praesumere; sic carere meritis, satis ad iudicium est. . . . Felix ecclesia, cui nec merita sine praesumptione, nec praesumptio absque meritis deest. Habet unde praesumat, sed non merita; habet merita, sed ad promerendum, non ad praesumendum. Ipsum non praesumere, nonne promereri est? Ergo eo praesumit securius, quo non praesumit." For the relation of merit to free choice, see II. *supra* and Notes.

⁴ "Non quibus egeat, sed quibus per hoc, uel de quibus prosit." The passage is a little obscure. It would seem to mean that God's use of man's goodwill and corresponding good works, in establishing his merits, has in view man's own advantage, and by no means reflects upon the perfection of the divine self-sufficiency. This is, of course, true; but the statement is less theological than the "Qui fecit te sine te, non te iustificat sine te" of St. Augustine (Serm. xv, *De Verb. Apost.* 11). Further, were God, in working salvation, to dispense with man's free correspondence with grace, He would be undoing by recreation what He had done by creation; "sed potius per gratiam reparata natura" (St. August. *De Spir. et Litt.*, xxvii. 47).

⁵ Phil. iv. 3, *Vulg.*

creature without itself, at other times by means of the creature against itself, at other times by means of the creature with itself.¹ For, indeed, there are many things which minister to the salvation of men by means of insensible, and likewise by means of irrational, creatures, which I have spoken of as done without the creature for the reason that it cannot, for lack of understanding, be conscious of them. God also maketh many things of use for the salvation of many men by the instrumentality of the wicked, whether men or angels, who, since they do such service unwillingly, therefore act against themselves.² For while they take pleasure in desiring to do hurt, it is themselves who are as much hurt by their own wicked purpose as others are profited by their useful doings.³ And then those with whom, as well as by means of whom, God worketh are the good, whether angels or men, who alike do and will what God willeth. For in the case of those who consent in will to what they do in act, with them God expressly shareth the work which He hath in hand. Whence Paul, when he had narrated the many good things

¹ Cf. St. Paul's comprehensive phrase: "Diligentibus Deum omnia cooperantur in bonum" (Rom. viii. 28, *Vulg.*). This is consonant with his striking image of the ἀποκαταδoκία τῆς κτίσεως in Rom. viii. 19. The intimate association of man with nature is evidenced by the results of the Fall and involves the participation of nature in the new creation. Such an association is based upon man's dominion in the created world. See Westcott, *Gospel of Life*, pp. 241 *sqq.*, Ed. 1892.

² Cf. e.g. the cases of Pharaoh (Exod. ix. 16; Rom. ix. 17), of Balaam (Numb. xxii. 18; xxiv. 13), and of the Chaldeans (Hab. i. 6). For God's *iustissima ordinatio mali* see St. August. *De Continentia*, xv. "Tanta quippe est omnipotens eius bonitas, ut etiam de malis possit facere bona, siue ignoscendo, siue sanando, siue ad utilitates piorum cooptando et uertendo, siue etiam iustissime uindicando. Omnia namque ista bona sunt, et Deo bono atque omnipotente dignissima: nec tamen fiunt nisi de malis. . . . Saeuiunt suorum hostes: de illorum saeuitia facit martyres." See also Gen. i. 20, *Vulg.*: "Vos cogitastis de me malum: sed Deus uertit illud in bonum."

³ "Lacum aperuit, et effodit eum: et incidit in foveam, quam fecit. Conuertetur dolor eius in caput eius: et in uerticem ipsius iniquitas eius descendet." Ps. vii. 16, 17, *Vulg.*

which God, by his means, had done, saith: "Not I, but the grace of God which was with me."¹ He might have said, "by means of me," but, because that would have been too little, he preferred to say "with me"; representing himself to be not only a minister of the work by giving it effect, but also, by giving his consent, in a fashion a partner of Him that worketh it.²

Let us consider now, in respect of this threefold manner of God's working, which we have alleged, what it is that the creature in each case meriteth. The creature, indeed, by means of which, but without which, is done what is done, what can it merit? But what can that merit, against which it is done, except wrath? And what that, with which it is done, if not grace?³ Accordingly, in the first case no merits are gained; in the second evil merits; in the last good merits. For the beasts of the field, when by their means some good or evil resulteth, do not merit good or evil; in as much as they do not possess the power of consenting to good or evil. Much less do the stones merit, for they have not even sense-perception. On the other hand

¹ 1 Cor. xv. 10, *Vulg.*, omitting "autem."

² "Praesumens se non solum operis esse ministrum per effectum; sed et operantis quomodo socium per consensum." Cf. 1 Cor. iii. 9, "Dei enim sumus adiutores," and 2 Cor. vi. 1, "Adiuuantes autem exhortamur ne in uacuum gratiam Dei recipiatis"; the Θεοῦ συνεργοὶ of the former passage helping to interpret the συνεργούντες of the latter; see XIII. *infra*, p. 78.

³ Cf. Rom. ii. 5. "Thesaurizas tibi iram in die irae." For the contrary, see 1 Tim. vi. 17 *sqq.*: "Diuitibus . . . praecepe . . . thesaurizare sibi fundamentum bonum in futurum, ut apprehendant ueram uitam," which precisely defines the purpose of grace. It must be remembered that man cannot merit grace *sine habitu gratiae*; it is only a good work which is meritorious of anything other than wrath, and "omne bonum opus hominis procedit a prima gratia sicut a principio, non autem procedit a quocumque humano dono": the act of faith itself "consequitur primam gratiam; et ita non potest esse meritorius primae gratiae." Cf. St. Thom. II. (1), Qu. cxiv. Art. 5. But "quolibet actu meritorio," which *ex hypothesi* can only proceed from grace, "meretur homo augmentum gratiae, sicut et gratiae consummationem, quae est uita aeterna" (St. Thomas, *ut supra*, Art. 8).

the devil, or wicked men, seeing that with fulness of reason they thrive and keep their watch,¹ thereby indeed merit, yet naught else than punishment, for they dissent from the good. But Paul, who preacheth the Gospel willingly lest, were it unwillingly that he so did, he would merely have been entrusted with a stewardship,² and whoever is of like mind with him, seeing indeed that they obey with full consent of will, are well assured that there is laid up for them a crown of righteousness.³ God therefore useth, for the salvation of His own, the irrational, and likewise the insensible, creature, a beast of burden or a mere instrument, which, their work once done, shall be nowhere found.⁴ He useth the rational, but ill-willed, creature as it were as a rod of discipline which, when His child hath been corrected, He will cast into the fire as a useless twig. He useth both angels and men of good will as His comrades and allies, whom, the victory won, He will reward most abundantly.⁵ Finally, Paul also boldly proclaimeth concerning himself

¹ "Cum uigean et uigilent ratione." The phrase suggests that active machination of the evil will, in which advertence is at its height. Cf. 1 Pet. v. 8.

² Reminiscence of 1 Cor. ix. 17. St. Bernard's point is that the Apostle's work as that, not of a paid agent under material obligation only, but of an unpaid agent recognizing obligation in the moral sphere, is therefore meritorious. "Si enim uolens hoc ago, mercedem habeo : si autem inuitus, dispensatio mihi credita est" (*Vulg.*).

³ Reminiscence of 2 Tim. iv. 8, *Vulg.* "In reliquo reposita est mihi corona iustitiæ."

⁴ "Iumento uel instrumento, quæ iam expleto opere nusquam erunt." The Benedictine editor reads "tamquam" before "iumento," but the MSS. omit it: the omission seems to place "iumento" in exact apposition with "irrationabili creatura," and "instrumento" with "insensibili creatura."

⁵ The co-operation of Angels and men in the service of God is finely expressed in the Michaelmas Collect. But, in truth, there is a co-operation of all created life *ad salutem mundi*, based upon the fact that God is the *ultimus finis* of the whole. The end is the same, although to be reached diversely; in the case of rational creatures "cognoscendo et amando Deum; quod non competit aliis creaturis, quæ adipiscuntur ultimum finem, inquantum participant aliquam similitudinem Dei, secundum quod sunt, uel uiuunt, uel etiam cognoscunt." St. Thom. *Summ. Theol.* II. (I), Qu. i. Art. 8.

and others the like : "For we are God's fellow-helpers."¹ Accordingly God, of His lovingkindness, assigneth merits to man, whenever He deigneth, by his means and with his help, to work any good work. Hence is it that we presume to be God's fellow-helpers, fellow-labourers with the Holy Ghost, meritorious of the kingdom, because, in fact, by consent of will we are joined unto the divine will.

¹ "Coadiutores enim Dei sumus"; for the "Dei enim sumus adiutores" of 1 Cor. iii. 9, *Vulg.* See XIII. *supra*, p. 76, and XIV. *infra*, *ad fin.*

CHAPTER XIV

What part is to be assigned to grace, and what to free choice, in the work of salvation.

WHAT then? Is this, therefore, all that free choice doth in the matter? Is this its sole merit, to consent? Certainly it is. Not indeed that even the very act of consent, in which consisteth its entire merit, is of itself; since not so much as "to think" (which is less than to consent) "anything as of ourselves, are we of ourselves sufficient."¹ These are not my words, but the Apostle's, who attributeth to God, not to his own free choice, everything of good that can be, that is to say, to think, and "to will, and to do according to His good will."² If, therefore, God worketh in us these three, that is to say, to think, and to will, and to perform, what is good according to His good will; the first, assuredly, He doth without us, the second with us, and the third by means of us. For indeed, by sending us good thoughts, He preventeth us; by also changing our evil wills He joineth us to Himself through

¹ 2 Cor. iii. 5, *Vulg.*, with "sufficientes simus" transposed from the beginning to the end of the sentence. This, of course, is St. Thomas's doctrine that "omne bonum opus hominis procedit a prima gratia sicut a principio" (*Summ. Theol.* II. (1), Qu. cxiv. Art. 5). Elsewhere he states that "in eo qui habet usum liberi arbitrii non fit motio a Deo ad iustitiam absque motu liberi arbitrii; sed ita infundit donum gratiae iustificantis, quod etiam simul cum hoc mouet liberum arbitrium ad donum gratiae acceptandum in his qui sunt huius motionis capaces" (*Summ. Theol.* II. (1), Qu. cxiii. Art. 3).

² Phil. ii. 13, *Vulg.*

consent; and, by supplying to our consent the opportunity¹ of performance, by means of our manifest work He that worketh in us maketh Himself known outwardly.² Certainly we are by no means able to prevent ourselves. But He who findeth no one that is already good, saveth no one whom He doth not prevent.³ The beginning of our salvation is, therefore, without doubt from God; neither is it at all by our means, nor is it with our help.⁴ But the consent of the will and the work performed, although they do not originate from us, nevertheless are not without us. Thus neither the first, in which truly we

¹ "Facultatem." The Benedictine editor reads in a footnote: "Codices quidam addunt, *uel facilitatem*, quod scribis anceps esset lectio huius loci."

² A voluntary act always presupposes intellect, according to the Scholastic axiom, "*nihil uolunt, quin praecognitum*." Cf. St. Thom. *Summ. Theol.* I. Qu. lix. Art. 3. "Solum id quod habet intellectum, potest agere iudicio libero; inquantum cognoscit uniuersalem rationem boni, ex qua potest iudicare hoc uel illud esse bonum. Unde ubicumque est intellectus, est liberum arbitrium." We may, perhaps, find the distinction between *cogitare* and *uolle* in the language of Heb. iv. 12, "Sermo Dei . . . discretor cogitationum et intentionum cordis." St. Bernard insists strongly upon the divine source of *bonum cogitare*: "Cum ergo mala in corde uersamus, nostra cogitatio est: si bona, Dei sermo est. Illa cor nostrum dicit, haec audit. *Audiam, ait, quid loquatur in me Dominus Deus, quoniam loquetur pacem in plebem suam.*" *In Cant. Cant.*, xxxii. 5. Cf. *Ibid.*, 7. "Sciant inimici gratiae, absque gratia nec ad cogitandum bonum sufficere cor humanum, sed sufficientiam ipsius ex Deo esse: Dei uocem, bonum quod cogitatur, non cordis prolem existere."

³ *Praeuenire* is, of course, used technically of *Gratia Praeueniens*.

⁴ Cf. St. August. *De Nat. et Grat.* xxxi. 35. "Praeuenit autem ut sanemur, quia et subsequetur ut etiam sanati uegetemur; praue nit ut uocemur, subsequetur ut glorificemur; praue nit ut pie uiuamus, subsequetur ut cum illo semper uiuamus: quia sine illo nihil possumus facere. Utrumque enim scriptum est: et, *Deus meus, misericordia eius praue nit me*; et, *Misericordia tua subsequetur me per omnes dies uitae meae*." The *misericordia Dei* when *in actu* is grace. As regards (a) the divine *bonitas*, "magis proprium est Deo misereri et parcere, quam punire" (St. Thom. *Summ. Theol.* II. (2), Qu. xxi. Art. 2); as regards (b) the divine *omnipotentia*, *misericordia* is its supreme manifestation. "Misereri ponitur proprium Deo; et in hoc maxime dicitur eius omnipotentia manifestari." St. Thom. *ut supra*, Qu. xxx. Art. 4. Cf. the Collect for Trinity XI.

do nothing ;¹ nor the last, which unprofitable fear or damnable hypocrisy doth oftentimes extort from us ;² but the second only is reckoned unto us as meritorious. In fact good will alone sufficeth, the rest avail nothing, if it only be wanting, I should have said : They avail nothing to the agent, nor to the beholders.³ Accordingly the intention availeth for merit, the action for example ; the preventing thought availeth merely to excite them both.⁴

Let us then beware lest, when we perceive these things to be invisibly enacted within us and with our co-operation, we attribute them either to our own will, which is weak ; or to any external necessity imposed upon God, of which there is none ; and not to grace alone of which He is full.⁵ Grace it is which moveth free choice, when it soweth the seed of good thoughts ; which healeth it, when it changeth the disposition ;⁶ which strengtheneth it, when

¹ In all things creative, conservative and recreative, God is the *primum mouens*. St. Bernard is thinking of three stages, *bonum cogitare*, *bonum uelle* and *bonum perficere* ; it is not until the second stage, *bonum uelle*, that human co-operation arises, and it arises by consent of will, as an *actus elicited*, and is therefore meritorious ; the last stage, *bonum perficere*, as an *actus imperatus*, depends upon conditions controlled by divine providence.

² "Extorquet." The "ultimum" is, of course, *bonum perficere* ; and connecting this with what St. Bernard says, a few lines later, "ualet actio ad exemplum," the point *may be* that it often fails of its effect by reason either of the fear or of the hypocrisy of those to whom the good example is set. But this view is not taken in the text.

³ "Cernenti," *i.e.* the onlooker may profit by the good example, but in the absence of *bona uoluntas* there is no merit to the agent.

⁴ *Intentio* = *bonum uelle* ; *actio* = *bonum perficere* ; *praeueniens cogitatio* = *bonum cogitare* ; this latter, as "sine nobis . . . nec per nos utique, nec nobiscum," St. Bernard dignifies with an epithet proper to the work of grace in such a case. The Benedictine editor reads "excitandum," adding in the margin, "*al. exercitandum.*"

⁵ Cf. John i. 14. "Verbum . . . plenum gratiae et ueritatis." "In Christo per se et ueluti natiua, in aliis participatione tantum plena fuerit gratia." Maldonatus *in loc.*

⁶ "Affectum." Grace replaces the *prudencia carnis* by the *prudencia spiritus*. Cf. Rom. viii. 6. The Greek *φρόνημα* expresses the sphere of heart and of will, the sphere of practical interests. Cf. Liddon *in loc.* "Sentire et sapere hic actiones sunt non tam intellectus,

it persuadeth it to external action;¹ which keepeth it, so that it may not suffer failure. But grace worketh with free choice in such a manner that, while in the first instance it only preventeth it; afterwards it accompanieth it; indeed it preventeth free choice, to the very end that in the future it may co-operate with it.² Nevertheless, what has been begun by grace alone is in such fashion performed by grace and by free choice that in co-operation, not separately; at one and the same time,³ not by turns; the result is wrought by both of them. It is not that grace doeth part and free choice doeth part; but each doeth the entire work by its individual energy.⁴ Free choice, in

quam appetitus et voluntatis." Corn. à Lapide *in Rom.* viii. 5. See also St. Bern. *In Ascens. Dom. Serm.* iii. 2. "Duo ergo sunt quæ in nobis purganda sunt, intellectus et affectus; intellectus ut nouerit, affectus ut uelit."

¹ *I.e.* does all it can to the end that the *actus elicitus* may have its corresponding *actus imperatus*.

² It is God's prerogative to originate, man's privilege to correspond. See notes, pp. 72, 76, 79. *Omne bonum opus* has grace as its *principium*, in the first instance *gratia praeueniens*, subsequently *gratia efficax*. The *rationale* of grace and correspondence may be expressed somewhat thus: in its first approach to the soul, usually called *prima gratia*, grace moves the soul to pray, whether explicitly or implicitly, and the soul begins to merit; further grace is therefore granted to it, grace which relatively to the past is *efficax* and to the future is *praeueniens*. It should be noted that, while the final effect of grace is wrought upon the will, yet, as a means thereto, it also illuminates the intellect; in fact there is no department of man's being which lies outside its influence; it energizes the entire *ego*. Cf. St. August. *De Corr. et Grat.* ii. 3. "Intelligenda est gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum, qua sola homines liberantur a malo et sine qua nullum prorsus siue cogitando siue uolendo et amando siue agendo faciunt bonum, non solum ut monstrante ipsa quid faciendum sit sciant, uerum etiam ut praestante ipsa faciant cum dilectione, quod sciunt."

³ "Mixtim, non singillatim; simul, non uicissim."

⁴ This identification of grace and free choice *actu* (not *potentia*) is quite Scriptural, and may be illustrated by St. Paul's language in Gal. ii. 20. Cf. Moberly, *Atonement and Personality*, p. 255, Ed. 1901. "A Christian formula for the central conception of human personality. . . I, yet not I. Not I, and therefore I, the full, real consummated 'I' at last!" This is the paradox of a sound mysticism.

truth, doeth the entire work, and so also doth grace, but, even as the whole is done in the former (by co-operation), so is the whole done of the latter (by origination).¹

We believe that it pleaseth the reader that we nowhere depart from the teaching of the Apostle; and whithersoever the argument may have wandered, we have often made use of his very words. For what else do we mean than what he saith: "It is therefore neither of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy"?² Which indeed he saith, not as though any man can will or run in vain; but because he that willeth and runneth ought to glory, not in himself, but in Him from Whom he hath received the power to will and to run. In fine, he saith: "What hast thou which thou didst not receive?"³ Thou art created, thou art healed, thou art saved. Which of these, O man, originateth from thyself? Which of these is not impossible for free choice? Thou, who didst not exist, couldest not create thyself, nor, a sinner, couldest thou justify thyself, nor, when dead, couldest thou bring thyself again to life; so say nothing of other good things,⁴ which are either necessary to them that must be healed, or laid up in store for them that are to be saved. What we say is sufficiently plain as concerneth the first (creation) and the last (salvation). But concerning the intervening stage (justification) also no one doubteth, save he that, "knowing nothing of the righteousness of God, and willing to establish his own righteousness, is not subject to the

¹ "Sed ut totum in illo, sic totum ex illa."

² St. Bernard reads "Ergo neque" for the "Igitur non" of Rom. ix. 16, *Vulg.*

³ 1 Cor. iv. 7, *Vulg.*, omitting "autem." St. Bernard is anxious to correct any misunderstanding of his language, "totum singula opere individuo peragunt," and to emphasize the "totum ex illa," *i.e.* the divine origination.

⁴ The "Quod oculus non vidit, nec auris audiuit, etc.," of 1 Cor. ii. 9. Cf. Isa. lxiv. 4.

righteousness of God.”¹ What? Dost thou recognize the power of the Creator, the glory² of the Saviour, and yet knowest not the righteousness of the Healer? “Heal me,” saith (the prophet), “and I shall be healed; save me, and I shall be saved, for thou art my praise.”³ He recognized the righteousness of God, by Whom he hoped no less to be delivered from misery than to be healed of sin; and therefore rightly he concluded that it was God, and not himself, that was his praise.⁴ Wherefore David also, reiterating, saith: “Not unto us, O Lord, not unto us, but unto thy name give the glory”:⁵ for it was from God that he was looking for both robes, that is to say, the robe of righteousness and the robe of glory.⁶ Who is he that knoweth not the righteousness of God? He that counteth himself righteous. Who is he that counteth himself righteous? He that claimeth for himself merits from some other source than grace.⁷ Moreover He Who made that which should be saved, also gave the means whereby it

¹ The Vulgate of Rom. x. 3, in the singular, with “enim” omitted, “institiam” and “Dei” transposed, and “uolens constituere” for “quaerentes statuere.”

² The Benedictine editor reads in the margin “*al. gratiam.*”

³ Jer. xvii. 14, *Vulg.*, omitting “Domine.”

⁴ “Laus,” in the sense of the object to whom praise should be addressed. Cf. Deut. x. 21: “Ipse est laus tua, et Deus tua, qui fecit tibi haec magnalia et terribilia quae uiderunt oculi tui.” For the praise due to God for His grace, see St. Bern. *In Cant. Cant. Serm.* xiii. 7. “Omnis igitur de bonis multiformis gratiae apparentis in nobis referatur ad ipsum laus, laudabilium siquidem uniuersorum auctorem et largitorem.”

⁵ Ps. cxiii. 9, *Vulg.*

⁶ For a striking comparison between *delictum* and *institia*, emphasizing both the gratuity of the latter and our own property in the possession of it, see St. Bern. *De Error. Abel.* vi. 16. “Quae ergo mihi iustitia facta est, mea non est? Si mea traducta culpa, cur non et mea indulta iustitia? Et sane mihi tutior donata, quam innata. Nam ista quidem gloriam habet, sed non apud Deum: illa autem, cum sit salutis efficax, materiam non habet gloriandi, nisi in Domino.”

⁷ “Nullis meritis gratiam praeuenientibus, debetur merces bonis operibus si fiant: sed gratia quae non debetur praecedit ut fiant.” *Concil. Arausican. Sec. Canon XVIII.*

may be saved. He, I mean, Who made those to whom merits should be granted, Himself grants them. "What," saith (the Psalmist), "shall I give back unto the Lord for all that he hath" not "given," but "given back unto me?"¹ Both that he existeth, and that he is righteous, he confesseth to be from God;² lest, by denying one or the other, he should destroy them both, losing, indeed, the means whereby he is righteous, and thus dooming that which he is.³ But, so confessing, now in the last place⁴ he findeth that which in his turn he should repay: "I will receive," he saith, "the cup of salvation."⁵ The cup of salvation is the blood of the Saviour. Therefore, if there wholly lacketh thee, of thine own, anything which thou mayst repay even for the second gifts of God bestowed upon thee,⁶ whence dost thou provide thyself with salvation? "I will call," saith he, "upon the name of the Lord";⁷ upon which, undoubtedly, "whosoever calleth shall be saved."⁸

¹ Ps. cxv. 12, *Vulg.*

² The argument is that it belongs to the goodness and omnipotence of God to provide the means of recreating what He has once created. Cf. St. Athan. *De Incarn. Verbi*. vi. *passim*. Οὐκ ἄξιον γὰρ ἦν τῆς ἀγαθότητος τοῦ Θεοῦ τὰ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γενόμενα διαφθεῖρεσθαι, διὰ τὴν παρὰ τοῦ διαβόλου γενομένην τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀπάτην . . . Ἀσθένεια γὰρ μᾶλλον καὶ οὐκ ἀγαθότης ἐκ τῆς ἀμελείας γινώσκεται τοῦ Θεοῦ, εἰ ποιήσας παρορᾷ φθαρῆναι τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον, ἥπερ εἰ μὴ πεποιθήκε κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν τὸν ἄνθρωπον . . . Οὐκοῦν ἔδει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους μὴ ἀφίεσθαι φέρεσθαι τῇ φθορᾷ, διὰ τὸ ἀπρεπὲς καὶ ἀνάξιον εἶναι τοῦτο τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ ἀγαθότητος.

³ "Amittendo utique unde iustus est, et sic damnando quod est"; *i.e.* his self-righteousness would deprive him of grace, and the loss of grace would mean the death of his soul.

⁴ "Vel tertio loco"; *tertius* as compared with "quod est, et quod iustus est." He recognizes, first, his existence as from God; next, his righteousness as from God; and third and last, what is due from himself to God, which is simply to accept salvation.

⁵ Ps. cxv. 13, *Vulg.*

⁶ *I.e.* the gifts of recreation and of all that it implies. *Vel (even)* has the force of "to say nothing of creation."

⁷ Ps. cxv. 13, *Vulg.*

⁸ "Omnis enim, quicumque invocaverit nomen Domini, saluus erit." Rom. x. 13 *Vulg.* This, namely, *saluus esse*, is the third gift, pointed to by the "tertio loco" above.

Therefore, they who are possessed of true wisdom confess a threefold operation, not indeed of free choice (as the agent), but of Divine grace in, or concerning, free choice. The first is creation; the second, reformation; the third, consummation. For first we were created in Christ unto freedom of will;¹ secondly, we were reformed through Christ unto the spirit of freedom;² lastly, we are to be consummated together with Christ unto the state of eternal life:³ inasmuch as that which did not exist needed to be created in Him who existed;⁴ the deformed to be reformed by means of the Form Himself;⁵ it needed that the members should not be made perfect save only in union with the Head. Which last result will then indeed be brought to completion when "we shall all attain unto a perfect man, unto the measure of age of the fulness of

¹ This is creation through the Divine Word, by virtue of which in the *status innocentiae* man's will was possessed of the gifts of *posse non peccare*, and *posse non turbari*, i.e. of *liberum consilium* and *liberum complacitum* in their inferior degrees. Cf. VII. *supra*. It has been thought better, in spite of a certain awkwardness of phrase, to translate "reformatio" and "consummatio" literally here; they belong to St. Bernard's technology. The MSS. omit "sumus" here, and read simply "creati."

² Probably we should understand by this "the freedom of the Spirit," the *libertas gratiae*. Cf. 2 Cor. iii. 17. "Ubi autem Spiritus Domini: ibi libertas." See also X. *supra*.

³ This, the *libertas gloriae*, "nobis reservatur in patria," implying *non posse peccare* and *non posse turbari*. Cf. IV. and VII. *supra*. See also Rom. viii. 21.

⁴ The Benedictine editor reads: "In illo creari oportuit qui erat; per formam reformari, etc.," and gives the following footnote: "Ita scripti nostri tres: Horstio sic: *in illo creari oportuit: quod erat per formam reformari, etc.*, sed mendosa lectio et interpunctio." The "qui erat" recalls the "In principio erat verbum" of John i. 1, and the *esse* is, of course, the divine *vita in Semetipso* (John v. 26). The MSS. support the Benedictine reading.

⁵ Cf. X. *supra*: "Venit ergo ipsa forma, cui conformandum erat liberum arbitrium," and Notes. Cf. the *χωρὶς ἐμοῦ* of John xv. 5. With this *χωρὶς ἐμοῦ* of grace corresponds the *χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ἐν ὃ γέγονεν* of creation (John i. 3). See also Col. i. 28: "Ut exhibeamus omnem hominem perfectum in Christo Iesu."

Christ;¹ when Christ appearing, who is our life, we also shall appear with Him in glory.”² Seeing then that the consummation hath to be wrought concerning us, or even in us, though not by us; whereas the creation hath been wrought also without us; that alone, which on account of our free consent is in a certain manner wrought with us, namely, our reformation, will be reckoned unto us as meritorious. This consisteth of our fasts, our vigils, our continence, our works of mercy, and the rest of our virtuous practices, by means of which it is plainly evident that “our inward man is renewed from day to day”:³ while the mind,⁴ bowed under worldly cares, little by little riseth again from depths to heights, and the affection, languishing in fleshly lusts, gradually gaineth strength for spiritual love; and the memory, fouled by the infamy of ancient deeds, now clothed in the white robe of good works, daily groweth joyous.⁵ For it is in these three things that interior renewal

¹ Eph. iv. 13, *Vulg.*, reading “omnes occurremus” for “occurramus omnes.”

² Col. iii. 4, *Vulg.*, reading “apparente Christo” for “cum Christus apparuerit,” and “apparebimus et nos” for “tunc et uos apparebitis.”

³ 2 Cor. iv. 16, *Vulg.*, with the substitution of “interiorem hominem nostrum” for “is, qui intus est,” and “renouari” for “renouatur.” For man’s work in justification, and for the value of virtuous acts, see St. August. *Serm.* xv. *De Verb. Apost.* 11. “Esse potest iustitia Dei sine uoluntate tua, sed in te esse non potest praeter uoluntatem tuam . . . Qui fecit te sine te, non te iustificat sine te. Ergo fecit nescientem, iustificat uolentem.” Cf. Eph. ii. 10. “Ipsius enim sumus factura, creati in Christo Iesu in operibus bonis (ἐπὶ ἔργοις ἀγαθοῖς), quae prae-parauit Deus ut in illis ambulemus.”

⁴ Earlier in this chapter *intentio*, as compared with *actio*, is used more strictly for the will, but here, and in the next sentence, St. Bernard uses the word apparently somewhat in the sense of φρόνησις. Cf. *supra*, “Affectum” and Note. See also a fine passage in Arist. *Eth. Nic.* VI. 5, on φρόνησις as a πρακτικὴ ἔξις. Λοκεῖ δὴ φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς βουλευσασθαι περὶ τὰ αὐτῶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ συμφέροντα, οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ποῖα πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἢ ἰσχὺν, ἀλλὰ ποῖα πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν.

⁵ For St. Bernard’s strong sense of memory, as the deposit of the past, see *De Conuersione ad Cler.* xv. Even when the will has changed its direction, and the fleshly appetites have been reduced to submission, “tertium adhuc, idque grauissimum restat, de purganda scilicet memoria, et exhaurienda sentina.” It is the work of grace, in

consisteth ; that is to say, in rectitude of mind, in purity of affection, and in the remembrance of good works by means of which memory shineth ever fairer in the consciousness of well-doing.

But, seeing that it is certain that these things are wrought in us by the Spirit,¹ they are the gifts of God : yet, because they are accompanied by the consent of our will, they are our merits. "For," saith He, "it is not ye that speak, but the Spirit of your Father that speaketh in you,"² and the Apostle asketh : "Do ye seek a proof of Him that speaketh in me, even Christ?"³ If, therefore, Christ, or the Holy Spirit, speaketh in Paul, doth He not also in the same way work in him? "For I do not speak," saith he, "of the things which God doth not work through me."⁴ What then? If both the words and the works are not Paul's, but God's, Who speaketh in Paul or worketh through Paul ; wherefore, in such case, are the merits Paul's? Wherefore is it that he so confidently affirmed : "I have fought the good fight, I have finished the course, I have kept the faith : henceforth there is laid up for me the crown of righteousness, which the Lord, the righteous judge, shall give to me at that day"?⁵ Was it, perchance, that he was assured that the crown was laid up for him, because it was through him that those deeds were done? But many good things are done by means of the wicked, whether angels or men ;

the remission of sins, not to destroy, but to purify memory, "ut quod prius inesse pariter et inficere consuevisset, sic de caetero insit memoriae, ut eam nullatenus decoloret."

¹ St. Bernard has here "spiritu," without the preposition proper to the living agent ; nevertheless it has seemed better to translate as has been done.

² Matt. x. 20, *Vulg.*

³ 2 Cor. xiii. 3, *Vulg.*, transposing "quaeritis" and "eius."

⁴ "Non enim loquor quae per me non efficit Deus." Cf. Rom. xv. 18, *Vulg.* "Non enim audeo aliquid loqui eorum, quae per me non efficit Christus, etc."

⁵ 2 Tim. iv. 7 *sq.*, *Vulg.*, exactly, with the exception of "de reliquo" for "in reliquo."

yet they are not reckoned unto them as meritorious.¹ Or was it rather because they were done with him, that is to say, with his good will? ² "For," saith he, "if I preach the gospel unwillingly, a stewardship hath been entrusted to me, but if willingly, I have whereof to glory."³

Moreover, if not so much as the very will, on which dependeth all merit, is from Paul himself; on what ground doth he speak of the crown, which he believeth to be laid up for him, as a crown of righteousness?⁴ Is it because whatsoever is even freely promised is yet asked for justly and as a matter of due?⁵ Finally he saith: "I know Whom I have believed, and I am persuaded that He is able to

¹ Such are the things which God does "per creaturam contra ipsam." Cf. XIII. *supra* and Notes.

² "Famem et sitim et caeteras molestias corporales, absit ut dicamus necessitatem habere peccandi, quibus molestiis exercitata uita iustorum splendidius enituit, et eas per patientiam superando maiorem gloriam comparauit; sed adiuta gratia Dei, adiuta Spiritu Dei, adiuta misericordia Dei; non superba uoluntate se extollens, sed humili confessione fortitudinem promerens." St. August. *De Nat. et Grat.* xxiii. 25. How applicable are St. Augustine's words here to St. Paul's life, and to the estimate which he formed of it!

³ A reminiscence, with an inference, of 1 Cor. ix. 16, 17, *Vulg.* Cf. XIII. *supra ad fin.* and Notes. St. Bernard infers here, as there, that St. Paul claims merit on the ground that he ministers solely in recognition of moral obligation, and not under any external necessity of so doing.

⁴ *I.e.* if the statements of Rom. xv. 18 and 2 Cor. xiii. 3 are to be held to invalidate the "Bonum certamen certavi" (2 Tim. iv. 7), as an act of St. Paul's own free will, how can a reward be justly due to him? "Ubi libertas non est, nec meritum" (II. *supra*).

⁵ The answer "yes," is, of course, understood. A promise is a unilateral contract imposing an obligation, and God cannot fail in such a case. St. Paul has a very strong sense of the divine *πρωτότης* in the moral government of the universe. Cf. *e.g.* 1 Cor. i. 9, and x. 13. St. Bernard understands the genitive "iustitiae" as predicating of the crown that it is justly due to the Apostle. See St. Bern. *In Cant. Cant. Serm.* lxxviii. 6. "Nam et de meritis quid sollicita sit, cui de proposito Dei firmior suppetit securiorque gloriandi ratio? Non potest seipsum negare Deus, neque non facere quae iam fecit, ut scriptum est, qui fecit quae futura sunt. Faciet, faciet, nec deserit suo proposito Deus. Sic non est quod iam quaeras, quibus meritis speremus bona, praesertim cum audias apud Prophetam: *Non propter uos, sed propter me ego faciam, dicit Dominus.*" Cf. Ezek. xxxvi. 22.

keep that which I have intrusted unto Him.”¹ The promise of God he calls his deposit; and because he believed Him that promised, he asketh for the fulfilment of the promise. What was indeed promised in mercy is yet due in justice. Thus it is a crown of righteousness that Paul expecteth; but of God’s righteousness; not of his own. It is forsooth just that God should pay what He oweth; but it is what He hath promised that He oweth. This then is the righteousness upon which the Apostle presumeth, namely, God’s fulfilment of His promise; lest, if, disdaining this righteousness, he would establish his own, he be not subject to the righteousness of God; ² when it was all the while God’s will that he should be partaker of His righteousness, in order that He might also make him meritorious of a crown. For He constituted him partaker of His righteousness, and meritorious of a crown, when He deigned to take him as His fellow-worker³ in the works as a reward for which the crown of righteousness was laid up. Further He made him His fellow-worker, when He made him His willing worker,⁴ that is to say, consentient with His will. Accordingly the will is held to be God’s aid; the aid it gives is held to be meritorious. If then, in such a case, the will is from God, so also is the merit. Nor is there any doubt but that both to will, and to perform according to the good will, are from God.⁵ God therefore is the author

¹ 2 Tim. i. 12, *Vulg.*, omitting “enim.” *Depositum*, Gk. παραθήκη.

² A reminiscence of Rom. x. 3, *Vulg.*, where the “suam iustitiam,” as explained by Phil. iii. 9, is the “iustitiam, quae ex lege est,” which, as St. Augustine says (*De Grat. et Lib. Arb.* xii. 24), is spoken of as a man’s own (*suam*), “quia sua uoluntate legem se posse putabat implere sine adiutorio gratiae.”

³ For “coadiutorem.” See XIII. *supra ad fin.* and Notes.

⁴ We must not read any notion of external compulsion into “fecit uolentem”; it would be a *contradictio in adiectis* so to do; the result was simply brought about by divine grace; it is the *uolle bonum* which, “ut proficiat, saluans gratia facit.” See VI. *supra*.

⁵ Cf. Rom. vii. 18, and Notes on *uerum sapere* and *plenum posse*, VI. *supra*.

of merit, who both applieth the will to the work, and supplieth to the will the fulfilment of the work.¹ Besides, what are called our merits may be properly described as seed-plots of hope, incentives to love, tokens of a hidden predestination, foretastes of future felicity, the way by which we reach the kingdom, not the moving cause of our kingship. In a word, not them whom He found righteous, but them whom He made righteous, did God also magnify.²

¹ "Qui et uoluntatem applicat operi, et opus explicat uoluntati." The Benedictine editor reads here in the margin, "*al. uoluntatis.*"

² A reminiscence of Rom. viii. 30, *Vulg.*, with "*magnificauit*" for "*glorificauit*," a passage which is retrospective upon the spiritual history, *à parte Dei*, of the blessed. The phrase "*occultae praedestinationis indicia*" would simply suggest that, while none can be assured of glory while still on probation, all may find, in the fact that God crowns correspondence with fresh grace, proof that, so far as He is concerned, His work will be completed; "God will not drop His work by the way" (Gore, *Epist. to the Ephes.* p. 67, Ed. 1898). It is to be noted that St. Bernard has no idea of a mere forensic justification. God can only *call* righteous those whom He has already *made* righteous.

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